ERITREAN OFFICIALS: NCP/SPLM COALITION AND UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000641

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG,
AND AF/E, NEA FOR DAS GGRAY
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU ER CD LY
SUBJECT: ERITREAN OFFICIALS: NCP/SPLM COALITION AND UNITY
VERSUS RISKY ELECTIONS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 637

B. KHARTOUM 628

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Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Eritrean policy toward Sudan centers on two
priorities, senior Eritrean officials told the Charge
d'Affaires in a recent meeting: facilitating a partnership
between the NCP and the SPLM that maintains the country's
unity and defusing the Sudan-Chad conflict. Asmara continues
to view a "comprehensive approach" to Sudan's internal
tensions as the best method for ensuring stability,
attributing the failure to end the marginalization--and
conflict--in Darfur and the East to political cross-currents
with the Government of National Unity. Predicting that
elections in 2009 will "collapse the CPA," Eritrea prefers a
postponement in favor of an NCP/SPLM "grand coalition" and a
political settlement in Darfur. Believing that the NCP has
softened its position toward N'djamena, the officials blamed
Libya for obstructing reconciliation between the two
governments. End summary.

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Eritrean Priorities: Unity, Ending Chad/Sudan Conflict
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2. (C) In an April 24 meeting with CDA Fernandez and Poloffs,
Eritrean officials Yemane Gharaeb and Abdullah Jabr stated
that their country's policy toward Sudan centers on two
priorities: 1) Facilitating a common understanding between
the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) on maintaining Sudan's unity, and
2) Defusing the conflict between Sudan and Chad. Asmara has
always supported a "comprehensive approach" to resolving
Sudan's internal tensions, said Gharaeb, and while addressing
the Darfur conflict is important, "Sudan's problems are
indivisible." Gharaeb affirmed that Eritrea continues to
view unity as the best outcome of the 2011 referendum on
Southern Sudan.

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NCP, SPLM Positions
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3. (C) While Eritrea continues to press the NCP to maintain
its partnership with the SPLM and follow a more accommodating
course that ensures unity rather than tactical political
steps to gain the upper hand, the NCP "does not countenance"
this approach, according to Gharaeb. Meanwhile, the SPLM has
yet to refine its strategy, vacillating between support for
unity and the pursuit of an independent Southern Sudan.
Gharaeb posited that the SPLM remains "potentially strong" in
the North but has been unable to capitalize on the
groundswell of support among Sudan's marginalized
populations. The status of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
(ESPA) exemplifies these trends. Eastern Front leaders
complained to Gharaeb and Jabr during an April 24 meeting in
Khartoum that neither the NCP nor the SPLM are serious about
the ESPA, despite the fact that the Government of National
Unity (GNU) signed the agreement, which committed both
political parties to its implementation. Yemane noted that
SPLM leader Malik Agar had led the GNU talks with the Eastern
Front when NCP negotiator Mustafa Othman Ismail wasn't
present.

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Elections May Collapse CPA
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4. (C) Concerned that the risks inherent in the 2009
elections are too great, Gharaeb stated that Eritrea - while
not opposed in principle to Sudanese elections - would like
to see them postponed "because there are too many unknowns
and they may lead to the collapse of the CPA." Instead,
Asmara has urged the parties to look into a "grand coalition"
that, if coupled with a political settlement for Darfur, will
stabilize the country through the transition period until the
referendum in 2011. However, neither the NCP nor the SPLM
want to be perceived as suggesting a deviation from the

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timeline in the CPA and are therefore reticent to discuss any
adjustment that may prove to be beneficial to the country and
the region in the long-term. Gharaeb suggested that the
international community discuss such a proposal "openly" with
the parties to provide them with political cover.

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NCP, SPLM Should Assume Responsibilities on Darfur
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5. (C) The cross-currents within the GNU have prolonged the
Darfur crisis. Acknowledging that the Darfur rebel movements
remain "weak and divided," Gharaeb asserted that this fact
does not absolve the NCP of its responsibility to address the
crisis. The SPLM has similarly failed to take adequate steps
on Darfur, despite its pivotal role in the GNU. "We need to
push the SPLM to say, 'we, as members of the national unity
government, have a responsibility for Darfur and cannot blame
the situation on the National Congress and the movements,'"
said Gharaeb. The NCP can also not just sit back and blame
the rebels and international community for not solving a
problem created by the Sudanese, "Khartoum could do more to
solve this."

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Bringing the Fur into the Peace Process
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6. (C) Gharaeb further suggested that the UN/AU mediation
"needed a new approach" and that Eritrea and the U.S. "reach
a certain consensus among ourselves about which direction to
push." A key element is to bring the Fur into the peace
process, he said, characterizing Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafie as "not very representative
of the Fur" and rival SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur as
"obstinate." Eritrea is monitoring discrete unification
discussions among Fur military commanders in the field,
"which have gone a certain distance," according to Gharaeb.
(Note: Gharaeb is likely referring to the efforts of Suleiman
Marjan, an influential Fur commander, to bridge the SLA
factions in North Darfur that have split from Abdulwahid with
those in Jebel Marra, West Darfur that remain allied with
him. End note.)

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Sudan Softening on Chad but Libya Obstructing Peace
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7. (C) During President Bashir's recent visit to Asmara,
President Afwerki noted that Sudan-Chad tensions preclude an
improvement in the security or humanitarian situation in
Darfur, according to Gharaeb. His and Jabr's visit to
Khartoum is an attempt to ameliorate the situation after
Bashir indicated he "is more amenable to looking at other
options" beyond regime change in N'djamena. Even though they
came close, overthrowing Deby turned out to be harder than
they thought. "We got them (the NCP) to say that if Chad
stopped support for the Darfur rebels, they could look at a
rapprochement," claimed Gharaeb. He said that Libya,
however, is "not being helpful" in forging a compromise and
called on the U.S., France, and other Western governments to
play a more robust role, which "is critical to help Darfur."
Jabr plans to attend the April 28 Contact Group meeting in
Tripoli and will attempt to mitigate Libya's "obstruction on
this issue."

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USG, Eritrea Somewhat Consistent on Sudan
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8. (C) CDA Fernandez stated that, based on Gharaeb's remarks,
much of Eritrean policy toward Sudan is consistent with USG
views. He noted that the U.S. is urging both N'djamena and
Khartoum to "scale back their confrontation" and pressing
Deby to reach out to the marginalized elements in Chadian
society. He concurred with Gharaeb's statement that the NCP
bears ultimate responsibility for resolving the Darfur crisis
"because they created it." CDA Fernandez also said that
while the USG prefers the preservation of Sudan's unity, the
U.S. is not "dogmatic" but wants the secession of Southern
Sudan to be handled through a "deliberative process." He
added that US support for the GOSS and SPLM is evident in the
largest US development program in Africa taking place in
South Sudan. In answer to a question from the Charge, a

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mostly silent Abdullah Jabr intimated that Sudan keeps the
"Jihad Eritrea" group on ice in Sudan in case they ever need
to unleash them again against Asmara.

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Comment
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9. (C) Though Eritrean influence in Darfur has waned since
their attempt to forge a unified movement of several SLA
factions collapsed in the fall of 2007, there is no reason to
assume that Eritrea will remain on the sidelines for long,
making them both useful interlocutors and potential
protagonists in Sudan's ongoing conflicts. Though astute
veteran observers of Sudan, Gharaeb and Jabr have at times
implemented their country's political and financial support
for Sudanese rebel movements, fomenting unrest within the
borders of their dominating neighbor. However, their frank
criticism of the SPLM, a long-time ally, and their
prescription for a "grand coalition" rather than elections
may signify genuine concern that Sudan's internal dysfunction
may spin out of control during the next year, with grave
repercussions throughout the region. End comment.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ