Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM529
2008-04-07 06:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

FM ALOR WARNS "THIS WEEK COULD BE DECISIVE" ON

Tags:  KPKO PGOV PREL UN AU SU 
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VZCZCXRO4815
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0529/01 0980638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070638Z APR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0473
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000529 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C,
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO
USAU.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: FM ALOR WARNS "THIS WEEK COULD BE DECISIVE" ON
ABYEI

REF: A. KHARTOUM 508


B. KHARTOUM 435

C. KHARTOUM 395

D. KHARTOUM 313

E. KHARTOUM 308

F. KHARTOUM 298

G. KHARTOUM 276

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000529

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C,
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO
USAU.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: FM ALOR WARNS "THIS WEEK COULD BE DECISIVE" ON
ABYEI

REF: A. KHARTOUM 508


B. KHARTOUM 435

C. KHARTOUM 395

D. KHARTOUM 313

E. KHARTOUM 308

F. KHARTOUM 298

G. KHARTOUM 276

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Deng Alor warned that April
2 discussions on Abyei between the National Congress Party
(NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) regressed
and the next meeting on April 9 could be decisive. He also
warned of SPLM plans to aggressively challenge Northern
encroachment along most of the border region and outlined an
ultimate scenario where the SPLM walks away early from Sudan
through a legislative Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
End summary.

AL-BASHIR'S ZIGZAG LINE
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Deng Alor warned CDA Fernandez on
April 5 that this week's Sudanese Presidency (President
Al-Bashir, FVP Kiir, VP Taha) meeting on April 9 could mark a
decisive watershed on whether the conflict over the oil-rich
Abyei region is resolved peacefully or not. Alor said that
last week's meeting on April 2 "had not gone well" with
mutual recriminations about changed positions and
backtracking. In his telling, President Al-Bashir himself had
backed off an NCP compromise proposal which had been
considered relatively favorably by the SPLM (reftel b). The
NCP compromise closely followed the "blue line" of the ABC
(Abyei Boundary Commission) Experts Report of 2005 while
excluding the mostly Arab district of El-Meriem and the oil
fields of Higlig. Al-Bashir wanted "a zig-zag line that would
not remind him" of the detested ABC Report. The SPLM's
position was that if Al-Bashir wanted a zig-zag, it should be
north of the blue line. They also want to keep Higlig but are
willing to rid themselves of El-Meriem.


3. (C) Alor said that there also continue to be problems in
border demarcation across most of the poorly-marked 1-1-1956

line. Except in Blue Nile state where the local SPLM Governor
(Malik Agar) "knows exactly where it should be," Alor said
that there was serious disagreement on where the line should
be in the Renk area of Upper Nile State, in the Aweil area of
Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (which is Salva Kiir's home turf),
and most seriously in the Raja and Kufrat al-Nahhas areas of
far Western Bahr al-Ghazal, which border South Darfur and
Central African Republic. Deng said that in some cases there
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is 50 kms south of the
expected border. He predicted that SPLA military units would
begin to challenge the SAF very soon in South Sudan's far
west. The SAF is in this area supposedly to prevent Darfur
rebel infiltration into South Darfur even though there have
never been any rebel attacks from that direction. The region
is supposedly mineral rich but poorly mapped and lightly
populated.

SECESSION WITHOUT REFERENDUM
--------------


4. (C) Although he admitted that SPLM officials had
incorrectly signed off on both some border demarcations and
on the census questionnaire, Alor said that the SPLM
continued to be concerned about an undercount of South Sudan
in the census and about the dropping of questions on
ethnicity and religion (GOSS Cabinet Affairs Minister Luka
Manoja signed off on the questions being dropped). An unfair
census could prejudice the writing of the rules by a new
National Assembly for the 2011 referendum. If there is indeed
a skewed result in the process, the South could decide to
secede before the 2011 referendum and actually not hold a
vote but take that fateful step through a decision of the
South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA). CDA Fernandez noted
that this would be a clear violation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement and could give the NCP an excuse to abrogate
other parts of the peace accord. Alor agreed but answered
that the SPLA could defend itself and recalled that Sudan had
become an independent country in 1956 through a similar
decision - it had foregone a referendum by making a simple
legislative decision for independence.


5. (C) Alor asked that senior USG officials consider calling

KHARTOUM 00000529 002 OF 002


NCP officials on April 7 or 8, urging NCP compromise on
Abyei. He suggested that Special Envoy Williamson might want
to call Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and AF A/S
Frazer might want to call Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman
Ismail to urge an early agreement this week on Abyei that
could defuse rising tensions and get the CPA on track (even
though neither Nafie nor Ismail have the NCP lead on Abyei,
that would be VP Taha and indicted ICC war criminal Ahmed
Haroun). Alor had canceled all travel and work as Foreign
Minister to concentrate on Abyei for the week (Alor himself
comes from that region). He said that for many in the south,
"Abyei is the issue," the other ones - census, elections,
etc. - can take care of themselves.

A DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------



6. (C) He said that "if this discussion fails this week," the
SPLM would not walk out of the government as it did in late
2007 but would be "a bad partner" of the NCP in the
Government of National Unity and seek to oppose it at every
turn. "It would be very difficult for me to work for better
US relations with Sudan, if this fails," he warned. Turning
to the possibility of talks between Sudan and the U.S. in the
very near future, he said that he envisions a senior
technical team led by MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq working on "day
to day, technical issues" while more senior officials (like
himself and/or Nafie) hover nearby.


7. (C) CDA Fernandez briefed Alor on Fernandez's recent visit
to Abyei and on our efforts to provide additional assistance
there. He also told Alor that UNMIS was concerned about the
"hate speech" coming from some Dinka youth and some SPLM
leaders like Agok County Commissioner Joseph Dut. Alor said
that "people who have suffered sometimes do behave badly" and
that the SPLM was conscious of not giving such people too
high a profile. Charge also noted that Misseriyya Arab
leaders had frankly admitted to NCP attempts to create mayhem
over the past few months by funding and arming PDF units in
Abyei that were pushing down into Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.
Deng commented that this was part of the NCP's strategy of
indirect "war by other means." They negotiate and they plot
at the same time to see which one works best for them.


8. (C) Alor complained about President Al-Bashir's
increasingly high-handed way of ruling. Even VP Taha was
nervous around him. The President had changed 7 of the 10 new
ambassadorial appointments carefully agreed upon between the
SPLM and NCP. He had changed the assignment of Sudan's Charge
d'Affaires in Washington, the SPLM renegade John Ukec Lueth,
from Ambassador in Bucharest to South Africa, a key position
for the SPLM. Alor had told Al-Bashir that this was
unacceptable to the SPLM but Al-Bashir "thinks that John
(dubbed "Khartoum Karl" by the Washington Post) does a good
job defending the regime." Al-Bashir then suggested Geneva
as a spot for the Washington CDA which was still unacceptable
to both his Foreign Minister and First Vice President.


9. (C) Comment: Although this week may well be decisive on
Abyei, we have heard these words before. What is likely is
that both sides will "muddle through" and continue their
deadly game of indirect confrontation through talk, pressing
and subverting each other. This could well lead to more
violence in Abyei and border areas and a slow, steady
deterioration in relations between the two. This is a
strategy initially perfected by the NCP which the SPLM has
adopted as a self-defense mechanism. Alor's warning on the
border demarcation, an area like the census, where SPLM reps
have not performed well, shows that the party is willing to
use its political and military muscles to correct mistakes
made by its own representatives. This policy of
"renegotiating what has already been agreed upon" is very
irritating to the NCP, but is, of course, the same game the
NCP plays constantly with the international community. End
comment.

FERNANDEZ