MINNAWI ON CENSUS, BILATERAL TALKS, AND PROPOSED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: MINNAWI ON CENSUS, BILATERAL TALKS, AND PROPOSED
DPA CONFERENCE

REF: KHARTOUM 585

KHARTOUM 00000625 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 21, Senior Assistant to the
President, Minni Minnawi, told CDA Fernandez that the census
will not be accurate in Darfur, that the U.S.-Sudan bilateral
negotiations legitimizes the NCP and marginalizes minority
political voices, and that a recent aborted trip to Juba
makes him question his relationship with the SPLM. Minnawi
also provided input on the proposed DPA implementation
conference (reftel) and stated that a preparatory committee
will be formed. END SUMMARY.

CENSUS
- - - -

2. (C) Minnawi opened the meeting commenting on the census
and passing us a copy of his letter to President Bashir
outlining SLM/MM's position on the census and the elections.
(Note: This letter will be translated and transmitted to
AF/SPG. End Note). Minnawi stated that he spoke to GoSS
President Salva Kiir on April 20, and that in Minnawi's
assessment, Kiir appears confused, as he says that the GoSS
will not accept the census results after agreeing to
participate in it. CDA Fernandez explained the difficult
position that the GoSS is in, pressured by the international
community to participate while realizing that the census may
be manipulated by the NCP or accurately yield lower
population figures for the GoSS. Minnawi emphasized that the
large numbers of Darfur's IDPS and refugees will yield
inaccurate census results and that "70 percent of the areas
of Darfur are empty as these people were forcibly displaced."
CDA Fernandez stated that while the South may discount the
census on illegitimate technical grounds, those in Darfur may
have much more valid reasons (such as displacement and
security concerns) for questioning the census and the U.S.
needs to try to make this distinction clear.

BILATERAL TALKS
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3. (C) Minnawi and SLM MP Ali Traio stated that the ongoing
bilateral talks between Khartoum and Washington legitimize
the NCP. "The talks and the way the press described the Rome
event gives people the idea that the U.S. Government is
ignoring the people of Darfur and undermining the native
Darfuri movements," stated Traio. CDA Fernandez emphasized
that the talks should not yet be considered a comprehensive
roadmap, but a technical discussion focusing primarily on
UNAMID deployment and humanitarian access. He noted that FM
Deng Alor had been advised by the CDA personally that it
would be useful to include someone from Minnawi's movement at
Rome but this had not happen. Charge said that the U.S.
could consider inviting representatives from minority groups
within the Government of National Unity (such as the
SLM/Minawi) to the next round of talks tentatively scheduled
in Khartoum but that would require NCP/SPLM buy-in and
approval by Washington. "You talk about Darfur and work with
one of the signatories (i.e. the NCP) but you leave the
people of Darfur out of the discussions," stated Traio.

SNUBBED BY THE SPLM?
- - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) Minnawi stated that on April 19 he attempted to
travel to Juba, but at the conclusion of the two-hour flight,
he was unable to land due to an obstruction on the runway.
Minnawi said that after circling for approximately an hour,
the pilots recommended that he return to Khartoum. He stated
that he agreed and that he was interviewed by security agents
upon his landing in Khartoum. Minnawi stated that for the
last two days Foreign Minister Deng Alor promised to visit
him at Minnawi's home, and that he waited for hours, but that
on both days Alor failed to show up. Minnawi stated that he
was not sure whether the SPLM or the NCP was responsible for
the airport difficulty, but that it was likely an intentional
obstruction of his visit. He stated that he has no further
plans to travel to the south, but will instead be going out
into the field in Darfur at the end of the week.

DPA CONFERENCE
- - - - - - - -

5. (C) Minnawi appeared receptive to a proposed conference
on Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation roughly
corresponding with its two-year anniversary (reftel). He
said that SLM/MM will need to carefully consider what message
they hope to send by holding such a conference. "We can
either come out and say 'we have failed' or 'there has been

KHARTOUM 00000625 002.2 OF 002


some progress' but we need to be clear," stated Minnawi. Ali
Traio emphasized that this should not just be a workshop
where "we just talk shop or do public relations" but that
there is an actionable outcome to the meeting. Minnawi and
Traio agreed that a committee will be formed to start
planning for the conference. CDA Fernandez received a late
night call from Minnawi only two days before where Minni
called signing the 2006 DPA "the biggest mistake of my life."

COMMENT
- - - -

6. (C) It is unfortunate that Minnawi was unable to meet
with the SPLM in Juba and upon his return to Khartoum. Charge
passed a message to GOSS Presidential Affairs Minister Luka
Biong Deng the day before encouraging greater interaction
with Minni but that does not seem to have worked. As
positive a development as it would be, there are many
challenges to an SLM/MM-SPLM alliance (the least of which
should be travel). In desperate financial straits, Minnawi
is likely pursuing his request for a loan from the SPLM,
which Kiir refused during Minnawi's last visit to Juba in
March. Inviting Minnawi and other marginalized leaders to
the next round of bilateral talks could help contextualize
the discussions and demonstrate to both the NCP and the SPLM
that the U.S. values all members of Sudan's Government of
National Unity, but it could very well be unacceptable to
both parties. While Minnawi's influence in both Darfur and
Khartoum remains tenuous and command and control within the
SLM is weak, he still holds sway over the largest number of,
often ill-disciplined, rebel fighters in Darfur and should
not be discounted.


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ