Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM684
2008-05-05 08:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

POSTURING FOR ELECTIONS, UMMA WORKS TOWARD PEACE

Tags:  PREL PGOV SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5564
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0684/01 1260815
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050815Z MAY 08 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS REQUESTS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0724
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0340
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000684 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG,
AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: POSTURING FOR ELECTIONS, UMMA WORKS TOWARD PEACE
IN CHAD, DARFUR

REF: NDJAMENA 00136

KHARTOUM 00000684 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

---------------------------------
Peace So Elections Can Go Forward
---------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000684

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG,
AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: POSTURING FOR ELECTIONS, UMMA WORKS TOWARD PEACE
IN CHAD, DARFUR

REF: NDJAMENA 00136

KHARTOUM 00000684 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Peace So Elections Can Go Forward
--------------


1. (C) Predicting that the National Congress Party and/or the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) may use the ongoing
crisis in Darfur as a pretext to postpone the 2009 elections,
the Umma Party is seeking to forge a peace settlement for the
troubled region and to defuse Chad-Sudan tensions, Umma Party
Chairman for Darfur Ismail Khitir Abdelkarim told Poloff on
May 1. Elections in Darfur before a workable peace
agreement--the prospect of which is made more remote because
of the Chad-Sudan conflict--are unrealistic, explained
Abdelkarim, who hails from the same Zaghawa tribe as several
Darfur rebel leaders and Chadian President Idriss Deby. At
the same time, however, a postponement of the elections will
result in "chaos." Abdelkarim asserted that the Naivasha
negotiations, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA),"missed their mark" by ignoring Darfurians'
legitimate demands. He characterized the Umma Party's
current efforts as an attempt to redress this mis-step.

--------------
Umma-NCP Understanding?
--------------


2. (C) Umma is negotiating a memorandum of understanding with
the National Congress Party (NCP) to play a mediating role
between the NCP and Darfur rebel groups as well as between
the Sudanese and Chadian governments. Presidential Advisor
Mustafa Osman Ismail "initialed" this memorandum in
mid-April, according to Abdelkarim. Following his return
from N'djamena, Umma Party Chairman Sadiq Al Mahdi is now
scheduled to meet President Bashir during the week of May 5
to finalize a common understanding between the two parties.
The NCP fears that it is losing control of events in Sudan,
said Abdelkarim. It is therefore amenable to exploring ways
to stabilize the political environment in Darfur and the
region and to allow greater political space for opposition

elements in the government--managed in a way that maintains
the NCP's (albeit more limited) influence (reftel).


3. (C) Stipulated in the tentative NCP-Umma agreement is that
the NCP will work to meet some of the demands of the
Darfurian rebels and the region's civilians, including
consolidating the three Darfur states into a single region,
compensation for the victims of conflict, equitable
power-sharing arrangements based on Darfur's population, and
disarmament of the Arab militias, said Abdelkarim. In
addition, Al Mahdi secured President Deby's approval to serve
as an intermediary with the NCP, and Umma is seeking a
similar commitment from Khartoum. If the NCP rejects these
overtures--or if there is a new coup attempt against
Deby--Khitir pledged that the Umma Party will issue a public
condemnation and terminate any discussion of an electoral
coalition with the NCP. Without such a coalition, Abdelkarim
claimed that the NCP will lose the elections. "We are
keeping our options open on the elections," he explained.

--------------
Umma Contact with Darfur, Chad Rebels
--------------


4. (C) In addition, Umma has been in direct contact with the
Darfurian and Chadian rebel groups. Party representatives
have urged the former to overcome their internal divisions,
said Abdelkarim. In turn, they have warned the Chadian
rebels that they should "not be fooled by the NCP," which
will conclude a deal with Deby irrespective of their
interests, and instead participate in political dialogue
facilitated by the Umma Party. While Umma-NCP negotiations
unfold, the party is refining its strategy for engagement
with the various rebel groups--considering, for example, a
conference of the Darfur rebel factions, Arab tribal leaders,
and government officials to discuss reconciliation.
Abdelkarim requested USG-funded capacity building programs to
support the Umma Party's "reconciliation" efforts and help
prepare it for elections.

--------------

KHARTOUM 00000684 002.2 OF 002


Comment
--------------


5. (C) Umma often overstates its influence in Khartoum and in
the party's historic stronghold of Darfur, where its
popularity has eroded as a result of five years of intense
conflict and the breakdown in traditional tribal structures.
The reality is that tQg&-d-nce by attempting to interject itself in
Darfur/Chad negotiations. Unable to secure itself a powerful
share in government at either the federal or state level if
it acts alone, Umma is likely to attempt to maintain some
relevance in Sudanese politics through a coalition with one
of the two major parties in the current Government of
National Unity (GNU). An NCP-Umma ticket may be enough for
the NCP to win elections in the North, particularly if the
SPLM is unable to develop a robust political machine outside
Southern Sudan due either to its own internal weakness or to
NCP obstruction. An SPLM-Umma ticket could, by contrast,
bolster SPLM support in the North but may be hindered by
Umma's ambivalence to the CPA and lingering North-South
resentments, which are just as prevalent within the Northern
elite that composes the Umma Party leadership as they are
within the NCP. Any USG support for the Umma Party should
take account of these dynamics. End comment.


6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ