AHMED HAROUN, DENG ALOR, AND PAGAN AMUN NEGOTIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000536

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AHMED HAROUN, DENG ALOR, AND PAGAN AMUN NEGOTIATE
ABYEI'S BORDERS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 529

B. KHARTOUM 524

C. KHARTOUM 508

D. KHARTOUM 507

E. KHARTOUM 435

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) CDA Fernandez and polchief entered Cabinet Minister
Pagan Amun's office April 6 and encountered not only Amun,
but also Foreign Minister Deng Alor and State Minister for
Humanitarian Affairs and ICC indictee Ahmed Haroun huddled
over a map of the oil-rich contested Abyei region. Alor and
Haroun exchanged pleasantries with us and left Amun to
explain that President Bashir has given the three of them
until Wednesday April 9 to come up with a solution on Abyei's
borders, when there will be a second meeting at the
Presidency regarding Abyei in as many weeks.

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EARLY SECESSION TALK
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2. (C) Always the purveyor of doomsday scenarios, Pagan said
"this week will be critical" and predicted that if the SPLM
and National Congress Party (NCP) cannot resolve the current
deadlock on Abyei, the SPLM could push for early separation
for the South from the North. "Just like Sudan did at its
independence, the South could make a unilateral declaration
of independence" explained Amun (FM Deng Alor told CDA the
same thing on April 5, reported ref a). Amun said the
meeting on Abyei last week went "very badly" and that there
is a high probability that "we may enter into another
crisis." Amun said President Bashir is equally frustrated
with the lack of progress and at the last Council of
Ministers meeting Bashir leaned over to him and said "I am
very disappointed with how things are going."


3. (C) Amun said Bashir has complained on several occasions
that Northerners are being mistreated in the South, and had
even suggested on several occasions that the North should
just "let the South go." Pagan said Al-Bashir personally
described "calling all the Northerners back form the South,
and sending the millions of Southerners who are in the North
back," a potentially explosive eventuality which would
certainly ensure Southern secession but under dire crisis
conditions. VP Taha seemed to be speaking from the same
talking points when he complained publicly on April 6 of
mistreatment of Muslims in South Sudan.

LINES IN THE SAND
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4. (C) Amun showed us the map from which he, Haroun, and Alor
are negotiating. The map showed a "green line" drawn just
below the lower blue line in the 2005 Abyei Boundary
Commission (ABC) report, which is the NCP's current position
on Abyei's northern border - though reportedly President
Bashir does not like the straight line and would like some
variation (refs a and d). The NCP also wants to keep
Arab-populated Meiram and the oil fields of Higlig in the
North. The map also showed the SPLM position, which leaves
Meiram to the North, but includes Higlig in SPLM-controlled
Abyei and has a northern border drawn in an arc slightly
above the ABC report's lower blue line. Amun said he thought
it unlikely that the NCP would accept the SPLM proposal, but
acknowledged that the NCP's position has grown somewhat more
flexible over time.


5. (C) However, the NCP is trying to delink oil and land in
an unhelpful way, said Amun, proposing that the borders of
Abyei not include Higlig, but that the oil from Higlig and
other parts of the "Abyei region" be distributed among all
the border areas between North and South, with a greater
percentage going to the South and the Dinka than was
stipulated in the CPA. Amun said this is an NCP trap which
is intended to make oil wealth sharing more attractive while
simultaneously complicating a clear border if and when the
South secedes. Amun urged that a high level intervention
from the USG to the NCP regarding the Abyei negotiations
would be helpful.


KHARTOUM 00000536 002 OF 003


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SPLM'S DECISION PARALYSIS
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6. (C) Note: NCP negotiator Dirdeiry shared essentially the
same information with polchief April 3 regarding the status
of the Abyei border negotiations. He said the NCP had
offered to increase the percentage of oil revenue that would
go to all border areas and especially to the Dinka and the
Misseriya, and had moved its proposal for the northern border
to the "green line" not far south of the ABC report's lower
blue line. Dirdeiry claimed that Amun and Alor had agreed on
this compromise and committed themselves to selling it to
Salva Kiir and other senior SPLM leadership in the South over
a month ago. Dirdeiry claimed that Pagan Amun and others in
the SPLM such as Presidential Advisor Mansur Khalid had
confided to him that the SPLM is in "decision paralysis." He
claimed Khalid told him that Salva Kiir presented what were
agreed NCP/SPLM proposals before the SPLM's political
committee for approval by consensus, and the compromises that
were negotiated on Abyei and elections were all rejected
(this characterization appears only partly true, since the
SPLM and NCP had not yet reached a negotiated solution on the
elections law). Dirdeiry predicted that the next compromise
on Abyei would suffer a similar fate. End note.


7. (C) CDA reported to Amun on his trip to Abyei (reftels)
and pointed out that while the NCP certainly is to blame for
many of the problems in Abyei, the SPLM also has its share of
the blame for stoking the fires of conflict. CDA pointed out
that the Misseriya feel manipulated by both the NCP and the
SPLM, and believe that if left to their own devices there
would not be any conflict. Amun countered that the NCP is
provoking the South all along the border, not just in Abyei.
He said that in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, in the Nuba
Mountains, and in Upper Nile the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
is occupying towns that belong to the South and is arming
Arab elements in these areas in what he said the parties are
referring to as "the war of the borders." In all cases, he
said, the SAF arms PDF tribal elements and pushes them
forward to engage the SPLA. Amun predicted that a proxy
tribal war is not out of the question, in which the SAF arms
the Misseriya and other PDF forces, and the SPLA arms Dinka
and other tribal militias, while both "regular" armies stand
by. CDA agreed that the NCP was indeed arming proxies, the
Misseriyya Arabs had admitted as much in Muglad but cautioned
against such a risky proxy war scenario that could get out of
hand and pointed out that it is not in the South's interest
to engage in such a conflict.


8. (C) Equally pessimistic regarding the census, Amun said it
is possible that the South will boycott the census if the
North does not agree to include the questions on religion and
ethnicity on the census forms as an annex. (Note: With the
census one week away, at this late date it does not appear
likely that the NCP may accept the idea of an annex to
include the religion and ethnicity questions, especially
since the SPLM originally agreed in writing not to include
the questions on the census forms. End note.)


9. (C) Comment: Amun is generally the most negative of our
senior SPLM interlocutors and we find it hard to believe that
the GOSS, having spent so much time preparing for the census
(moving IDPs to the South, conducting mass information
campaigns, etc),and having at one time officially accepted
leaving the questions of religion and ethnicity off the
census forms, would now boycott the census and risk
frustrating its own population and the international/donor
community. We share Amun's concern on a possible Abyei
agreement, however, at least at this time. It is positive
that the two parties may be inching closer to an agreement,
but they have been talking about more or less the same terms
of an agreement for the last nine months, while tensions on
the ground steadily rise. However the NCP position on the
northern Abyei border has inched northward over time, and
with an additional push including encouragement from the US,
an agreement is not out of the question. As reported in Ref
A, FM Deng Alor also suggested that a high level call from
the USG to the NCP would help push the negotiations forward.
The language about a unilateral declaration of independence
is relatively new and alarming (as Pagan often is) and would
mean a messy, violent separation of Sudan into at least two

KHARTOUM 00000536 003 OF 003


parts well before the 2011 referendum date. End comment.
FERNANDEZ