CHAD: ERDIMI BLAMES STALLED TALKS ON CHAD, LIBYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG,
AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
PARIS FOR KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU SU CD LY
SUBJECT: CHAD: ERDIMI BLAMES STALLED TALKS ON CHAD, LIBYA
(C-AL8-00761)

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Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)

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Summary
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1. (C) RFC leader Timan Erdimi says that the talks in Tripoli
between his movement and Chadian representatives have stalled
because of Deby's lack of sincerity to participate in real
political dialogue and Libya's pro-Deby bias. Though some
RFC representatives remain in Libya to signify Erdimi's
preference for negotiations over war, a military solution may
be the only option if Deby's government refuses serious
negotiations. The National Alliance (AN),though delayed in
mounting a new offensive due to "logistical problems,"
remains poised to launch another coup attempt and was
excluded from the Tripoli talks by the Libyan authorities.
Erdimi claims that the RFC and the AN have overcome the
ethnic divisions that plagued them during the February coup
attempt and that while the views of AN leaders on a post-Deby
political structure differ from his own, powerful military
elements in the AN share his vision for a transitional
government. End summary.

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Libya Talks Stalled
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2. (C) Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) President Timan
Erdimi told PolCouns and Poloff on April 30 in Khartoum that
the negotiations in Tripoli between his movement and the
Chadian government have stalled, blaming both President
Deby's regime and the Libya government for the break-down in
dialogue. Chadian negotiators have demonstrated neither a
willingness to engage in substantive talks nor real
flexibility in discussing power-sharing issues, preferring to
buy time using false pretenses. Libyan authorities continue
to back Deby "and only Deby," said Erdimi, and to exclude
representatives from the National Alliance (AN) from
participating. (Note: In discussions with Poloff, AN leaders
have also claimed that Libya did not invite them to the
negotiations. End note.) For these reasons, Erdimi returned
in frustration to Khartoum in mid-April. He admitted,
however, that the Chadian rebels are "caught" because of
Libya's negative role: Constructive dialogue cannot occur in
the current venue, but if the talks are moved and held under
more neutral auspices, the "Libyans will cause trouble."

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Prefers Dialogue but War May Be Only Option
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3. (C) Sudan expressed initial support for the Tripoli talks,
claimed Erdimi, but has since pushed him to withdraw his
negotiators because of the lack of progress. He has resisted
this pressure, however, to demonstrate his preference for
political dialogue over war, which he said would be
"catastrophic." Reporting that his forces remained centered
in Borak, Chad, Erdimi said that as long as the RFC is at
least formally engaged in negotiations it will not attack
Deby's government. Nonetheless, a military solution may be
the Chadian rebels' only option if Deby's government refuses
serious talks, predicting that the rainy season (which would
prevent a new rebel offensive) will not begin until July.
"If the U.S. doesn't want Idriss' regime changed by force,
the only solution is dialogue," said Erdimi, who urged the
USG to press Deby's government to negotiate in earnest.

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Sudan, AN Free to Pursue Regime Change
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4. (C) Since Libya did not invite AN representatives to
Tripoli--and dislikes Front du Salut de la Republique (FSR)
leader Ahmed Soubian--the Sudanese Government "is free" to
pursue regime change in N'djamena through the AN. The allied
forces of the FSR, Mahamat Nouri's Union des Forces du
Developpement et de la Democratie (UFDD),and Abdelwahid
Aboud's UFDD/Fondamentale remain near Ade and have delayed an
offensive due only to "logistical difficulties." Downplaying
any tribal tensions between his Zaghawa movement and the AN,

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Erdimi said that "even now, we prefer that others
participate" in negotiations. He blamed the friction between
RFC and AN fighters during the February offensive in
N'djamena on "those without a national perspective," implying
that the Chadian rebels have since overcome these differences.

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New Chadian Government "Changes Nothing"
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5. (C) Erdimi stated that the appointment of a new Chadian
government "changes nothing," claiming that even those
ministers drawn from the political opposition are "Deby's
people." Internal Chadian tensions resulted from Deby's
mistreatment of the Arab population and "political-military
problems", he explained. "Idriss insulted the Arabs, who
represent 20 to 25 percent of the population," said Erdimi.
"You cannot have elections or democracy without them, and
Deby is the great handicap to ending the ethnic problems."
If Deby either accepts a credible power-sharing arrangement
or is forced from office, a disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) program for the rebels could contribute
to building a multi-ethnic national military. He claimed
that the rebel groups are willing to participate in such a
program.

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RFC, AN Positions Differ
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6. (C) The positions of the RFC and the AN leaders on a
post-Deby political strategy differ in the timing for a
transition to full democracy, however. Erdimi portrayed the
AN plan for a "National Forum" that prepares the country for
elections after six-months as unrealistic. Instead, he
believes that the national forum of rebel movements,
political opposition leaders, and civic activists could
legitimize an interim administration that assures security
and governs during a two to three-year "transitional period."
The interim administration would focus on building Chad's
governing institutions, attracting international support, and
executing a DDR program. Criticizing Nouri, Soubian, and
Abdelwahid for not appreciating the amount of organization
and funding necessary for elections, Erdimi claimed that
influential field elements within the AN agreed with his
approach, mentioning UFDD's Adiman Hasballah, who he said
commands 3,000 of Nouri's fighters.

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Comment
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7. (C) Though Sudan has provided Erdimi with a large and
well-appointed house in an upscale Khartoum neighborhood
(that is much nicer than the small apartment he occupied
before he left for Tripoli),he offered no indication that
the Sudanese authorities are restricting his movements. He
demurred when asked whether the GOS is pressing him to delay
or initiate a renewed offensive against Ndjamena. Despite
his pro-Arab rhetoric, Erdimi disparages Nouri and Soubian's
abilities. He believes that, among the main rebel leaders,
only he is qualified to govern Chad. In a power-sharing
arrangement that keeps Deby as President, Erdimi will
continue to demand the post of Prime Minister; if Deby falls
from power, Erdimi will aspire to replace him. His argument,
however, that inter-ethnic tension among the rebels have
decreased and that a DDR program is easily made operational
are unconvincing when confronted with the likely chaos that
would plague Chad in the event of Deby's sudden collapse.
The one exception is if France, through back channel
discussions with the rebels, takes responsibility for
stabilizing the country after Deby's departure, though Erdimi
denies he has had any contact with French officials.
Whichever option is pursued, the looming rainy season means
that it could be a long hot summer in Chad before the rains
stop the "fighting season." End comment.


8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ