FM DENG ALOR ON ROME, ABYEI, AND "COLD" RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: FM DENG ALOR ON ROME, ABYEI, AND "COLD" RELATIONS
WITH THE NCP

REF: A. KHARTOUM 461

B. KHARTOUM 474

C. KHARTOUM 529

D. KHARTOUM 536

E. KHARTOUM 538

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Sudan is likely to make some concessions on
UNAMID deployment at the bilateral talks in Rome, such as
agreement on the Thai and Nepalese troop contributions, FM
Deng Alor advised CDA Fernandez in a meeting April 10.
However Alor cautioned that the ruling National Congress
Party (NCP) is seeking to buy itself time with these talks,
and is currently holding progress on critical issues such as
Abyei hostage to the talks so that they can gain American
concessions on the issues that matter to them most (getting
off the state sponsors of terrorism list and eliminating some
sanctions). There was no progress on Abyei and other issues
at the Council of Ministers meeting April 9 for this reason.
Alor said he is disappointed that the NCP hasn't taken the
first step on embassy issues, since President Bashir promised
him he would do so. Alor was pessimistic about the SPLM's
relationship with the NCP, predicting the two would enter a
long-term period of "cold relations." Alor said the NCP is
likely to cheat on the census to gain an advantage in the
elections and the next government, and then will likely try
to manipulate the referendum which could lead to eventual
unilateral action by the SPLM in violation of the CPA. Alor
said the SPLM would likely send one or two of its members of
the GNU to Rome, but did not yet know who they would be. End
summary.

NCP Seeking Concessions, Prepared to Offer Some
-------------- --


2. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting April 10, FM Deng Alor told
CDA and polchief "don't be surprised if the NCP offers some
real concessions" on UNAMID, including accepting the Thai and
Nepalese troops at the talks in Rome, while being less
forthcoming on humanitarian and political issues in Darfur.
Alor was in a Council of Ministers meeting with President
Bashir earlier in the day, and said the President had told
him that "we will concede to the US on the Thais and the
Nepalese but not to the UN" in order to gain concessions from
the Americans. Alor said there was no progress on Abyei
negotiations this week because the NCP wants to see what it
can get from the Americans in exchange (getting off the State
Sponsors of Terrorism List and reducing some economic
sanctions). Alor said State Minister Ahmed Haroun, delegated
the responsibility of negotiating an agreement on Abyei with
Alor and Minister of Council Affairs Pagan Amun (Ref D) did
not even bother to show up to a scheduled meeting the had
arranged two hours before the Council of Ministers meeting.

But Beware the Stall Tactics
--------------


3. (C) Alor warned that the NCP is seeking to buy time with
these talks. "They are regrouping their people in Darfur and
seeking a military solution while they negotiate, just like
the did with us in the South." Alor said the regime still
believes that it can achieve a military victory in Darfur
against the rebels and therefore is delaying a peaceful
settlement. The possibility of a massive SAF response to a
provocation by the JEM rebel group, as happened in February,
is quite likely. Alor complained that the President refused
to brief the Ministers (and hence the SPLM) on recent
janjaweed activity in Darfur (Ref E) where pro-government
militia rioted because they have not been paid. Alor said
the agenda included only the Sudan Consortium (which the
Sudanese have grudgingly accepted to occur on Oslo) after
which the meeting adjourned without any discussion of Darfur,
Abyei, or the upcoming meetings in Rome.

Pessimistic on NCP-SPLM Relationship
--------------


4. (C) Alor expressed pessimism about the trend of the
SPLM-NCP relationship, predicting that the two could enter a
long-term period of "cold relations." He based this
assessment on the continuing tension on Abyei, the census,
and elections plus the fact that President Bashir had just
named a hard-line NCP confidante, BG Galwak Deng, a former
pro-Khartoum Nuer militia commander, to be Governor of Upper
Nile (where the SPLA has accused the SAF of deploying troops
in violation of the CPA). He said the Governor is extremely
loyal to Bashir (serving as Minister of Animal Resources from
2005 to 2007) and served with him in the military. Alor said
the SPLM can work with the Governor ("his cousins are Dinka

from Bor") but it would not be easy as Galwak is being sent
to "prepare the ground for increased illegal militia (OAGs or
"Other Armed Groups"). Per the CPA, each side names one
governor from their party in the other's region so the NCP
names the governor in the southern state of Upper Nile while
the SPLM currently holds the governorship in the northern
state of Blue Nile.


5. (C) Alor also based his pessimism on the NCP's use of
former Foreign Minister and SPLM renegade Lam Akol to
destabilize the SPLM. "They should just make Dr. Lam a
member of the NCP rather then using him to cause us problems"
said Alor, noting that President Bashir himself had recently
attended a large dinner in honor of Akol. CDA noted that
these are both signs of the obvious NCP strategy of "war by
other means" to destabilize and undermine the SPLM. This
seeks to detach the oil-rich northern tier of the South -
Upper Nile, Unity and parts of Northern Bahr al-Ghazal - and
for such a strategy the NCP needs Shilluk (like Akol) and
Nuer (like Galwak Deng) surrogates.


6. (C) Alor warned that the NCP's strategy on issues like the
census and elections will eventually affect the survival of
the CPA. An almost certain undercounting of the South will
lead to southern constituencies in the new National Assembly
of less than one third which would mean "even if we sweep the
south," that the NCP will set a national agenda without an
SPLM veto. This will allow the NCP to set unfair terms for
the 2011 referendum. As both Alor and Amun told CDA earlier
this week (reftels),such a scenario could lead to an SPLM
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) ahead of 2011,
which would be a gross violation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). Faced with such an eventuality, the SPLM may
decide to forego elections and stake all on the referendum
with the current, more favorable correlation of forces. CDA
agreed that the NCP is likely to make separation and the
referendum as difficult and painful as possible and they will
only embrace elections "if they are sure of being able to win
by cheating," which is a distinct possibility.



7. (C) The Foreign Minister described the April 9 day visit
of President Al-Bashir, NISS chief Salah Ghosh, Nafie, and
Presidential Affairs Minister Gen. Bakri Salih to Asmara to
visit President Afwerki as an NCP effort to "compare notes on
Somalia and on Chad." He said that the Sudanese were
supporting Eritrea's efforts to wreak havoc in Somalia by
supporting radical Islamist insurgents. Alor also said that
Eritrea had been moving anti-Ethiopian regime rebels from
Eritrea down through Sudan to positions in Blue Nile and
Upper Nile states opposite Ethiopia's western border with
Sudan to "open a second front" to pressure the Ethiopians

US-Sudan Relations
--------------


8. (C) Regarding the US-Sudan bilateral relationship, Alor
said he had discussed the talks with SPLM SecGen (and
Minister of Cabinet Affairs) Pagan Amun and that both are
frustrated that the NCP had not done more to show that it
would take the first step as Al-Bashir had promised in
February. Obviously feeling badly that he himself might have
misled the US (and feeling nervous on the eve of the talks in
Rome) Alor lamented that "we were genuine in our trip to the
U.S. and we thought Bashir was going to respect his
commitment." Alor described how he had convinced President
Bashir to take the US seriously and do everything possible to
improve relations now, including the NEC. "This is America"
you are dealing with, Alor said he had told the President
(and now Alor said Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail
reminds Alor jokingly of his "this is America" entreaty
whenever they discuss bilateral relations with the U.S.)
Alor commented that President Bashir told him he would give
him a medal if relations with the US improve, something Lam
Akol never accomplished, but now Bashir had taken to joking
"I will kill you" if relations don't improve. Alor laughed
when CDA Fernandez told him that of heads of state in recent
memory, only Saddam Hussein had killed one of his ministers,
"not a good model for Sudan to follow".


9. (C) Alor said that Al-Bashir seemed to have concluded that
a rapprochement with the U.S. will be easy "although Dr.
Nafie is not so naive." He thought it was good that the
"hardest of the hardliners" was representing Sudan at this
upcoming discussion. Alor added that the NCP's analysis was
that the USG "really wanted a deal with the US" in order to
secure a positive legacy for President Bush so extracting
concessions while offering relatively little (except on
UNAMID) would be an easy task. CDA reminded Alor that he had
warned Nafie only a week ago, "not to toy with the Americans

the way you do with the SPLM or Chad in negotiations" (reftel
B).


10. (C) Alor said the SPLM would send one or two of its
members of the GNU to the talks in Rome, but did not yet know
who that would be. When post checked with the MFA late in
the day April 10 to see why the GNU had not yet submitted its
visa applications to the Italian embassy, the MFA blamed the
SPLM which it said had not yet provided passports for its
members of the Rome delegation.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Following his meeting with Secretary of State Rice in
February, and his personal investment in trying to improve
relations with the US (while seeking concessions on those
items of interest to the US as well as the SPLM) FM Alor
obviously feels a degree of personal responsibility for the
success or failure of the talks in Rome. He clearly wants to
be as helpful as possible to us in advance of the talks,
sharing information that will be useful in our negotiating
strategy such as the information that President Bashir had
told him directly - that the regime would offer concessions
to the US on the Thai and Nepalese troops in exchange for
concessions from us. Alor's pessimistic view of the future
of relations with the US is likely on target, but was also
likely meant to serve as encouragement for the US to engage
fully with the NCP to pressure them into living up to their
CPA obligations - chief among them elections, Abyei, and the
referendum. The SPLM does fear an improvement in US-Sudanese
relations delinking Darfur from the CPA where the Americans
are enticed on issues such as UNAMID deployment and lulled
into forgetting Abyei and similar issues of greater concern
to the SPLM.
FERNANDEZ