Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM524
2008-04-06 11:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SPLM'S EDWARD LINO IN ABYEI: ESCALATING TENSIONS,

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON EAID SOCI MOPS SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4494
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0524/01 0971104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061104Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0466
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000524 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID SOCI MOPS SU
SUBJECT: SPLM'S EDWARD LINO IN ABYEI: ESCALATING TENSIONS,
BUT NO CONFLICT YET

REF: A. KHARTOUM 507

B. KHARTOUM 508

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000524

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID SOCI MOPS SU
SUBJECT: SPLM'S EDWARD LINO IN ABYEI: ESCALATING TENSIONS,
BUT NO CONFLICT YET

REF: A. KHARTOUM 507

B. KHARTOUM 508

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: According to SPLM-appointed Abyei
Administrator Edward Lino, the NCP is ratcheting-up tension
in Abyei by sending SAF and police reinforcements to the
region, and by seeking to incite Misseriya herdsmen against
the Ngok Dinka. The Misseriya have resisted this ploy and
Lino hopes to establish a basis for peaceful coexistence
between the two. The U.S. delegation and Lino,s staff
discussed USAID proposals for short-term, high impact
development projects. While Lino blamed NCP machinations for
increased tensions, his own SPLM also has aggravated the
situation. Reftels report on other meetings during CDA
Fernandez,s April 2-3 visit to Abyei and Muglad. End
Summary.


2. (C) On April 2, CDA Fernandez, accompanied by USAID
Mission Director Fleuret, and State and USAID Emboffs, met in
Abyei with the SPLM's unilaterally appointed Administrator
Edward Lino and his cabinet. The Charge noted that the Abyei
region has been without an established government for three
years and that that this is the fault of the National
Congress Party (NCP). While decisions on Abyei are to be
decided between the NCP and SPLM, there are practical steps
that can be taken to relieve the problems in Abyei. First,
the parties could allow the establishment of a government by
either accepting the Abyei Boundary Commission report or
reaching an acceptable compromise with the SPLM. Second,
UNMIS must be allowed to patrol outside of Abyei town.
Third, interference with the work of NGOs, by both parties
and their military, in the area needs to stop.

Escalating Tensions
- - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) Lino said that the SPLM knows and appreciates the

U.S. position and that this support is needed now. He said
that on March 30 tensions had sharply escalated, when the SAF
deployed a force of 230 men, several light vehicles and four
trucks to Abyei. (Comment: Other contacts in Abyei told CDA
that the tension had begun to escalate with Lino,s own
previous arrival with a company-sized SPLA &bodyguard,8 in
vehicles armed with heavy weapons. End comment.) Lino said
he had conferred with SAF commanders to reduce tensions.
However, rampant unsubstantiated rumors were creating fear
and further increasing tensions among the population.
Khartoum was continuing to dispatch forces to the region.
The latest reports he had heard was that 300 police were on
the way, and "it is they who usually start trouble". He noted
that CDA Fernandez's visit had temporarily defused tensions
by delaying the introduction of these new forces for a few
days.


5. (C) The Charge responded that the U.S. is seeking to send
a strong political message to Khartoum: that Abyei is a key
U.S. concern in Sudan. The U.S. is putting increased
emphasis on the CPA-designated "Three Areas", including
Abyei. Secretary Rice had told FM Deng Alor (himself an
Abyei native) during his visit to Washington that the U.S. is
willing to quietly help resolve the Abyei crisis, if the
parties wish. CDA said that two days earlier he warned GNU
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie that, in the short-term,
among the things that could derail the possible discussion of
improvement of relations now being explored by Khartoum and
Washington are the actions of Sudanese supported rebels in
Chad and the outbreak of conflict over Abyei.

Short-Term, High Impact USAID Projects
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

6. (C) USAID Director Fleuret told Lino that his staff would
brief Lino's Administration separately on existing USAID
activities in Abyei, but that the U.S. wants to do more to
relieve the situation. USAID is considering three
short-term, high-impact development projects that could
improve peoples lives: building an Abyei airstrip capable of
year-round operations, constructing feeder roads, and
providing training and capacity building for lcoal people.
These three initiatives could be started relatively quickly,
would improve the delivery of needed services to the rural
population and would facilitate other, future projects.

Misseriya Resisting NCP Incitement
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. (C) Abyei Administration Secretary General Malony Tong
said that the NCP-controlled Popular Defense Forces had

KHARTOUM 00000524 002 OF 002


planned a raid on a Ngok Dinka cattle camp, seeking to
provoke a Dinka-Misseriya conflict. However, traditional
leaders of both groups calmed the situation. According to
Tong, it was when the NCP saw that the Misseriya did not want
war, that they made the decision to send SAF reinforcements
to Abyei. He said that the NCP also is attempting to stir
discontent among the Misseriya by telling them that the new
Administration is there only to help the Dinka.


8. (C) Tong said the SPLM and the Administration recognize
the right of the Misseriya to migrate annually with their
cattle through Abyei, and to receive government services in
their own home area (i.e., in the Muglad region, north of
Abyei),but not on Dinka lands to the south. With U.S.
political and material support, Tong said, Lino,s
Administration can resist NCP pressure and begin undertaking
development projects.

Returning IDPs Add to Stress
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9. (C) Lino said that 74 busses and trucks loaded with
several thousand returning IDPs and their belongings had
arrived in Abyei in just the last few days. This stream of
returnees was adding to the Dinka-Misseriya tensions in the
region. (Note: Our sense is that IDP's are being pushed
into Abyei by the SPLM not only for the census, but also to
increase Dinka numbers in the event that fighting breaks out.
End note.) He described the returnees as &Dinka-plus,8
who had been living in the Khartoum area for years and were
used to the urban services available there. On returning to
Abyei, they were finding that the region's human and
livestock population had grown, while the availability of
water and other resources had declined. Returning young
people were finding fewer resources on which to live, leading
to increased competition between Dinka and Misseriya.

Peaceful Dinka-Misseriya Coexistence
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10. (C) Lino said he is working to organize a
Dinka-Misseriya peaceful-coexistence conference to discuss
these issues and reduce tensions. Lino said the problem is
not the Misseriya. Rather, the NCP is seeking to manipulate
the Misseriya for its own ends. He added that the three
possible initiatives outlined by USAID Director Fleuret would
help relieve these pressures. Personally, he did not think
there would be conflict, &the NCP is not that crazy.8
USAID would have a secure environment in which to work.

Dealing with the HAC
- - - - - - - - - -

11. (C) Director Fleuret raised obstruction that
USAID-partners and other NGOs have faced from the Government
of National Unity's Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAC).
He noted that in parts of Sudan, HAC is both very powerful
and very obstructive. In others, HAC is weak. The U.S.
would prefer to see a very weak HAC in Abyei. Lino said that
HAC does not have a presence in Abyei, but that it could try
to cause problems from its headquarters in Khartoum. He
recommended that NGOs route their activities in Abyei through
Juba instead.

Comment
- - - -

12. (C) Lino and his staff echoed what we heard in other
meetings with both Dinka and Misseriya in Abyei and Muglad:
that while there are (and always have been) irritants between
the two groups, they also have lived peacefully side-by-side
in the past and there are no fundamental conflicts between
them now that need lead to fighting. Left to themselves,
they would be able to work out their differences peacefully.
Targeted development projects also would be a big help.
However, Lino told only half of the story. The NCP is not
alone in raising tensions in Abyei. The SPLM has its own
(not necessarily benign) local agenda and seeks to use Abyei
to serve those purposes. Local Misseriya and UN officials in
Abyei told of credible reports of chauvinistic speeches by
Lino encouraging Dinka irredentism. While the establishment
of an effective administration in Abyei is to be welcomed,
Lino,s own aggressive actions there (as the SPLM
representative and "unofficial" administrator) probably have
contributed at least as much to the problem as to its
solution.
FERNANDEZ