HIGHLIGHTING ABYEI IN US-SUDAN BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000770

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC
FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2012
TAGS: KPKO MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF PREL EAID SU
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTING ABYEI IN US-SUDAN BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 762

B. KHARTOUM 745

C. KHARTOUM 737

D. KHARTOUM 529

E. KHARTOUM 524

F. KHARTOUM 508

G. KHARTOUM 507

H. KHARTOUM 313

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. This is an action message. Please see para 6.


2. (C) Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
their tribal surrogates and the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) and their proxies over the disputed oil-rich area
of Abyei claimed more lives and displaced more people this
week than fighting in Darfur over the past two months. This
fighting and the tortuous and acrimonious negotiation between
the two parties in lieu of full implementation of the Abyei
Protocol of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
threatens to re-ignite the North-South conflict which will
certainly lead to a worsening political and humanitarian
situation across Sudan, including Darfur, and could
conceivably drag in several of Sudan's neighbors into a wider
conflict.


3. (C) With high-level US discussions set to resume with the
Sudanese regime, it is imperative that Abyei be near the top
of that agenda for discussion. Abyei can not only affect the
future of the CPA but will also drag Darfur into it as the
NCP and SPLM look for allies in a potential confrontation.
Previous discussion and non-papers with the Sudanese focused
on three points regarding Abyei: the need for an interim
administration, a call for UNMIS to patrol unhindered, and a
willingness from the U.S. to engage further should both
parties wish it. These are still sound steps but clearly not
enough with a worsening humanitarian crisis and hardening of
polarized positions on both sides - our previous suggestions
are Band-Aids on a festering wound - when what is needed is
for the NCP and SPLM to come to a mutually acceptable
compromise cleaving as closely as possible to the Abyei
Protocol and to do so as soon as possible without the
possibility of the issue dragging on interminably as it has
now for three years.


4. (C) Abyei is "America's protocol" as it was proposed as a
compromise by then Special Envoy Jim Danforth to ensure the
signing of the peace accord ending the longest running civil
war in Africa. It is the only one of the CPA's protocols
which has not been implemented at all. The Abyei Boundary
Commission's recommendation was summarily rejected by
President Al-Bashir in August 2005 as "exceeding its
mandate." Even if the United States wanted to, we cannot
walk away from Abyei because the SPLM will not do so. At some
point, their patience will be exhausted and then they will
try the one card they have not openly used in Abyei -
military escalation (in violation of the CPA, in an area
technically in "North" Sudan). To date, the CPA has frayed
but not broken and this step would be a fateful one. Both the
NCP and SPLM are courting the Misseriyya Arabs to join in on
their side in this struggle for land, oil and political
power. Darfur rebel groups like JEM, which launched a bold
attack on the Khartoum suburb of Omdurman, also look to
spread their influence to the Misseriyya and across Kordofan.
The SPLM will also walk away from bilateral discussions with
the U.S. and NCP, sooner or later, if Abyei is not addressed.


5. (C) Along with Chad, UNAMID deployment, IDPs, and
humanitarian access, Abyei is an issue that must be seriously
addressed in the next round of US-Sudanese discussions. As
the February 2008 US non-paper noted in its introduction,
"Sudan is looked at holistically, you cannot have an
improvement in the situation in Darfur with a deterioration
in Abyei." This is exactly where the inertia of past
discussions will take us if we allow it.


6. (C) The United States must clearly put down as a marker in
the next round that without a real solution to Abyei there
cannot be a tangible, sustained improvement in bilateral
relations. Such a solution would have the following elements:

-- An interim administration to be set up per the CPA within
a specific timeframe.

-- Unfettered UNMIS patrolling in the greater Abyei area.


KHARTOUM 00000770 002 OF 002


-- A commitment by both sides to avoid incitement.

-- The SAF 31st Brigade should be moved out of the cantonment
it currently occupies in a girls' school in the center of
Abyei town.

-- Agreement to release oil revenues intended for the
Misseriyya and Ngok Dinka, per the Abyei protocol.

-- Agreement on interim Abyei borders between the SPLM and
NCP within 30 days of US-Sudanese discussion on this matter
during the next visit of the Special Envoy to Sudan.

-- If no agreement after 30 days, this decision should be
arbitrated by the United States with the decision binding on
both parties.


7. (C) Given the regime's fragile state after a Darfuri rebel
raid that almost reached across the Nile to Khartoum, now is
the best time to forcefully and clearly make such a gambit.
The Sudanese have been expecting it and while it would be
comforting to keep saying "just wait for the parties to solve
it," we just do not have that luxury anymore, if we ever did.
While many procedural issues cry out for American attention,
this is a substantive challenge that must be addressed. The
Sudanese regime, the NCP in particular, while naturally
treacherous and suspicious, is also eager for a real dialogue
with the U.S. that leads to a tangible improvement in
relations. Just like accelerated and expanded UNAMID
deployment, Abyei needs to be part of our price for
considering such a relationship.
FERNANDEZ