FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISES SWIFT ACTION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG,
AF/EX, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018
TAGS: SU KPKO ABLD AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISES SWIFT ACTION ON
BILATERAL ISSUES, SEES SOME PROGRESS ON ABYEI

REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 428

B. B) KHARTOUM 386

C. C) KHARTOUM 296

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Deng Alor agreed to the
immediate visa issuance of US Military Observers requested by
UNAMID, and promised rapid progress on other visas and on
security measures. He also will be raising the issue of NEC
containers with President Al-Bashir in the next two days.
Alor had not seen the final draft of a Sudanese non-paper for
the USG but, despite describing it as a "purely NCP document"
strongly urged US engagement with the Sudanese as follow up.
He said that there had been some additional progress and
agreement in principle on Abyei but still no definitive
breakthrough. End summary.

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VISAS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATS
--------------


2. (C) CDA Fernandez arranged to meet Sudanese Minister of
Foreign Affairs Deng Alor on March 24 immediately after
Alor's week-long absence in Juba and Nairobi. CDA reminded
Deng of their discussion on March 15 of visas for US military
Observers for UNAMID (reftel b). Alor responded that so far
UNAMID has only asked for three of them and "orders have been
given for them to receive their visas in Washington." He said
that once UNAMID formally notified the Sudanese MFA of the
other MILOBS, he would make sure their visas were issued as
well. Since UNAMID notified the MFA only on March 19,
approval will have come in just five days (over a long
holiday weekend),if indeed they are now issued. Alor also
agreed to clear up any backlog of official American visas
still outstanding, including the incoming RSO and DLO. In
Charge's presence he asked his office director to have the
Sudanese Embassies in Washington and Addis Ababa informed
immediately.


3. (C) CDA then raised the issue of Embassy security. This
continues to be a major concern as Embassy buildings,
especially the Chancery, are quite susceptible to a "Jeddah
style" armed attack because we have no Marines. Charge asked
that the Minister push his staff to accomplish two things:
secure non-diplomatic plates for Embassy vehicles and
permission for arming some members of the local guard force
protecting our various offices in Khartoum. Charge noted that
both requests have been made repeatedly for months and while
we have heard "informally from the Ministry" that these steps
will be approved, we have nothing in writing and nothing has
happened yet. CDA Fernandez recalled that the request for
arming guards was made in early December, even before the
murder of two Embassy staff on January 1 while the requests
for non-dip plates (also made by the UK Embassy which still
waiting for a response) dated from early January. Alor asked
"what type of weapons do you want to arm them with?" Charge
responded that he was not sure but he thought 9mm pistols and
the FM answered "you should ask for Kalashnikovs." He then
called in his office director and asked him to follow up with
the Protocol and Americas Departments, who have been working
on these issues.

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PRESSING ON NEC CONTAINERS
--------------


4. (C) Charge asked if there was anything new on the release
of containers for NEC construction recounting MFA U/S
Siddiq's explanation that the current containers being held
could be released upon the holding of the next US-Sudan
discussion on improving relations (reftel a). Alor said that
Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail and himself would
be raising the issue in the next couple of days with
President Al-Bashir. Deng had raised the issue two weeks ago
with the President after speaking with A/S Jendayi Frazer and
Al-Bashir had said at the time "let's wait until we deliver
our written response to the Americans." This response was
delivered on March 23 (reftel a) so it was an opportune time
to ask him again.


5. (C) Alor explained that he had the Sudanese non-paper on
his desk but did not have a chance to review it yet, it was
"an NCP (National Congress Party) document and not a
Government of National Unity paper." VP Ali Osman Taha had
told him that "the NCP should take the lead in drafting it
because you don't have any problems with the U.S., we do."
CDA agreed with that logic but noted that the document gave
"an NCP spin" to the issue of Abyei and also included some
ridiculous things like the US apologizing for the 1998 cruise

missile attack on a Khartoum pharmaceutical plant. "They
included that?" Alor laughed, "maybe they should ask
President Clinton to apologize."

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ZIGZAGS FOR ABYEI
--------------


6. (C) Alor said that he would study carefully the portion of
the Sudanese document dealing with the CPA and specifically
on Abyei. Although he had not attended the entire meeting of
the SPLM's Interim Political Bureau (IPB) held in Juba March
16-19, he was there for the session on Abyei. Alor said that
First Vice President Salva Kiir had agreed to Ali Osman
Taha's suggestion that oil and land be separated as issues in
settling the dispute. He had not yet decided on Taha's
suggestions that a special fund be set up using Abyei's
revenues (after deducting funds for local people per the CPA)
to promote infrastructure projects to promote national unity
and tie the country together. He said that the NCP proposal
has Kiir himself chairing this fund. Alor said that
discussion on Abyei's borders still hovers around the "blue
line" of the ABC report, minus El-Merriam and Higlig (reftel
c). Reportedly President Al-Bashir objected to the "straight
line" of the blue line, "because it reminds him of the hated
ABC report recommendations." Can you imagine that, he joked
"we will have to make it a zigzag in order to please him."


7. (C) The Foreign Minister said that, even though he has not
studied Sudan's (or rather, the NCP's) response to the USG
non-paper, he believes that this dialogue is worth moving
forward on "in order to test the NCP's true intentions." He
believes that MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq is the right choice to
lead the Sudanese side "because he is one of them and a
decent guy, for an Islamist," he laughed.


8. (C) Comment: As usual in Sudan, follow-through is the key
- not just with adversaries in the NCP, but with our friends
in the SPLM (and UNAMID in Darfur too). Post will continue to
follow up with Sudanese officials as well as UNAMID on all
these issues to see if good intentions are translated into
actual deeds. DPKO in New York also needs to be pressed to
get UNAMID to accept the remaining American MILOBS. Alor's
candid observations on Abyei, a subject close to his heart,
show how close we are to an agreement there but also how it
could still fall apart. It also shows that the overheated
rhetoric on total NCP intransigence on Abyei is an
exaggeration - at least sometimes. End comment.
FERNANDEZ