USG ELECTIONS STRATEGY IN SUDAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000427

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - GARBELED TEXT PARA 4

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG, DRL,
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: USG ELECTIONS STRATEGY IN SUDAN

REF: A. KHARTOUM 422


B. KHARTOUM 420

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Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (C) Free and fair elections in Sudan are a top foreign
policy objective for the USG, and it is therefore critical
early on to define a policy framework and begin planning in
earnest now for the 2009 Sudanese elections. Despite the
constant demands for our attention from Darfur and the
North-South border, there are several reasons that it is
critical to define a clear policy on elections now. First,
elections will soon collide with Darfur and we must have a
clear policy stating that elections should occur nation-wide
despite the on-going conflict in Darfur - this will be
especially important after the census in Darfur is declared
incomplete due to lack of access and participation. Second,
the SPLM must know what support it can expect from the USG in
order to plan appropriately, and we should inform the SPLM
now so that we are not seen to be waffling in our support for
the South. Third, the donor community and the UN must be
mobilized and we cannot take a leadership role in that
process without a clear policy. This is especially important
because the UN appears to have no real strategy other than
hiring some staff, and is resistant to pressuring the NCP
regime on elections. Therefore it falls to the US to take a
leadership role in moving the elections process forward in
order to ensure that this key CPA milestone is met. The
risks of a failed CPA due to greatly delayed or failed
elections are too great to ignore. Failed elections in Sudan
could ignite violence on a much wider scale than was seen in
Kenya's recent elections.

Elections Policy in Darfur
--------------


2. (C) When the census in Darfur is declared incomplete
despite our efforts (reftel),as is widely expected, it is
imperative that the US and others in the international
community reassure Darfuris - publicly - that they can and
should still participate in the elections. Many Darfuris are
resistant to participating in either the census or the
elections until the crisis in Darfur is solved. This is a
message that IDPs receive regularly from rebel leaders such
as Adbulwahid Al-Nur, who want to use the election as a lever
to push for resolution of security and compensation issues.
(Note: However, other political parties such as Umma have and
will continue to push for participation by Darfuris in
elections. End note.) This is not the first time that the
CPA has collided with the crisis in Darfur, as those who
negotiated the North-South agreement amidst fighting in
Darfur know well. Many in Darfur believe that the SPLM
abandoned them in favor of their own interests, both in
Naivasha and at Abuja.


3. (C) However, the decades-long war in the South killed ten
times as many people as the war in Darfur by most estimates,
and the risks to country-wide instability are far greater if
the CPA is derailed. Elections are a key milestone in the
CPA, and there is a serious risk of instability within the
GNU and in the South in particular if the election is greatly
delayed or viewed to have been stolen outright by the NCP.
This will make many in the South believe that the NCP is
likely to take away the referendum as well.


4. (S) Paradoxically, non-participation in elections by
Darfuris is actually in the interests of the NCP, because
most voters in this brutalized region will not vote for the
NCP, and the regime knows this. Therefore the USG should be
doing everything possible to encourage and develop
SLM/Abdulwahid and SLM/Minnawi as political entities, to
encourage broad-based alliances of like-minded democrats and
to encourage their followers (and followers of other parties)
to participate in elections in Darfur. The USG should also
encourage the SPLM to ally itself with the SLM and other
opposition parties in the north in a broad coalition against
the NCP. The NCP is still likely to win, given its coercion
and access to resources as the sitting regime, but a result
that brings a greater number of opposition members into the
government will force the regime to make concessions and
codify a certain amount of political space in Sudan for years
to come.

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5. (C) Although a comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur is
highly unlikely before the elections, US policy should be
that Darfuris take advantage of every opportunity to
participate and not be excluded and further marginalized.
Although many in Darfur may reject this view and such
statements may make the US temporarily unpopular amongst
IDPs, in the long run it is in the interests of Darfur to
participate and a significant showing from voters in Darfur
could actually serve to change the power dynamic in this
grinding conflict and encourage the regime to make greater
concessions on Darfur to solve the land rights, tribal
favoritism, governance, and public sector investment and
services issues that created the conditions for war.
Moreover, the SPLM, Umma, and DUP all have followers in
Darfur as well, and have an interest in ensuring that they
can vote in the election. US policy must make it clear that
support for peace in Darfur and for democracy in Sudan as a
whole are not incompatible. Emphasizing democratic
transformation in Sudan is also not a substitute for an
enforceable peace in Darfur including elements such as a
ceasefire and return of IDPs and refugees in safety and
dignity.

Elections Policy in the South
--------------


6. (S) Many in the South and in the SPLM would like to avoid
elections and move directly to the referendum. We believe
this is a mistake and risks undermining not only the CPA but
also the internal political dynamic in the South - if the
SPLM is viewed by other groups as protecting its own
Dinka-dominated leadership at the expense of other groups.
The SPLM is looking for a clear signal from the US regarding
elections policy and needs reassurance that the US will
support them. If not, for the sake of self-preservation, the
SPLM will be tempted to "make a deal with NCP" in hopes of
preserving its minimal fallback position on the CPA: the
right to vote for independence and secede in peace in 2011.
Post believes it is in the interests of the USG to support a
broad coalition of parties against the NCP, especially the
SPLM and the SLM. The SPLM has already begun refining its
options for an elections strategy, and needs to receive clear
signals from the USG.


7. (C) The SPLM may yet be tempted by an elections alliance
with its CPA partner the NCP. However this would be a
mistake, as it would further raise anger in the North
(including Darfur) against the SPLM, where it is already
viewed by many as having abandoned its democratic principles
in favor of a monopolistic hold on power and wealth through
the CPA. There is even the possibility that the NCP could
use this to raise anger against the SPLM and create support
for a re-opening of the CPA following elections. (Note: This
is another area which requires clear US policy before, during
and after elections - that the CPA should not be opened
following elections and that the South's right to a
referendum following elections is sacrosanct. Readers in
Washington may assume this is a given, but here in Sudan both
Sudanese and Western pundits alike speculate on the
implications a new post-election coalition would have on the
CPA and the referendum. End note.) Depending on how voting
occurs, there will likely be a modified ruling coalition
formed after the elections, which could include the NCP, the
SPLM, some elements of the DUP, the Umma if they run, and the
SLM if we can convince them to run.


8. (C) Post believes that it is not helpful to advise the
SPLM to run GOSS President Salva Kiir against President
Bashir. John Garang would have made an attractive national
candidate given his historic profile and campaign for a New
Sudan, but given the significant possibility of instability
in the South and the need for the SPLM to focus on governance
in its own territory, Kiir's continued leadership is required
as President of the GOSS. The SPLM should therefore focus
its efforts on the South, while developing an effective
national strategy of outreach to Arabic-speaking Muslim
Northern Sudanese and run a charismatic and respected
candidate who straddles both Northern and Southern interests,
such as Blue Nile Governor Malik Agar, party leader Yassir
Arman (a distant cousin of President Bashir) or former Nuba
Commander Abdel Aziz Helou. The SPLM will obviously make its
own choices in this regard, but we believe Kiir should not be
encouraged to run. Indeed, having him run for President of
Sudan, while leaving the GOSS Presidency up for grabs

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(assuming, per the new law, that he will have to choose one
or the other) is an almost certain recipe for instability in
South Sudan with Kiir's GOSS VP, the corrupt, scheming and
widely disliked Riek Machar (except among his own Nuer)
unleashed for further mischief.

Pushing the Donors and the UN Forward
--------------


9. (C) The UN is grossly unprepared to move forward on
elections, with only three employees in the elections office
and little more than a theoretical timeline and a plan to
hire more staff. There appears to be little or no strategy
among the UN and donors as we all wait for the Sudanese to
pass the Electoral Law. SRSG Qazi and his staff appear to
have little appetite for elections and even less appetite for
applying pressure to the regime, which will be required if
elections are to move forward. Therefore the US will need to
continue to press the regime on complying with timelines, and
speak out at key points in the process to indicate our belief
that elections must move forward nationwide in a timely
fashion.


10. (C) When the census is determined to be incomplete (as is
widely anticipated due to lack of preparation and access as
reported reftel) that will be an opportune time for the US to
state clearly and publicly that the census should be a lesson
-- that preparation must begin immediately on the elections
so that this key CPA milestone is not missed. We will also
need to state clearly our understanding that participation in
the census is not required for participation in elections -
that voter registration is the key to being able to vote -
and that national elections that include Darfur are essential.


11. (C) If the SPLM and NCP strike a deal and announce that
they want to significantly delay elections (which may happen
in the coming months) the US should state clearly that while
we respect the wishes of the CPA parties for a well-prepared
election, it is imperative that the parties do everything
possible to respect the timelines in the CPA, while also
ensuring a free and fair election nationwide, and encourage
them to minimize delays. This means elections in Sudan no
later than fall 2009, after the end of the rainy season in
South Sudan. A free and fair election nationwide is essential
for both the stability and democratic transformation of
Sudan, but a lengthy delay in the election carries its own
inherent risks, especially in the South.

US Elections Programming Support
--------------


12. (C) Although the US now funds several small-scale
programs such as IRI and NDI to assist with political party
development (SPLM in the South and SLM/Minawi in the North),
US policy in Sudan requires a much larger and more robust
elections support program that focuses on four tracks: 1)
structural support for elections, especially in the South but
also in Darfur and the East, 2) direct support to the SPLM,
SLM, and other parties for media outreach and party building
activities, especially in the North; 3) enhanced support to
all political parties in Sudan, and 4) a robust program for
monitoring and observation of elections. Despite the
Political Parties Act, which bans outright foreign support
for Sudanese political parties, the US should proceed with a
substantive plan for support of all political parties in
Sudan. Post believes this support should be on an
"industrial" rather than an "artisanal" scale by working
through and generously funding several organizations. The
NCP will attempt to prevent access by the organizations
identified by the US to carry out political party support,
but that should not deter us from doing everything possible
to develop opposition parties who have little other means of
support.


13. (C) International monitoring for elections in Sudan is
enshrined in the CPA (unfortunately, international
observation was not enshrined in the CPA for the census) and
the US should plan a robust monitoring support program to
include the Carter Center, which has already formally been
invited by the GOS to observe the elections.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Although Sudan's elections (envisioned by the CPA to

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occur in July 2009) may seem far off and of a lesser priority
than the crisis in Darfur and brewing crises in Abyei and
along the North-South border, they are essential to achieving
stability in Sudan, and assuring the US administration's
legacy in Sudan in brokering the historic Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. Defining a clear elections strategy now is needed
so that we will have a coherent plan moving forward into the
next US administration and as internal planning and
horsetrading among political players begins in Sudan for the
first (and probably most comprehensive ever in Sudan's
history) democratic elections in 23 years.
FERNANDEZ