SUDAN'S NSC DISCUSSES JEM ATTACK AS ARRESTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000724

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C,
NEA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN'S NSC DISCUSSES JEM ATTACK AS ARRESTS
CONTINUE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 716


B. KHARTOUM 710

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Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) In the aftermath of the JEM attack on Omdurman
(reftels) Sudan's National Security Council pledged to
"react" to Chadian aggression, neutralize the "fifth column"
that supported the rebels, and exploit the opportunity to
enhance Sudan's international image, Senior Assistant to the
President Minni Minawi said on May 11. President Bashir
quieted some advisors' calls for retribution against certain
ethnic groups, an allusion to JEM's (and Minawi's) Zaghawa
tribe, and emphasized the need for national unity. The
security services, however, have detained over 110 Zaghawa
civilians since May 9, many of whom have been beaten.
Popular Congress Party leader Hassan Al Turabi--the regime's
nemesis (and original patron) who is often said to be JEM's
founding father--and several of his senior lieutenants were
also arrested on May 12. While it is too early to know who
within the NCP establishment will take the fall for such an
egregious security breach, the USG can play a vital role in
empowering certain figures in the regime who may be more
inclined to seek a deal that addresses the political problems
underlying the conflicts in Chad and Darfur. End summary.

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Six Decisions
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2. (C) Meeting with CDA Fernandez on May 11, Senior Assistant
to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Chairman
Minni Minawi said that Sudan's National Security Council took
six decisions in the wake of the Justice and Equality
Movement's (JEM) May 10-11 bold attack on the Khartoum suburb
of Omdurman (reftel): 1) To condemn the attackers in the
strongest terms; 2) To "react" against Chadian-orchestrated
aggression; 3) To neutralize the "fifth column" in Khartoum
that may have supported the rebel offensive; 4) To use the
opportunity provided by the attack to improve Sudan's
international image by portraying itself as a victim and
attributing recent bombing campaigns in Darfur to an attempt
to halt JEM's advance; 5) To unify the national political
forces given most political parties condemnation of the
attack; 6) To press for JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim's
international isolation, including his inclusion on an
Interpol watchlist.

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The Fifth Column vs. National Unity
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3. (C) Following Defense Minister Abdelrahim Mohammed
Hussein's sheepish account of JEM's skillfull evasion of a
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) division sent to intercept the
rebels north of Omdurman on May 10, several hard-line
presidential advisors, as well as SLM Secretary General
Mustafa Tirab (a Fur),made threatening statements against
"the tribes which supported the invaders," a clear allusion
to Ibrahim (and Minawi's) Zaghawa tribe. National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General
Salah Ghosh reported that Ibrahim is hiding in Omdurman,
which Minawi interpreted as a pretext for house-to-house
raids targeting Zaghawa. Presidential Advisor Abdallah Ali
Massar (one of the intellectual authors of the Janjawid Arab
militia) piled on by launching a vitriolic attack on the
unnamed "treacherous tribe."


4. (C) Preferring to avoid a backlash, President Omar Al
Bashir re-directed the blame from a single ethnic group, and
instead emphasized the importance of maintaining solidarity
within the Government of National Unity and cohesion in
greater Khartoum's multi-ethnic population. However, he
rejected First Vice President Salva Kiir's recommendation to
pursue negotiations with Chad rather than breaking relations
and stressed that Chadian diplomats in Khartoum helped
coordinate the assault. Bashir noted that Ethiopia, Egypt,
and the United Arab Emirates pledged "support" for Sudan,

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without providing specifics. Minnawi noted that Bashir
obsessed on methods used to crush insurgents with the
President suggesting that "we publicize what the Americans do
in Iraq and Afghanistan" as Sudan seeks to do the same.
Sudanese TV reported on May 12 that Bashir had received phone
calls of support from the Egyptian, Yemeni and
Congo-Brazzaville Presidents and Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal.

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Libyan Role?
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5. (S/NF) While Libyan involvement was not discussed, Minawi
speculated that Tripoli supplied much of JEM's arsenal.
Given that the weapons were Russian-made, he said they "were
from either Libya or Eritrea, through Chad" rather than from
President Deby directly or obtained through previous JEM
raids on SAF units, which rely on Chinese arms. (Note:
Minawi listed JEM's arsenal as containing SPG-9 73mm
recoilless guns, 14.5mm heavy machine guns, B-11 107mm
recoilless rifles, and ZU-23 23mm AA guns. He retains
intermittent contact with Libyan officials, including
intelligence chiefs Abdullah Sanousi and Musa Kusa and as
recently as February received uniforms and other equipment
from Libya for his own force after a visit to Tripoli. End
note.)

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Ibrahim's Arrogance
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6. (C) Minawi asserted that Ibrahim's arrogance led him to
believe that he could in fact overthrow the Sudanese
Government during the recent assault. As a measure of this
behavior, Minawi cited Ibrahim's decision in early 2007 to
redraw the geographic lines of Darfur's three states, appoint
governors to each new state, and appoint new Zaghawa sultans
to rival the existing two. He explained, however, that JEM
had not deployed high-quality fighters during the recent
offensive. Referring to the television images of the some of
the captured and bedraggled JEM fighters, Minawi called them
"school boys and waiters" from the Tama or Massaleit tribes,
not battle-hardened Zaghawa. He noted that if they had been
Zaghawa, they would have made it across one of the Nile
bridges into Khartoum because the raiders initially faced
only Sudanese police in their advance before SAF and NISS
troops were able to respond. Minawi speculated that the JEM
leader probably offered the recruits 500 Sudanese Pounds each
(250 US) to join the attack on Khartoum. Other rebel
movements, though avoiding outright condemnation of JEM,
remain distant from Ibrahim, fearing that he will fulfill his
pledge to "take Khartoum and clean Sudan of the other rebel
movements." He confirmed press reports that one of Ibrahim's
top lieutenants, the intellectual Jamali Hassan Jelaledin,
died in a bombing raid on May 11 in Kordofan.

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Detentions Continue
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7. (C) Predicting that the next 24-hours would herald "many
arrests and torture" of Darfurians--particularly Zaghawa--in
metropolitan Khartoum, Minawi said he had told both the
National Security Council and the Council of Ministers that
GNU should focus on mitigating tribal tensions and avoid
retributive acts on civilians. Arrests have continued
throughout greater Khartoum, however, according to SLM
officials tallying the detentions. As of May 12, the
security services have detained over 110 Zaghawa in the
capital, some of whom have been severely beaten. Meanwhile,
the Zaghawa-dominated area of Umm Bedda, in west Omdurman, is
sealed off and a complete curfew remains in place while
police and the security services conduct house-to-house
searches. (Note: The curfew was lifted in Khartoum on May
11). The security services in El Fasher, North Darfur, also
arrested two SLM officials (both Zaghawa) on May 11. There
are other widespread, yet inspecific, reports of reprisals
throughout Darfur, including detentions of civilians in El
Geneina, Nyala, and El Fasher.


8. (C) In addition, Popular Congress Party (PCP) Chairman
Hassan al Turabi, long rumored to be JEM's founding father
with close and continuing ties to Ibrahim (which he denies);

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PCP Secretary General Bashir Adam Rahma; and six other senior
PCP officials were arrested at 0530 hours local time on May

12. Khartoum State Chairman Adam Tahir Hamdoul, who was
previously arrested and then released on May 10, was among
them. Turabi and Rahma returned from a party conference in
the eastern state of Sennar at 0330 hours, Rahma's wife told
Poloff after her husband's arrest. She believes all of the
PCP officials are being held in the Khobar Prison in
Omdurman. In addition, Egyptian security services reportedly
detained JEM Chief Negotiator, Ahmed Tugoud, who was in Cairo
during the JEM attack, on the evening of May 11.

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Comment
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9. (C) Post is closely tracking the arrests and reports of
human rights violations in the aftermath of the JEM offensive
and will continue to press the government to exercise
restraint vis-a-vis civilians. Meanwhile, the U.S. should
use the political openings provided by recent events to
forestall regime hardliners seeking a brutal and futile
military response to this challenge and, probably, a renewed
proxy war with Chad. The sudden JEM assault, which
threatened the national capital itself, exposed the weakness
of a regime hitherto seen as the model of an Arab autocracy,
complete with a formidable security apparatus. While it is
too early to know who within the establishment will take the
fall for such an egregious breach, the USG can play a vital
role in empowering certain figures in the regime who may be
more inclined to seek a deal that addresses the political
problems underlying the conflicts in Chad and Darfur--which
have now reached Khartoum for the first time in the country's
history. Our swift condemnation of the attack has likely
demonstrated to regime hard-liners that the U.S. does not,
despite their paranoia, seek regime change and certainly does
not support the Islamist aspirations of Khalil Ibrahim. We
should use the resulting goodwill to engage directly with
pragmatic NCP officials, at a high-level, to gain commitments
that would address Darfurian's legitimate political
aspirations, isolate the militant Ibrahim, and lessen
Sudan-Chad tensions. End comment.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ