MFA OFFICIAL COUNSELS "TANKS MORE LIKELY THAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000582

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: SU AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL COUNSELS "TANKS MORE LIKELY THAN
ARMED LOCAL GUARDS" FOR US EMBASSY

REF: A. KHARTOUM 574

B. KHARTOUM 560

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) In the midst of a wide-ranging discussion on violence
in Darfur (reftel A) on April 13, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Under-Secretary Mutriff Siddiq, a regime insider and former
intelligence officer (and also in charge of the UNAMID
deployment file for the GOS),asked CDA Fernandez "why aren't
you going to the talks on Sudn in Rom?" CDA noted that
other urgent embassy business, such as trying to get progress
on NEC construction and security matters, preclude his
leaving the country at this time.


2. (C) Siddiq responded that "I know you raised the issue of
arming local guards" with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Deng Alor) again last week (reftel B). Siddiq said that the
MFA had further looked into the idea and "it is just a bad
idea," he noted. He said that such a step could put "your
local staff in big trouble" if they were to use their weapons
improperly or hurt and kill someone. "We could be more
forthcoming if these were Americans you were arming" than
Sudanese. A better solution, he continued, was increasing
local police and other official protection, "if you need a
tank or armored car positioned somewhere, we can even look at
doing that."


3. (C) CDA Fernandez responded that security threats related
to Islamic terrorists seeking to hurt Americans still exist
in Sudan ("I am unaware of any current threats," Mutriff
retorted). The Embassy would prefer to have local staff able
to protect places where most American officials work, such as
the Chancery and the USAID complex in Manshia, in addition to
local police. This is not because of lack of confidence in
the police but because this provides additional protection.
Siddiq answered that Embassy security was important to the
Sudanese but that there should be other ways to do this. CDA
responded that one way to improve our security is to get the
NEC finished in a hurry.


4. (C) On the NEC, Siddiq said that any good faith effort by
the USG to respond to pressures on the Sudanese missions in
New York and Washington would probably be reciprocated by the
Sudanese in releasing NEC containers. He said that FM Alor
had personally taken on trying to solve this matter with
President Al-Bashir "but you need to give him some ammunition
to get this resolved". CDA noted that AF/SPG had already
taken the initiative of meeting with the Sudanese Embassy to
meticulously go over their most pressing concerns, and
Mutriff responded "yes, but I have seen the report and
nothing was resolved yet."


5. (C) Comment: Embassy will continue to raise the issue of
arming selected LES guards, first formally raised in November
2007 and then again in February 2008 as an additional line of
defense, with senior Sudanese officials. While Siddiq's
skepticism was disheartening, especially when contrasted with
the Minister's vague earlier good will, we will also explore
whether asking for even more local police or even armored
vehicles makes good security sense. Tanks guarding entrances
is generally not a sight seen anywhere in Khartoum including
in such sensitive locations as the Presidential Palace,
Ministry of Defense, or NISS headquarters. End comment.

FERNANDEZ