LIAR'S POKER: SUDANESE "CALL AND RAISE" ON USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000428

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC
FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ABLD SU
SUBJECT: LIAR'S POKER: SUDANESE "CALL AND RAISE" ON USG
NON-PAPER

REF: A. KHARTOUM 300


B. KHARTOUM 297

C. KHARTOUM 278

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Sudan's formal response to a USG non-paper
raises the hope of progress on some humanitarian and UNAMID
deployment issues, considerable flexibility on CPA-related
items and also presents unrealistic, maximalist
recommendations towards normalizing relations with the United
States and funding for initiatives unlikely to be achieved in
a short timeframe. As such it is a typical Sudanese opening
gambit tantalizing in its description of possible
bureaucratic breakthroughs and at the same time projecting an
image of rock-solid, even arrogant, self-confidence. It
actually promises little and asks for much -- a standard ploy
for very experienced Sudanese negotiators. The Sudanese
response also ignores demands that it cease bombing and abide
by a cease-fire in Darfur, doubtless seeing such steps as an
infringement of its sovereign right to self-defense against
rebel forces. Embassy Khartoum's strong recommendation is
that there is enough room here for a detailed discussion with
the Sudanese albeit with lowered expectations about achieving
a mutually agreed upon workplan and crystal clear consensus
by US policymakers about our own non-negotiable demands and
actual quid pro quo responses. End summary.

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AN OFFER WE CAN REFUSE
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2. (C) Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Mutriff Siddiq and
key NCP strategist Said al-Khatib called in CDA Fernandez on
March 23 to present him with Sudan's written response to an
11 page American "non-paper" presented to them on February 29
by Special Envoy Williamson (reftels). The three part
response consists of an introduction, an 11 page matrix
listing 59 possible action items 25 of these are responses to
demands made in the American non-paper while 24 are Sudanese
suggestions of needed American actions. The matrix describes
the issue, the implementation measure, suggested timeframe
and the authority needing to implement it - UN, Sudan, US,
SPLM, for example. (The USG non-paper did not include any USG
quid pro quo steps in response to Sudanese concessions) and a
paper on US impediments to the normal work of the Sudanese
diplomatic missions in New York and Washington. Embassy will
scan and send the entire text to AF/SPG. Text of cover memo
and complaints from missions in the U.S. follow at the end of
this message.


3. (C) Siddiq and Khatib, veteran negotiators with years of
hard bargaining experience (Khatib was deeply involved in the
CPA and Siddiq negotiated the 2006 Darfur Agreement with Kofi
Annan on the UN/AU Hybrid Force) began by noting that Sudan
was sincere in wanting an improved relationship with the
United States. Although Sudan did not like much of the tone
of the USG non-paper, they respected Special Envoy
Williamson's vision and description of the USG document as a
"living document." They said that the Sudanese response was
also a living document: it was not a take it or leave
position and Sudan was ready to discuss "all American
concerns in detail anytime, anywhere within one week's time."
They suggested somewhere in Europe might be easiest to
arrange but they were flexible. They did not expect that the
United States would be willing to accept every proposal that
Sudan makes in the matrix towards normalizing relations.

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NOT YET ON NEC FACILITATION
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4. (C) When pressed by CDA Fernandez, Siddiq confirmed
Sudan's position that no steps will yet be taken to release
OBO containers for Khartoum NEC construction at this time.
Siddiq said that he expected Sudan will release the current
20 containers in country as a "confidence building measure"
upon or before the successful conclusion of an initial
meeting to discuss a bilateral workplan and that there would
be no problems with the NEC "if we agree on a way forward in
our bilateral relations". This confirms what Presidential
Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail told CDA earlier in the week
that the issue of the NEC (and the Sudanese Missions in the
U.S.) remains very much on the table and part of a package
deal.


5. (SBU) The matrix responds to American concerns and
priorities by beginning with humanitarian issues. Much of
what would be agreed to are items that Sudan has already
signed off on, for example, in the Joint Commuique. In some

cases, it does expand (or appear to expand) on some concerns
such as:

-- NGO staff to be granted entry visas within 72 hours.

-- Travel to Darfur to be allowed within 48 hours from
notification.

-- NGO items to be cleared within 7 days of arrival at port.

-- Multiple entry visas for NGO directors (but not all NGO
staff) per Joint Communique.

-- Commits itself (once again) to only voluntary return of
IDPs in Darfur.

-- Seems to allow UNHCR to expand into IDP camp coordination
in South Darfur State (currently limited to West Darfur).

-- Willing to commit the use of the Joint Procedures Center
(JPC) only for NGOs and Humanitarian Agencies.

-- Agrees to additional police to protect routes from bandits
attacking food convoys.

-- Establishing an airport office for emergency situations.

As for possible USG actions, under the same humanitarian
rubric, it calls for:

-- US-funded "model villages in order to facilitate voluntary
returns in Darfur."

-- US-funded programs to halt environmental degradation in
Darfur.

-- US-funded reconstruction and development programs in
Darfur.

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A PROMISE ON CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
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6. (SBU) Under UNAMID issues, the Sudanese re-assert that
"securing the borders is the sole sovereign right and duty of
the Sudanese Government," but in an agreed-upon workplan it
would agree to the following:

-- Naming a senior Sudanese official as focal point to solve
all UNAMID deployment issues.

-- Facilitation of UNAMID customs clearance at Port Sudan
within 10 days.

-- Allowing US companies to work unhindered in Darfur.

-- Sudan will consider the deployment of the Thai infantry
battalion and Nepalese "immediately after the completion of
the stages of deployment and evaluation of the African
contribution" (Note: this is no concession but just
re-stating the current Sudanese negotiating position).

-- Removal of all day/night restrictions on UNAMID
aircraft...once UN upgrades airport capability.

For US actions in this category, the Sudanese propose:

-- US financial and technical support in upgrading airports,
water and electricity, roads and other transportation "in
implementation of the light and heavy support packages."

-- They restate steps the USG is already taking to fund
UNAMID and equip and train African battalions for the force.


7. (SBU) Under facilitating the work of the Join Meiation
Support Team (JMST),the Sudanese would agree to ease up on
petty harassment of UN JMST work while calling on the US to
begin applying real pressure on recalcitrant Darfur rebel
groups and getting American support for an international
conference on development in Darfur.


8. (C) The Sudanese would agree to solve all issues related
to NEC construction within seven days of an agreement to
solve problems with the Sudanese Missions in New York and
Washington. The United States would have to remove Sudan from
the State Sponsor of Terrorism List, remove economic
sanctions on Sudan, issue a formal apology and make payment
of damages for the 1998 cruise missile attack on the Al-Shifa
pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum "immediately". The United
States would also help Sudan to join the World Trade



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NOTHING NEW ON CPA
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9. (C) The matrix makes clear Sudan's sensitivity to public
criticism by asking for the "cessation of hostile official
media campaigns against Sudan, including antagonistic
groundless accusations" and the setting up of some sort of
"Dialogue Mechanism" to address all issues of concern. The
fact that most criticism of Sudan in the U.S. has little or
nothing to do with official statements seems lost on the
Sudanese who control much of their own media. The
US-educated NCP should know better but they are stung by US
press nevertheless.


10. (SBU) On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),the
regime agrees to stop supporting all non-government actors
(like the Misseriyya militia or PDF) - support it has never
admitted to supplying in the first place - and also funding
of the census, passage of the electoral law, formation of the
National Electoral Commission, and setting up an interim
administration for Abyei within 45 days (all things that the
regime should be doing anyway). There is nothing new here as
this is part of the daily rhetoric of painfully slow ongoing
NCP-SPLM negotiations on these issues. The text explicitly
blames the SPLM for any delays in solving Abyei, an
interesting point that will have to be explained to Foreign
Minister Deng Alor, an Abyei native, once he returns to Sudan
on March 23.


11. (C) Comment: The documents presented to us are an
accurate reflection of the mindset of the Khartoum regime
(meaning the National Congress Party): proud, tough, even
defiant, vaguely positive, deeply knowledgeable about Sudan
and its intricacies but hopelessly naive about the outside
world, offering little but demanding much in the expectation
that much of what is on the table - from both sides - will
have to be whittled down, ready to deal and mostly
unrepentant. The difference is that most of the USG
suggestions in our non-paper are quite realistic and many of
the Sudanese recommendations for American reciprocal actions
are totally surreal. Despite this, Embassy Khartoum does
believe that there is enough here to warrant further
discussion with the Sudanese while keeping our expectations
of actual success low. The key is to have great clarity
about our own bottom line demands, timelines and what we are
willing to offer in return. We also believe that, while the
regime is proud and intransigent, it is also fragile and
quite susceptible to additional pressure and this is an
eventuality that also needs to be explored (realizing that
the Sudanese will inevitably respond by further squeezing the
US official presence in Sudan). This is also a tool we should
not shy away from brandishing, as needed, in our private
discussion with the Sudanese. There is no doubt, however,
that possible steps agreed to in principle by the Sudanese,
in the humanitarian and UNAMID fields, would - if actually
implemented - improve access for humanitarian workers and
speed up (perhaps marginally, given UNAMID's own internal
problems) UNAMID peacekeeper deployment. The question will be
at what price will those improvements come? On CPA, we are
not daunted on the lack of specificity here but rather
believe that any future discussion should include pressing
the Sudanese regime harder on Abyei (and ABC Report borders)
and on elections. End Comment.


12. (SBU) Begin text (introduction):

"President Bashir's initiative to give the mending of
Sudan-U.S. relations a serious attempt was made in good faith
and is based on the assumption that although we have suffered
the brunt of many punitive measures which were either totally
unjustified and/or politically motivated, there are some
genuine concerns on the part of the USG and that these
concerns should be addressed by us seriously and
constructively just as we expect our legitimate concerns to
be seriously and constructively addressed by the USG. If
this assumption is not shared by both governments then the
obvious conclusion we could arrive at is that this effort
will be futile.

We understand fully the extent to which the USG could use its
enormous might and influence to incur damage on the fortunes
of our country and people, however, this effort is not driven
by fear. It is fueled by optimism, confidence and belief, and
so threats as real and imminent as they may be shall not have
a positive role in shaping our relationship.

The response we got is disappointing not because it made
certain demands on our government - those we do expect but
because it stayed away from the main focus of the initiative,
which is and shall be the bilateral relations - and dealt
instead with issues that are the concerns of Sudan and
various "third parties."

It is also disappointing because it betrays a degree of
disrespect to the sovereignty of Sudan. It furthermore
disregards agreements Sudan has concluded with other entities
or assumes that in order to improve Sudan-US relations, the
Government of Sudan should seek to amend or fail its
obligations under those agreements. Notwithstanding the
above general commentary on the proposals, we have chosen to
respond to them constructively, this is because of the
following:

We want to confirm our seriousness and challenge the resolve
of both parties and their commitment to the declared
objectives of working towards healthy relations.

The Special Envoy characterized the proposals as a living
document and as such we prefer to see how this document would
look after our response is incorporated in it.

We believe in dialogue as much as we resent being dictated to.

It concerns a matter of vital importance to our future and
national security and should be approached with due
seriousness and responsibility.

In light of verbal assurances that the intentions are good,
although the workplan may look otherwise, we elect to go the
extra mile.

It is our belief that the cornerstone to improving relations
is focusing sincerely and frankly on the common concerns. And
it is our belief that Sudan has a lot to offer, if we
establish a healthy and normal relationship. We are not
seeking guardianship, under an erroneous assumption that we
are a burden and a problem to be either ignored or used
against the Sudanese people. We are looking for a
partnership that would unleash our enormous potential for the
common good of both countries and that of the region."

End text.


13. (SBU) Concerns of Sudan Missions in New York and
Washington:

Begin text: "Washington - financial aspects:

The tight financial restrictions imposed by the treasury on
the Embassy account as well as on the private accounts of the
diplomats to the extent that commercial banks refuse to open
an account for the Embassy.

The money transfers for the Embassy are subject to strict
restrictions and prior requests for providing information on
the source of the transfer and its size. Any missing
information could led and actually led to the cancellation of
transfers.

All the financial transactions of the Embassy are subject to
strict restrictions. The Embassy regularly receives queries
about details of its daily transactions, including details
about checks. The Embassy faces great difficulty in issuing
cashiers checks requested by some parties.

The Bank appointed a full-time officer to deal with the
Embassy's account. He is paid a monthly salary of three
thousand dollars by the Embassy.

The private accounts of Mission members are subject to
restrictions including a prior permission from the Treasury
for opening the accounts and a personal undertaking for the
bank in order to allow for withdrawal of money for personal
needs only (these accounts have been frozen twice so far).

As a result of the U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan and its
Mission, service companies have refrained from offering any
service to the Mission. The insurance company, which has been
dealing with the Mission for twenty years has canceled its
contract with the Mission in order to avoid any legal
accountability. It is not unlikely that other needs of the
Mission will be affected (water, electricity, telephones and
actual repairs of premises).

New York

Delay in the issuance of entry visa requests by Sudanese
officials who are visiting New York to attend official
meetings of the United Nations. In some cases, visas were
granted after the beginning of the meetings in a manner that
eventually deprives officials from participating.

Treatment of Sudanese official when arriving at New York
airports. Some of them, including the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and other high ranking officials were detained for
hours in private rooms without informing them of the reasons
justifying such behavior. Those incidents were reported to
both the US Mission and the United Nations Host Country
Committee. No action was taken so far to ensure
non-repetition of those incidents.

Financial concerns of the Mission. Difficulties facing the
Mission's account that led lately to freezing that account in
violation of host country obligations and international law
norms and practice.

Members of the Mission are frequently victims of unwarranted
and unjustifiable delay in renewal of their stay permits in a
way that hinders their travel from New York on official
business."

End text.


14. (SBU) Text of matrix scanned for AF/SPG distribution.

FERNANDEZ