SUDANESE DEFENSE MINISTER: WE WANT A BETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000480

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC
FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE DEFENSE MINISTER: WE WANT A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S.

REF: KHARTOUM 474

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a surprising conversation after a two
year boycott, Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Hussein
told CDA Fernandez that Sudan was strongly in favor of a
better relationship with the United States. He gingerly
accepted that "mistakes were made" in Darfur, called for
greater American engagement with the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF),and promised to tell the Americans "our side of the
story" on issues such as Abyei, Darfur and the SPLA. Hussein
said that Sudan would consider whether to assign a SAF DATT
in Washington and would welcome military visits, such as by
CJTF HOA leadership, "if the Sudanese political leadership
agrees." He warned that the SPLA's massive defense
expenditures risk destabilizing Sudan and the South and that
the SPLA's free movement and rearmament are a clear violation
of the CPA. End summary.

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STRONG WILL FOR BETTER TIES
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2. (C) Almost six months after it was requested, CDA
Fernandez had his first meeting with Sudanese Minister of
Defense Lieutenant General Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein on
April 1st. CDA was accompanied by DLO and POL chief to MOD HQ
for Hussein's first meeting with US officials in almost two
years. The scheduled 30 minute meeting lasted 70 minutes,
almost all of it in Arabic between Hussein and Fernandez.
The Minister said he was glad to welcome the Charge,
belatedly, to Sudan. He felt he already knew the Charge from
Arab Television appearances. Hussein said that Sudan
appreciated the US's role as a "witness' to the CPA and
positive American efforts in securing the 2006 Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA). Sudan wanted to see a more balanced American
role on Sudan's problems and in the troubled relationship
between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan
Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM). He said that "there is a
very strong will and intention by Sudan to improve relations
with the US, and the SAF shares that view."


3. (C) The Minister noted that there are problems in Darfur,
although it is better than it has been in the past. There
seemed to be no American appreciation of Sudan's efforts to
correct past mistakes. "We are not saying that you should
agree with a 100 percent of what we say or do, but if we are
trying, and if we are only 50 percent right, you should
acknowledge this and give us credit for changing our
behavior". Sometimes we do the right thing and we don't even
hear thank you, he added. He noted that American forces
sometimes kill innocent people by mistake in Iraq and
Afghanistan, admit it and apologize, "these things happen in
war and we are being attacked in Darfur." We know that
"mistakes were made" but we are trying to correct them.


4. (C) Charge Fernandez thanked the Minister for Sudan's
cooperation and help in making the rapid transport by USAF
planes of 800 Rwandan peacekeepers happen in October 2007
without a hitch. This showed that Sudan and the U.S., and
both militaries, can work together towards a common good,
which is providing better security in Darfur. CDA admitted
that there was sometimes disagreement in what actually
happens in Sudan and there are ways that the SAF can seek to
remedy the situation. For example, greater and deeper contact
between the DLO and the Sudanese military or Sudan can assign
a Defense Attache in Washington. We would welcome such a
move. CJTF HOA's senior leadership is also interested in
visiting and this could possibly be within the context of
trying to get some modest help with the Joint Integrated
Units (JIUs).

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SAF BRUTALITY IS A PROBLEM
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5. (C) Charge continued that it was true that, in some ways,
things have improved in Darfur. The number of innocents dying
has decreased every year since the events of 2003-2005 and
that is good. But while we respect and acknowledge the
sovereign right of Sudan for self-defense, there is a problem
of disproportionate response. When JEM attacked and seized
part of West Darfur, Sudan had every right to attack but
there was a high civilian cost, perhaps unintentionally, in

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both deaths and in IDPs. The international press may have
magnified this but this was true and was caused by both the
use of irregular forces and by aircraft bombing. Sudan may
feel that it is being judged unfairly by a special standard,
but that is the reality. Despite no exchange of information
with the SAF, we were able to learn that the SAF was not
entirely to blame. We learned that the rebels had committed
some crimes, and that local people generally prefer the
presence of the better disciplined SAF over pro-government
irregular forces or rebels. Some IDPS had returned. So we
tried to be fair in our analysis and criticism. On the
SPLM/SPLA, CDA noted that we provide limited non-lethal
support and training for the SPLA in strict adherence to the
letter and spirit of the CPA, to shift it from a guerrilla
army to a regular force.


6. (C) The Minister said that there were problems with the
SPLA. Per the UN, the SAF had almost entirely redeployed from
the South by the SPLA had not. "You know this is true from
the AEC Security Working Group." Not only had the SPLA not
redeployed south but it was aggressively pushing north. In
Abyei the SPLA was fighting the Miseriyya Arabs and many
civilians have been killed by them. "We are under political
pressure to intervene, there are elections next year, the
Miseriyya want to know, why can't you defend us?" The SAF
realizes that if they intervene, they could begin fighting
with the SPLA "and the whole border would explode and the CPA
collapse." So the SAF is facing two urgent, dangerous
pressures, "save the CPA or save the Miseriyya." He noted
that the CPA gave the SAF "every right" to move around in the
North, and that includes Abyei, while the SPLA had no right
to be there, outside the JIUs, but the SAF was, so far,
exercising self-discipline.


7. (C) "The SPLM is ruling the South through its Army,' the
Minister continued, there is not much of a state in South
Sudan aside from the SPLA. Not only is the SPLA aggressively
pushing north, and initialing buffer zone agreements that it
doesn't keep but it also moves freely throughout the South
which is a violation of the CPA which called for SPLA units
to be concentrated in camps. American training and support
should not be for the SPLA alone, in his view, but for the
JIUs which will form the "core of a future united army". The
South admits to 40 percent of its budget going for the SPLA
"but we have it from trustworthy sources that it is 75
percent. This is actually the biggest threat to unity,"
because instead of these massive funds going for development,
the money goes for a large armed force whose cost and
existence must be justified. Southerners do not see the
fruits of peace despite $3 billion dollars transferred to
South Sudan since the peace treaty was signed. There is ten
times more money per citizen going to South Sudan than to
North Sudan, but there is no development there. In the north,
you see roads being paved, bridges built. The number of
universities has increased from two to 26 and number of
college students from 15,000 to 370,000. The SPLA is not even
used to build roads but rather kept on a war footing.

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PLAYING WITH FIRE IN JUBA
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8. (C) "They are guerrillas who don't know how to handle such
billions," the Minister continued. "They lack honest
administration." Hussein criticized the SPLA's supposedly
*secret* purchase of Ukrainian T-72 tanks, there are 40 more
waiting at the port in Mombasa "bought illegally and at two
to three times the price," and said that the SAF knew the
SPLA was also purchasing helicopter gunships. He offered to
share this information with the U.S. The Southern Army has
160,000 men and is not downsizing. The Minister added that
the SAF and NCP will accept the results of the 2011
referendum "no matter what" but if separation does occur they
want a calm, stable neighbor that will be friendly and that
will not export its problems outside its borders. The SPLA
could well become a coercive vehicle for Dinka domination of
a fractious South. He noted that North Sudan would not be
immune from these problems, more Southerners fled north
during the civil war than into Uganda and Kenya. "They are
everywhere in the North," he described the population of Wadi
Halfa, in Sudan's extreme northern border with Egypt as "25
percent southerner."


9. (C) CDA Fernandez noted that while we are indeed
sympathetic to the SPLM, we do recognize that they have their

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own problems in building up the South from scratch and
managing ethnic tensions. We listen to them and it is easy to
have a relationship with them, we have "one side who talks to
us, presents their position and on the other side, a vacuum."
Hussein answered that the MOD would begin filling that
vacuum. He then turned to the DLO and told him, "feel free to
contact us at any time and we will do the same, you don't
have to go through the MFA."


10. (C) Comment: A regime hard-liner, Hussein is a very close
confidante of President Al-Bashir who chose him as his
Minister of the Presidency, then Minister of Interior (during
the worst years of the violence in Darfur, violence which he
played a role in instigating) and then Defense Minister since

2005. He grew stony-faced during the discussion about SAF
actions in Darfur but animated when it shifted to the SPLA.
The conversation was as startling as it was revealing: it
showed a regime desperately reaching out to the Americans
while justifying (mostly) its actions and demonstrated where
the heat and attention of the NCP is today, not on Darfur but
on its complex and potentially explosive relationship with
its Government of National Unity partner, the SPLM, and its
military wing. It also revealed a bit of the patronizing
racism of Northern Sudanese, coupled with fear, towards the
now assertive Southerners. If evidence was ever needed for
the value of SST programs in South Sudan, this discussion is
proof positive. Although the Minister is not entirely wrong
about internal pressures in the South and about the SPLA's
aggressive self-confidence, he conveniently ignores the SAF's
own role in using armed proxies against the South and stoking
tribal tensions in most of Sudan. End comment.

FERNANDEZ