Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM453
2008-03-27 08:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC: JMST
how-toVZCZCXRO5856 PP RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHKH #0453/01 0870843 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 270843Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0319 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000453
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC: JMST
REORGANIZATION
REF: A. KHARTOUM 192
B. KHARTOUM 112
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000453
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC: JMST
REORGANIZATION
REF: A. KHARTOUM 192
B. KHARTOUM 112
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloffs met March 25 with the UN Joint Mediation
Support Team's (JMST) newly-appointed Chief of Staff Yasir
Sabra to discuss the stalled Darfur peace process and JMST
plans to restructure its operations and pursue modest
"confidence building measures" with the parties in advance of
a more robust process under a new Chief Mediator. Sabra
arrived in early March on a six-month mission to guide the
JMST through the reorganization phase, and his been involved
with other mediation processes including the Congo (DRC).
2. (C) Although not close to announcing the new chief
mediator, Sabra said the UN and AU are considering
well-respected former Arab League envoy, the Algerian
Mohammed Sahnoun. According to Sabra, a senior mediator
empowered to negotiate with both sides is necessary not only
because rebels have been requesting someone of that level,
but also because the JMST is currently encountering
operational limitations from the Government of Sudan (GoS).
Since Sahnoun is relatively high profile, he apparently has
insisted that he replace the UN and AU Special Envoys rather
than report to them. He is willing to live full-time in
Khartoum (not in El Fasher) which Sabra said would require
that a capable deputy mediator also be identified, "someone
who is empowered to negotiate with rebels on the mediator's
behalf." Sabra said current envoys Eliasson and Salim may be
willing to step down, since they recognize that a full-time
mediation team is required, and that these details are being
negotiated now.
3. (C) While these decisions are being worked out between the
UN and AU, Sabra is focused on trimming back the size of the
JMST office. Having already cut its administrative staff
(and now relying on UNAMID for administrative support),the
JMST will further reduce its footprint to achieve "greater
mobility." Sabra envisions that the JMST will split into
teams of three or four political officers (two senior and two
junior officers on each team) with one team assigned to deal
with the rebel movements, another to deal with civil society,
and a final team to deal with the GOS. One officer will be
tasked to handle public outreach and information.
4. (C) Before the next phase of the mediation process begins
in earnest under the "right conditions" including greater
security as well as a new mediator, the JMST plans to
organize informal confidence-building workshops and/or
meetings between the GoS and the rebels. So as not to raise
expectations, Sabra said the meetings will be kept a secret
and would not be tied to specific goals. Rather, the
meetings would focus on building confidence and helping the
parties develop proposals key issues such as security and
humanitarian access. Sabra noted that such meetings, held in
absolute secrecy, had been effective in bringing the
Congolese parties together. Sabra said the JMST would brief
the donor community on these initiatives at the right time.
5. (C) In addition to holding preparatory workshops, the JMST
plans to engage civil society more actively, though will
leave most of the coordination and organization of activities
with civIl society to UNQMD ciil Affa)rs.( 8CommEn4: QlhsQM
_?_oQ
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC: JMST
REORGANIZATION
REF: A. KHARTOUM 192
B. KHARTOUM 112
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloffs met March 25 with the UN Joint Mediation
Support Team's (JMST) newly-appointed Chief of Staff Yasir
Sabra to discuss the stalled Darfur peace process and JMST
plans to restructure its operations and pursue modest
"confidence building measures" with the parties in advance of
a more robust process under a new Chief Mediator. Sabra
arrived in early March on a six-month mission to guide the
JMST through the reorganization phase, and his been involved
with other mediation processes including the Congo (DRC).
2. (C) Although not close to announcing the new chief
mediator, Sabra said the UN and AU are considering
well-respected former Arab League envoy, the Algerian
Mohammed Sahnoun. According to Sabra, a senior mediator
empowered to negotiate with both sides is necessary not only
because rebels have been requesting someone of that level,
but also because the JMST is currently encountering
operational limitations from the Government of Sudan (GoS).
Since Sahnoun is relatively high profile, he apparently has
insisted that he replace the UN and AU Special Envoys rather
than report to them. He is willing to live full-time in
Khartoum (not in El Fasher) which Sabra said would require
that a capable deputy mediator also be identified, "someone
who is empowered to negotiate with rebels on the mediator's
behalf." Sabra said current envoys Eliasson and Salim may be
willing to step down, since they recognize that a full-time
mediation team is required, and that these details are being
negotiated now.
3. (C) While these decisions are being worked out between the
UN and AU, Sabra is focused on trimming back the size of the
JMST office. Having already cut its administrative staff
(and now relying on UNAMID for administrative support),the
JMST will further reduce its footprint to achieve "greater
mobility." Sabra envisions that the JMST will split into
teams of three or four political officers (two senior and two
junior officers on each team) with one team assigned to deal
with the rebel movements, another to deal with civil society,
and a final team to deal with the GOS. One officer will be
tasked to handle public outreach and information.
4. (C) Before the next phase of the mediation process begins
in earnest under the "right conditions" including greater
security as well as a new mediator, the JMST plans to
organize informal confidence-building workshops and/or
meetings between the GoS and the rebels. So as not to raise
expectations, Sabra said the meetings will be kept a secret
and would not be tied to specific goals. Rather, the
meetings would focus on building confidence and helping the
parties develop proposals key issues such as security and
humanitarian access. Sabra noted that such meetings, held in
absolute secrecy, had been effective in bringing the
Congolese parties together. Sabra said the JMST would brief
the donor community on these initiatives at the right time.
5. (C) In addition to holding preparatory workshops, the JMST
plans to engage civil society more actively, though will
leave most of the coordination and organization of activities
with civIl society to UNQMD ciil Affa)rs.( 8CommEn4: QlhsQM
_?_oQ