ISMAIL: CHADIAN MILITARY ESCALATION RISKS PUSHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000074

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON,
IO, D, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS
TO USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL AU UN CD SU
SUBJECT: ISMAIL: CHADIAN MILITARY ESCALATION RISKS PUSHING
SUDAN TO WAR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 035

B. NDJAMENA 018

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail warned of
growing Sudanese exasperation at what they see as Chadian
military escalation on the Darfur border. He also expressed
Sudanese frustration at obstacles to Sudanese diplomats
performing their work in the U.S. and warned of possible
counter measures affecting American diplomats in Sudan. He
echoed regime suspicion of the newly appointed US Special
Envoy to Sudan Ambassador Richard Williamson based on the
written record. End summary.

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CHADIAN WAR FEVER
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2. (C) Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismail told
CDA Fernandez on January 19 that repeated Chadian aerial
bombardment of Sudanese territory in West Darfur (which has
killed and injured Sudanese military and civilians in
addition to Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum) represents
a qualitative escalation in tension and aggression by the
Deby Government and "risks provoking a Sudanese armed
response if the Chadians continue bombing us." Ismail said
that President Al-Bashir is "not just a politician but a
military man" who will respond in kind to continued Chadian
aggression. Ismail added that increased tensions between the
two neighbors would not bode well for the rapid deployment of
UNAMID (in Darfur) and EUFOR (in Chad). He asked that the
United States weigh in with Chad, France and Libya on
reducing tensions and getting the Chadians to stop their
cross border bombing. He noted sarcastically that Chad was in
lockstep with Sudanese Darfur rebel Khalil Ibrahim "who has
been sanctioned by you, the Americans", for obstructing the
peace process in Darfur. He contrasted "American and western
silence" on Chad's military moves with the "exaggerated
response" to an exchange of fire between Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) and a UNAMID convoy.


3. (C) Dr. Ismail said that both Sudan and Chad support each
others rebels, "we all know that" but the latest repeated
bombing runs by the Chadians was a "qualitative change" in
the status quo. Charge Fernandez countered that many,
including President Deby, may believe that the Sudanese
(military and intelligence) were behind the bloody offensive
launched in late 2007 by Chadian rebels seeking to overthrow
Deby. Ismail said that this accusation of Sudanese
interference was true before the May 2007 agreement between
Chad and Sudan brokered by Saudi King Abdullah but "we are
not doing that anymore."

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STICKS RATHER THAN CARROTS FOR THE AMERICANS
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4. (C) Moving to bilateral relations, Ismail said that the
Sudanese were seriously considering imposing a monthly
surcharge of thousands of dollars on the US Embassy in
Khartoum as a response as a response to the monthly bank
surcharge of $3,000 that Khartoum's mission in Washington
must pay. He said some senior officials want to close the
Sudanese Embassy in Washington because of "continued American
harassment" as a result of US sanctions on Sudan. This
monthly irritant directly affected Sudanese flexibility on
the building of the Khartoum NEC. CDA responded that every
time we talk to the GOS about the NEC there is a new excuse
or reason for the delay: a mortgage for the Washington
embassy, sanctions, and now this surcharge issue. Ismail
cheerfully countered that indeed the real problem was the
poor state of relations but recalled several years ago when
he tried to get the US to reverse a 25 mile from Washington
limit for Sudanese diplomats, "I tried with Colin Powell and
with Zoellick" but was only able to get a positive American
response when Sudan began restricting American diplomats to
travel only 25 miles from Khartoum. CDA said that the NEC
issue was a security issue first and foremost and Sudan's
refusal to allow us to finish the new building puts our
people at risk from Al-Qa'ida style terrorism we have seen in
places like Jeddah, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.


5. (C) CDA asked Ismail about the recent appointment of
notorious janjawid leader Musa Hilal as a government advisor.

KHARTOUM 00000074 002 OF 002


Ismail defended the appointment noting that the US had called
for greater inclusion of Arab tribes into the Darfur
political process and that former SE Natsios and Embassy
officials had met with Hilal in late 2006 in South Darfur.
CDA Fernandez agreed that incorporating Darfuri Arab voices
into the mix was the right thing to do but hoped such
inclusion would look to credible leaders beyond militia
commanders like Hilal.

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SPECIAL ENVOYS - PAST AND PRESENT
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6. (C) Ismail continued by describing the view in the senior
ranks of the Sudanese Government that former Special Envoy
Natsios "was fired because he had moderated his views on
Darfur." Natsios had called for pressure on Darfur rebels
(especially Abdul Wahid Nur),had begun to understand the
complexity of the reality on the ground in Darfur and in
Sudan as a whole and he had seen that the situation in Darfur
had "greatly improved and that there was no genocide today."
for these reasons "the hawks in Washington had forced him
out." CDA corrected Ismail noting that Natsios had resigned,
he had not been fired or forced out.


7. (C) Ismail said that the Sudanese leadership had a big
file on new SE Williamson and "none of it gives us much
hope." He said that Ambassador Williamson had called the
violence in Darfur "genocide," and had advocated in writing a
no-fly zone and US military intervention in Sudan. CDA
responded that the President had also called the violence in
Darfur "genocide" but that official American analysis did not
preclude the US seeking a negotiated solution to Darfur's
problems. He urged that Sudan should keep an open mind on
Williamson. Ismail agreed and suggested that either a
detailed road map on step by step confidence building
measures between the two countries be worked out before
Williamson's visit or that he come prepared for such
discussions. "We can solve our problems but we both need to
be precise about what needs to change and how exactly to go
about it," he remarked.


8. (C) Comment: UN Special Envoy Eliasson later on January 19
echoed the concern about rising tensions between Chad and
Sudan he had heard from other Sudanese officials so this is a
message the regime is eager to get out. The claim by Ismail,
however, that Sudan ceased its aggressive support for Chadian
rebels after the May 2007 agreement is preposterous (Chadian
and Libyan support for Sudanese Darfuri rebels has also
continued unabated since then). While Ismail's call for a
US-Sudan "roadmap" is a common refrain that suits the mindset
of a regime that loves form over substance and process over
results, it is true that a clear and concise understanding of
what exactly is most important to us, and what incentives and
pressures we are prepared to use, is an important
prerequisite to success in talking to the Sudanese regime.
End comment.
FERNANDEZ