BASHIR WILL REPORTEDLY APPROVE NEC CONTAINER

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000442

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/EX,
OBO FOR AD INTERIM DIRECTOR RICHARD SHINNICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: SU ABLD AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: BASHIR WILL REPORTEDLY APPROVE NEC CONTAINER
RELEASE

REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 435


B. B) KHARTOUM 428

C. C) KHARTOUM 355

D. D) STATE 29995

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: President Al-Bashir told his Foreign
Minister on March 25 that he is willing to authorize the
release of NEC containers the same day the U.S.
Administration "eases up on pressure on Sudan's diplomatic
missions in New York and Washington." Alor complained about
the lack of SPLM input in a non-paper presented to the United
States and secured Al-Bashir's approval of SPLM participation
in any future "technical team" that may meet with the
Americans in the near future. End summary.


2. (C) Charge Fernandez met with Foreign Minister Deng Alor
the evening of March 25 to discuss Alor's earlier meeting in
the day with President Omar al-Bashir to discuss, among other
things, NEC construction (reftel a). Alor said that he
complained to Al-Bashir that the Sudanese non-paper handed
over to the Americans "was an NCP (National Congress Party)
document, not a Government of National Unity document." He
asked Al-Bashir that there be robust SPLM participation in
any technical team that may meet with the Americans in the
near future to discuss bilateral issues. Al-Bashir agreed.


3. (C) Alor told the President that MFA Under-Secretary
Mutriff Siddiq would lead this team and a meeting could take
place in the next 2-3 weeks "once the Americans have
discussed our ideas and decided whether or not to proceed."
Al-Bashir queried Alor about whether Siddiq was "senior
enough" to be able to conclude a workplan with the Americans
and Alor said that more senior Sudanese officials could
always join the discussion if needed (Note: Mutriff Siddiq is
an NCP insider, close to VP Ali Osman Taha, and a very able
diplomat who negotiated the highly favorable - to Sudan -
Addis Ababa agreement on the UN/AU hybrid force in 2006).


4. (C) "There is one other thing," Alor continued, "the
containers for the Embassy." Al-Bashir reportedly said that
"this is part of a larger deal with the Americans that we
haven't arrived at yet." Alor countered "but we promised to
go first, to take the first step with them." Al-Bashir then
said: "ok, this is what we'll do: tell the Americans to pick
a day. It can be this week, next week, whenever. On this day,
they are ready to actually ease the pressure on our Missions
in Washington and New York. On that day, we will go first and
release their containers, construction can resume. They can
reciprocate later that same day once Washington opens."


5. (C) In a separate discussion, Canadian CDA Sam Hanson told
CDA Fernandez that Alor and Presidential Advisor Mustafa
Othman Ismail had presented a very positive analysis of the
possibility of improved US-Sudanese relations to visiting
Canadian Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier on March 25.
Fernandez cautioned that "we're not there yet, by a longshot.
There haven't been any formal discussions yet and there is no
agreement either."


6. (C) Comment: Alor seems to have secured from the President
agreement to release the containers and allow NEC
construction to proceed as reciprocity in easing
restrictions, mostly OFAC-related, on Sudanese diplomatic
missions in the U.S. (see reftel b for a description of the
Sudanese complaints). This would supposedly remove the issue
of "the Embassies" from the table as Alor promised Secretary
Rice on February 12. But we continue to be concerned about
the "expectations gap" between the Sudanese and ourselves
about the possibility of rapid improvement in relations.
Alor, and other senior Sudanese officials, have made very
rosy pronouncements on such an outcome during the visit of SE
Williamson and evidently continue to do so. If Al-Bashir is
under the misconception - because of his advisors - that such
an improvement will be easy or a relatively cost-free
endeavor, there are bound to be misunderstandings or
recriminations along the way. This is especially true given
the fissures within the Government of National Unity and
Al-Bashir's penchant for distraction, emotional decisions,
and last-minute changes in policy direction. Carefully
managing expectations with the Sudanese promises to be a
major challenge. End comment.
FERNANDEZ