Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM615
2008-04-21 13:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UNAMID'S JMST REACHES OUT TO THE U.S. LOOKING FOR

Tags:  KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3419
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0615/01 1121307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211307Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0614
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000615 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID'S JMST REACHES OUT TO THE U.S. LOOKING FOR
HELP AND DIRECTION

REF: KHARTOUM 614

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID'S JMST REACHES OUT TO THE U.S. LOOKING FOR
HELP AND DIRECTION

REF: KHARTOUM 614

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY On April 20, UNAMID's Joint Mediation
Support Team (JMST) Chief of Staff Yassir Sabra told poloffs
that there is a "window of opportunity" for engaging the
rebels and the Government of Sudan (GoS) on security issues
with a meeting planned for late May possibly in Geneva.
Sabra also discretely requested U.S. assistance in
identifying an individual who may be able to enliven this
"dry discussion on security" and at the same time provide
confidence-building measures and improve group dynamics. In
a separate meeting on April 20, other JMST representatives
raised the idea of having an American fill the UNAMID's chief
mediator position. Sabra also provided a lively account of
the JMST's meetings in the field with several rebel factions.
END SUMMARY

PROCESS AND "DISCRETE" REQUEST FOR AMERICAN EXPERTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2. (C) Sabra said that the JMST continues to focus on
security and will likely hold a meeting in late May with
several rebel movements and the Government of Sudan. Sabra
stated it is important not just to fixate on the end result
of security negotiations, but to focus on bringing the groups
together for confidence-building and improving the group's
overall dynamic. He said that negotiations should not be a
one-time event, but an ongoing process. Sabra described
security as a "very dry subject" and said that even if the
parties are not able to come to a final agreement, that
building relationships and trust could be more productive in
the long run. Sabra discretely requested names of
individuals (possibly American) who could provide advice on
these security meetings so they could be conducted in a
creative, interesting, and productive manner. Sabra stated
that the initial meetings will be low-profile and informal

because "when you cannot bring them to the big table, you
bring them to the side table." Sabra noted that such
confidence-building meetings were an important part of the
process in negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and
that perhaps some of the same personalities involved in that
process could participate now in Darfur. (Note: On April 20,
another JMST representative also discussed further direct
American involvement in the peace process with poloffs. JMST
political advisor Muin Shrim told poloff that he raised the
idea with Sam Ibok and Jan Eliasson of appointing an American
to UNAMID's Chief Mediator position, as the group does not
have any viable candidates at the moment and believes an
American will have the most credibility and influence with
the parties. End Note.)


3. (C) Sabra stated that the typical negotiating sequence
(starting with a declaration of principles and ending with a
comprehensive cease-fire) does not apply to Sudan, as the DPA
has already covered some of these steps. "We need to reverse
the order and jump in where we are able to make progress,"
said Sabra. He stated that the Government of Sudan appears
ready to sign "within weeks" a cessation of hostilities, as
long as the border areas are excluded from the agreement.
(Comment: By excluding the border areas, the GOS seeks to
keep the pressure on JEM and SLA/U who receive supplies and
arms via Chad. End comment.)

VENUE, TIMING, AND THE "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) According to Sabra, the Sudan Liberation Army of
Abdul Wahid Al-Nur (SLA/AW) prefers holding these informal
talks in Geneva, while JEM prefers Libya, Chad, or Nigeria.
Sabra stated that there appears to be a window of opportunity
for negotiations with the Government of Sudan. As an
example, he said that he attended the Libreville contact
group (following the Dakar agreement between Chad and Sudan)
and noted that he was amazed that the GoS delegation to
Libreville headed by Mutriff Siddiq did not immediately
protest when the parties proposed a monitoring mechanism
involving UNAMID, EUFOR, and MINURCAT. "I was looking over
at Mutriff and I was just waiting for him to jump in protest,
but he did not argue with the idea," stated Sabra. As
another example, Sabra added that it struck him as strange
that in recent meetings with the JMST, Sudanese Government
hardliner Dr. Nafie Ali Nafi appeared very receptive to
UNAMID's suggestion for more consultation with civil society
organizations. According to Sabra, these and other examples
indicate that the GoS appears ready to engage (as it is doing
with the U.S., UK, and its neighbors) and that this
opportunity should also be embraced by UNAMID in the coming

KHARTOUM 00000615 002 OF 002


weeks.

FIELD VISITS WITH SLA/AW AND JEM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5. (C) Sabra described JMST's field visit with SLA/AW
commanders as very positive. He stated that SLA/AW appears
ready to negotiate with all other rebel movements except for
Abdul Shafie's group who they regard as a spinter group.
According to Sabra, SLA/AW field commanders described JEM's
Khalil Ibrahim as "crazy," especially as JEM commanders
recently traveled to SLA/AW areas and attempted to bring
SLA/AW fighters into their movement. Sabra noted that while
SLA/AW field commanders were receptive to JMST proposals,
they also appeared very disorganized.


6. (C) Sabra stated that JEM greeted the JMST delegation
with an impressive, centralized, and highly-controlled show
of force. He said that after much planning, JEM agreed to
meet in a "no man's land" based on GPS coordinates and that
once the JMST team landed, JEM stormed into the meeting with
dozens of vehicles. Sabra stated that Khalil Ibrahim was the
only one that spoke for JEM. He said that Ibrahim's
presentation was so choreographed that while discussing JEM's
efforts to attract more followers, with a wave of the hand,
dozens of people came out of the desert and joined the
meeting. According to Sabra, all of the JEM fighters'
equipment appeared brand new "from the RPGs to the matching
socks of their uniforms." He stated that Ibrahim called for
direct negotiations with the GoS of Sudan, but that they will
accept negotiations under the auspices of the JMST. Sabra
said that the JMST is attempting to bring all rebel movements
to the next round of negotiations, but that JEM may not agree
to participate if other groups attend. "We want everyone to
come to the same venue and talk, but we will plan for a
backup meeting for JEM if they do not come," stated Sabra.
He stated that two rounds of negotiations may actually be
more appropriate as the issues of the Fur, IDPs, and smaller
rebel groups could be handled in one meeting, and the issues
of JEM and Chad could be handled in another.

COMMENT
- - - -

7. (C) Despite numerous attempts during the meeting with
Sabra, poloffs were not able to get more clarity and
specificity from him regarding the JMST's strategy for the
security talks in Geneva and beyond. While security
discussions are the most logical and urgent starting place,
it will difficult to use this sensitive topic to build group
dynamics and confidence between the parties. Although their
plan is still unclear, Sabra's request for U.S. input and
Shrim's consideration of an American for the JMST's Chief
Mediator should be taken seriously - it is a sign of
desperation and clearly the JMST is looking to the U.S. for
guidance and support (or seeks to engage us now to avoid
criticism later). Regardless, the JMST clearly needs
guidance. We suggested that seasoned UN mediators such as
Lakhdar Brahimi should be consulted, or others who were at
the UN-sponsored talks on Congo and/or Burundi. If the
Department has any suggestions based on our experience in
Naivasha or at other peace talks, suggestions for the JMST's
proposed security meetings in Geneva appear to be welcome.
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is based on
Geneva and has provided one consultant to the JMST already,
may become more involved in planning the proposed Geneva
meeting.
FERNANDEZ