PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ISMAIL ON ROME, CHAD/JEM, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000637

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C,
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ISMAIL ON ROME, CHAD/JEM, AND
VISA HUMILIATIONS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 616


B. USUN NEW YORK 372

C. STATE 40950

D. KHARTOUM 631

E. KHARTOUM 628

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Sudan decided to keep its high-level
delegation in Rome - despite the majority of the US
delegation being "comprised of low-level officials", to
demonstrate its seriousness - said Presidential Advisor
Mustafa Othman Ismail. Ismail suggested that the second
round of talks should occur before the last week of May if
possible, when President Bashir and other senior officials
will be in Japan, so that SE Williamson can meet with
President Bashir. Ismail said the GOS has information that
JEM plans to attack Kordofan and requested US intervention
with Chad and JEM. Ismail also described the "humiliations"
of senior Sudanese Presidential Advisors such as himself
routinely being stopped for several hours in secondary
screening at US immigration every time they visit the US on
official business. End summary.


2. (C) Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail told CDA
Fernandez April 23 that the Sudanese decided to send a
high-level delegation to Rome to demonstrate how serious they
are about the negotiations with the U.S. Presidential
advisor Nafie Ali Nafie called him after Nafie had arrived in
Rome and met with the US delegation, and had seen that most
of the US delegation was relatively low level. Despite this,
both Nafie and Ismail agreed that it was important to keep
all of the senior members of the government in Rome for the
duration of the talks. Ismail noted that SE Williamson would
testify the afternoon of April 23 and said President Bashir
had commented to him, "They will send rockets against him
(Williamson) and we will see if he can defend himself."
Mustafa observed that SE Williamson seemed to have the
support of President Bush and expressed hope that the US will
remain serious about this process. Ismail requested that
if possible the next visit should occur before the last week
in May so that SE Williamson can meet with President Bashir.
He said President Bashir will be in Japan the last week in
May.


3. (C) Ismail turned the discussion to JEM and Chad, and said
the Sudanese government had information that JEM leader
Khalil Ibrahim intended to attack Kordofan in the near future
in order to widen the war in Western Sudan beyond Darfur.
Ismail said he himself might travel to Ndjamena to tell the
Chadians that they should not support Khalil's provocations.
Ismail urged the US to pressure the Chadians to intervene
with JEM as well, and to end their support for JEM. Ismail
lamented that "Abdul Wahid Nour will one day make a deal but
Khalil Ibrahim is very difficult and doesn't respond to
pressure." CDA Fernandez noted that in this regard Khalil is
similar to the NCP, to which Ismail laughed and nodded in
agreement, "he was once one of us". Ismail went on to claim
there are three people destabilizing Darfur - Khalil Ibrahim,
Chadian Defense Minister MohammeQfQ-informed Ismail that due to ongoing visa
security issues, the visa of President Bashir's brother had
been revoked (ref c) and that CDA Fernandez would meet with
Abdallah Hassan Al Bashir the following day to inform him of
this and let him know that he could reapply for a visa any
time he wished (ref d). CDA noted that there are US visa
security issues with some figures in the regime because of
the regime's former links to Al-Qaeda, but offered to
intervene when necessary to make sure that important
individuals in the government can travel to the US when

KHARTOUM 00000637 002 OF 002


needed. Ismail thanked CDA for informing him of the issue,
noting that it could have turned into an embarrassing
incident with damaging repercussions. Ismail commented that
every time he travels to the US as part of an official
delegation, including his last trip to the UN two weeks ago,
he is forced to go into secondary screening at immigration,
sometimes for several hours. "This is humiliating for us,"
said Ismail, noting that when relations between the US and
Sudan are on the upswing, Sudanese officials don't complain
about this treatment, but that when things are going badly
"everything becomes a big issue."


5. (C) Ismail noted that Americans don't recognize the
importance of highly symbolic issues to Sudanese (and Arabs)
involving personal treatment and dignity, like visas, airport
treatment, and Guantanamo. "Look at all the trouble that
resulted from the 25 mile limitation!," he exclaimed (this
was the 25 mile limit place on a U.S. visa for President
Al-Bashir and party in Havana for the 2006 UNGA, this
"personal slight" has entered Sudanese political folklore as
one factor in deteriorating relations in 2006-2007). "You
know that the personal is everything to us. There are things
you get not because of policy but because of personal
relationships and Sudan is no different from other Arab and
Islamic countries." CDA Fernandez agreed that this is
certainly his experience in Sudan and past assignments in the
area.


6. (C) Comment: This is the third meeting we have had this
week (ref a, c, d) in which Sudanese officials have offered a
relatively positive read-out of the Rome meetings. They are
relatively pleased with the atmosphere of the meeting but
also clearly hoping for additional progress at the next round
of talks, where they would like to see additional specificity
on what they US absolutely must have, and what the US will be
willing to offer the Sudanese in return. It is clear the
Sudanese see a benefit merely in talking to the US about a
possible improvement in relations, but soon we will need to
define more clearly precisely what the outcomes of these
discussions will be for both sides. Ismail's warning about
JEM/Chad/Kordofan should be taken seriously because further
attacks by Khalil Ibrahim and JEM, especially outside Darfur,
are bound to provoke a brutal regime reaction.
FERNANDEZ