Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM734
2008-05-14 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN'S MESSAGE TO U.S., FOLLOWING

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO AU UNSC SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4260
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0734/01 1351506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141506Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0814
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000734 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, SE
WILLIAMSON, NEA, IO, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN'S MESSAGE TO U.S., FOLLOWING
CHADIAN-SUPPORTED DARFUR REBEL RAID

REF: A. KHARTOUM 732

B. KHARTOUM 727

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000734

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, SE
WILLIAMSON, NEA, IO, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN'S MESSAGE TO U.S., FOLLOWING
CHADIAN-SUPPORTED DARFUR REBEL RAID

REF: A. KHARTOUM 732

B. KHARTOUM 727

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) CDA Fernandez met Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa
Othman Ismail on May 14 at NCP HQ shortly after Ismail
received his diplomatic marching orders from President
Al-Bashir (Note: Sudan's Foreign Minister, Deng Alor, belongs
to the SPLM and Ismail is Al-Bashir's and the ruling National
Congress Party's (NCP) chief foreign policy advisor. Alor is,
in any case, unavailable in Juba at the SPLM National
Convention).


2. (C) CDA Fernandez noted some strange calls at a peaceful
rally held by the NCP earlier in the day to denounce Chad and
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. These included "Khalil is a
Zionist and Crusader Agent" (also the catchy, rhyming in
Arabic, chant - "Deby, Khalil, you cowards, Al-Bashir is on
the field"). Ismail laughed noting that "people get carried
away at rallies." Ismail said that Sudan had four serious
points to communicate urgently to the United States on the
current crisis. First, Sudan was grateful for the position of
the United States and also for the U.S. position at the UN
Security Council on the JEM attack in Omdurman.


3. (C) Second, there was "absolutely no doubt of Chadian
involvement" in the invasion. Sudan is indeed ready to
respond to Chad's provocation. Khalil had started his
misadventure with 309 brand new four wheel drive vehicles,
each with 7-12 men, he now has 9 vehicles with him. He was
back in Darfur seeking to escape and calling the Chadians to
extract him by air. That is the reason the Sudanese had
temporarily suspended UNAMID flights, "our radar is not as
advanced as yours," and the Sudanese would like to shoot down
any such attempt to rescue Khalil Ibrahim and also don't want
to shoot down any UN aircraft by mistake.


4. (C) Sudan is ready to forgo retaliation if Chad stops
interfering in Darfur and supporting Khalil Ibrahim. Chad

should not rescue Khalil or offer him safehaven, those steps
are further clear evidence, if any was needed, of Chadian
complicity. For the sake of regional peace and security,
Sudan was willing to reject revenge and break the circle of
retaliation if the United States could deliver on these
points but thought that it was unlikely given the intimate
relationship of JEM with the Deby regime. CDA responded that
obviously Sudan would try to utilize this incident in its
favor but should be extremely careful about not igniting a
wider regional conflagration. There was some sympathy
internationally for Sudan right now but that would dissipate
immediately if Sudan did anything that caused further misery
in Darfur or Chad.


5. (C) The third point was that Sudan will now consider the
JEM - Khalil Ibrahim faction as a terrorist organization and
will not deal with it. Hundreds of people died in the attack
on Omdurman, many of them civilians. Ismail noted that the
"terrorist label" only applied to Khalil's faction not to
SLM-Abdul Wahid Nur or even JEM splinters like JEM-CL or
other Zaghawa-led groups. Khalil will be tried in absentia
and Sudan will ask European countries who harbor JEM-Khalil
leaders to expel them or treat them as terrorists. He had
just informed the UK Ambassador of this decision.

6. (C) The fourth point is that Sudan is ready "more than
ever" to find a peaceful, political solution to Darfur and
welcomes the bilateral help of the United States and the
multilateral help of the UN/AU team. It means that Sudan
wants to respond favorably to American concerns on
accelerated UNAMID deployment, enhanced humanitarian access
and political steps to be taken. Al-Bashir would be speaking
to the Sudanese National Assembly in about a week and that
could be an opportunity to take about a positive way forward
(Note: Or to declare war on Chad. End note). Ismail suggested
that SE Williamson come to Sudan as soon as possible but no
later than late May/early June.


7. (C) Ismail said that Sudan would soon be giving Western
diplomats a direct opportunity to talk to the many JEM child
soldiers they had captured, "we don't know what to do with
them." CDA Fernandez asked about Libya's role and Ismail
said that Al-Bashir was so furious that he had rejected 10
attempts by Qaddafi to phone him and still hasn't done so.
Al-Bashir reluctantly met with the Libyan SG of CEN-SAD
(Community of Sahel-Saharan States) but it was more a photo

KHARTOUM 00000734 002 OF 002


op than a meeting as the President did not want to talk.
Sudan would not talk publicly about the Libyan role but their
involvement was clear.


8. (C) Comment: The Sudanese regime, although embarrassed
militarily, has reaped some political benefit from this
crisis. It caused the political leadership across the
spectrum to close ranks in defending the motherland. Khalil
Ibrahim is a rather unsavory character - not surprisingly
since he is cut from the same jib as his enemies in the NCP -
and many in Khartoum resent the violence and uncertainty he
visited on the capital's twin city. There seems little doubt
that the Sudanese will respond militarily somehow to Chad as
long as the Chadians maintain that intimate link with Khalil
Ibrahim. Meanwhile, the Sudanese regime is clearly basking in
some unaccustomed international solidarity, especially by
countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia, who are nervous about
the arrogant Islamist Khalil Ibrahim's links with not only
Chad, but libya and, supposedly, Eritrea. If this does lead
to a wider conflagration, Ibrahim clearly hopes to continue
fishing in troubled waters that could lead him - not to peace
in Darfur - but to ruling in Khartoum, visiting further
disasters on the long-suffering Sudanese people. Clearly the
time for the United States to reach out directly to the
Sudanese leadership is now, with a message of forbearance, of
harsh condemnation of Khalil Ibrahim, but also of warning to
Sudan to consider, and consider again, the unforeseen
consequences of a crisis that they and the Chadians (Deby
came to power with Al-Bashir's help) have together created.
End comment.
FERNANDEZ