THERE ARE NEITHER MODERATES NOR HARDLINERS IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: THERE ARE NEITHER MODERATES NOR HARDLINERS IN THE
NCP

REF: A. KHARTOUM 355


B. KHARTOUM 338

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The NCP regime is unified and well organized
despite its corruption, and the popular characterizations of
regime "hardliners" versus "moderates" are overplayed,
according to opposition observers who have known individuals
in the NCP regime for decades. These opposition members also
complain that the NCP has suffocated all opposition by buying
off key opposition members and dividing opposition party
leadership while endlessly negotiating "agreements" that only
serve to further weaken the opposition. End summary.


2. (C) During polchief's recent meetings with opposition
leaders in Khartoum, a common picture emerged of the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) and its relationship with the
opposition parties. Al Siddiq Al Turabi, son of Popular
Congress Party (PCP) leader and former NIF hardliner (and
founding member of Al Bashir's islamist regime) Hassan Al
Turabi, described in detail his understanding of the NCP
regime and its inner workings. Contrary to the popular view
of the NCP as a divided party in which hardliners and
moderates vie for influence while a mercurial President Al
Bashir waffles between these two power centers, Al Turabi
said that all NCP regime insiders with true power are cut
from the same cloth and have only small differences in views
to distinguish them. "Those with true power are the
hardliners," said Turabi, because it is their job to protect
the interests of the party and the regime. In his view,
President Al Bashir, NCP Secretary General Nafie, NISS chief
Ghosh, and Minister of Defense Hussein are the four strongest
individuals in the regime and are therefore the "hardliners"
only in terms of their power and interest in protecting the
regime (such a lineup significantly excludes VP Taha).
Turabi said the idea that Bashir is some sort of puppet and
relies on others beneath him is false. "Bashir has
consolidated his power and remains fully in control of the
elements in his regime," said Turabi. The only thing Bashir
worries about, said Turabi, is that elements in the military
would seek to overthrow him if there is dissatisfaction with
the elections or the referendum. However Turabi predicted
that most northerners would accept the peaceful secession of
the South.


3. (C) Turabi also pointed out that each individual in the
regime has been designated to play a specific role. Nafie
may be viewed as a hardliner because he maintains party
discipline and normally has the last word on policy, but only
because his role gives him this power. Former Finance
Minister (and now Energy Minister) Al Zubeir may have seemed
a hardliner because he would not release the NEC containers
for the US Embassy, but only because he was instructed to do
so. The seemingly moderate and polished negotiators that are
empowered to interact regularly with the Americans and the
SPLM (Taha, Salahudin, Al Khatib, Dirdeiry, Bebiker) are
merely playing the role they have been given by the regime.
There may be debates regarding when and how to interact with
the West, but decisions are determined purely by party and
regime interests. Turabi claimed that the only guiding
ideology of the regime at this point is continued the cynical
access to power and wealth, and Al Bashir and his top
advisors focus exclusively on strategies to maintain their
positions.


4. (C) In a separate meeting with polchief, Umma party Deputy
Secretary General Abdel Nabi made similar points regarding

SIPDIS
the power players in the regime, but added some nuance to the
picture. The main point of debate is whether the regime
needed to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 in
order to stay in power. Nabi pointed out that even though
Vice President Ali Osman Taha had and still retains
significant influence in the party and the regime, he was
under severe pressure during and after the Naivasha
negotiations and many are still against him "and to this day
he's not part of what's going on." Nabi recounted that Taha
left the country for several months two years ago (reportedly
to Turkey) and did not return until summoned by President
Bashir. With regard to regime insiders being "cut from the
same cloth" in Turabi's words, Nabi pointed out that the
regime insiders are all from the same part of the country and
same three tribes, are all of the same generation, all went
to the same schools (many in the US in the 1970s and 1980s
during the Nimeiry years) and all grew out of the same NIF
movement (with Turabi) in the late 1980s.

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5. (C) Both opposition leaders complained that the NCP has
suffocated the opposition parties. Turabi was honest that
the opposition is weak and divided and has been exploited by
the regime when necessary (for example in its negotiations
with the SPLM). Turabi said it is well known that the NCP
has bought off senior members of the Umma and DUP parties
(though he did not say whether his father's PCP party had
been similarly corrupted). Turabi laughed at the recent
"agreement" between the Umma party and the NCP, and predicted
that this will only lead to defections by Umma members into
the government. Turabi said the NCP's goal is to divide
opposition party leadership while endlessly negotiating false
"agreements" that only serve to further weaken the
opposition. Turabi thought it unlikely that the opposition
would be able to mount an effective campaign against the NCP,
and predicted that the NCP and the SPLM would likely continue
to control their respective parts of the country and that
ultimately the South would secede (which he said the North
would likely accept). Nabi remained optimistic said the Umma
party will be able to organize the opposition against the
NCP, but only if the SPLM allows the Umma party to lead the
coalition against the NCP in the North. "The most productive
coalition would be with the SPLM and other marginalized
parties from Darfur, because most of our members are from
marginalized areas of the country." The Umma party hopes that
elections will occur, said Nabi, so that the NCP will be
forced to make some concessions. Without elections, or with
an SPLM-NCP partnership (to protect the CPA) there will be
less opportunity for concessions to the Umma and other
parties.


6. (C) Comment: These observations track with what we hear
from other observers in Khartoum - that the NCP regime is a
corrupt oligarchy determined to hold onto power by any means.
Non-political observers in the business community also share
the view of the NCP not as a regime with hardliners and
moderates, but merely as a regime with powerful and less
powerful actors -- and individuals who have been selected to
play certain roles -- whose main goal is to protect the
stability and longevity of the regime and steal as much money
as possible while doing so.
FERNANDEZ