UNAMID ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY DYNAMICS IN WEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000408

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: UNAMID ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY DYNAMICS IN WEST
DARFUR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 385


B. KHARTOUM 266

C. KHARTOUM 269

D. KHARTOUM 274

E. KHARTOUM 346

KHARTOUM 00000408 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Instability is still prevalent in the corridor north
of El Geneina, where fighting over the last month displaced
thousands and has left the civilians who remain in the area
vulnerable to looting and violence at the hands of Arab
militias, the Sudanese military, and the Central Reserve
Police. UN agencies, the humanitarian community and
Darfurians are clamoring for UNAMID to establish a presence
in Silea, but an absence of logistical capacity and
operational creativity have so far prevented any deployment
of peacekeepers. The SAF continues to build its military
presence in West Darfur, and new attacks on Jebel Moon or
other Chad-supported JEM rebel targets are likely within the
coming weeks. Continued fragmentation of rebel groups and
alliances of convenience with the GoS compound the complex
security and political landscape in West Darfur, which
remains firmly under NISS control. End summary.

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INSTABILITY PERSISTS IN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR
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2. (SBU) Poloffs traveled to El Geneina, West Darfur from
March 10-13 to assess political and security conditions in
the state and re-initiate contact with representatives from
the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),local
government, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatory groups and
Chadian opposition elements (Ref. A). Conversations with the
acting West Darfur UNAMID Head of Office, Civil Affairs and
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) focused heavily
on the recent SAF counter-offensive against rebel-held Sirba,
Silea and Abu Surug--in the corridor north of El Geneina--and
the attendant humanitarian consequences (Refs B-E).


3. (C) Acting West Darfur UNAMID Head of Office Joanna
Oyediran highlighted that protection of civilians in the
northern corridor remains tenuous. She reported that the
population is "squeezed" between remaining in the northern
corridor--where they receive services but remain vulnerable
to looting and sexual violence--and the Chadian border areas,
which are more secure but where they have no access to
services. The UN has documented some cases of ongoing
harassment, human rights abuses, looting and rape in the
northern corridor, allegedly perpetrated by both Arab
militias and by units of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
Central Reserve Police (CRP).


4. (C) UNAMID confirmed that SAF units remain present in
Silea and Abu Surug, while the CRP maintain a presence in
Sirba (the area was secured by local police only until
overrun by JEM rebels in late December 2007). "People still
don,t feel secure in these areas," Oyediran declared,
"though some civilians have returned to Sirba and Abu Surug."
The humanitarian community continues to make day-trips to
the northern corridor to provide services, though longer-term
programming is suspended until security stabilizes. One NGO
representative characterized the northern corridor as a
"catastrophe in terms of protection."


5. (SBU) The civilian component of UNAMID and humanitarian
organizations echoed that the best immediate hope of
re-establishing security in the northern corridor and
encouraging the return of thousands of displaced persons is
to quickly deploy at least some UNAMID peacekeepers to Silea.
Short of creating a foothold for UNAMID, both humanitarian
and UN contacts recommended that civilian police with ties to
the communities be deployed in the northern corridor as they
are less likely to prey on the population. (Note: Our
understanding from reporting in reftels is that civilian
police have been deployed to Silea. End note.).


6. (SBU) (NOTE: UNAMID military officials, for more than a

KHARTOUM 00000408 002.2 OF 004


month, have wanted to establish an outpost in Silea, but
complain that UNAMID's civilian support staff cannot provide
the necessary logistics, including tentage, rations, access
to water and long-range communications. Force Chief of
Staff, recognizing that UNAMID's credibility is on the line,
commented to Fieldoff on March 13 that, in the interim,
UNAMID intends to rotate platoons for short periods of time
into Silea. END NOTE.)

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SAF INTENTIONS IN JEBEL MOON AND JEM DISPOSITION
-------------- ---


7. (C) SAF military action in the northern corridor, aimed at
re-taking areas previously captured by the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM),are likely to shift to the rugged
Jebel Moon area, according to UNDSS officers. UN sources
confirm other reports that JEM received new arms and vehicles
from Chad in recent weeks but, because of the SAF campaign,
no longer has sufficient manpower to utilize them. UNDSS
verified that the Sudanese military continues to mass
soldiers and material in camps around El Geneina and are
fixated on delivering a "knock out blow" to the JEM, which
was weakened both politically and militarily in the latest
SAF offensive, and by JEM preparing to flee back into Darfur
if Chadian President Deby's regime collapses. Several UN
officials observed that popular local support for JEM
evaporated as the rebel group proved unable to defend Sirba,
Silea or Abu Surug--and then rushed to N'djamena to protect
Deby. There were also credible reports of rebel abuse of
civilians in the period when they held the area.


8. (C) Asked by Poloffs to assess the current status of JEM
forces and displaced population in Jebel Moon, UNDSS opined
that "no senior JEM leadership remains in Jebel Moon" and
that most fighters were still in Chad, possibly in the
vicinity of the border town of Birak. UNDSS and NGO
interlocutors added that the situation remains confusing for
humanitarians, as well, since the command structure of JEM
shifted, rendering past contacts irrelevant and making access
to the area more difficult.


9. (C) JEM denies these pessimistic reports, however.
Poloffs spoke on March 13 with JEM Ceasefire Commission
representative General Bashir, who claimed he was in "within
fifty kilometers" of Jebel Moon, though he gave no further
details of troop strength. He added that that the movement
repelled a SAF attack on Jebel Moon earlier that day and
restored its control of the area. Bashir underscored that
the region is stable enough for UN and humanitarian missions.
The whereabouts of JEM political leadership also remains
unclear, though Poloffs were informed by three independent
contacts that Khalil Ibrahim may be in Europe, strategizing
on next steps to counter SAF operations and eventualities
should Deby's regime fall.


10. (C) Spurring SAF military operations, too, is the further
splintering of JEM, with the most recent fracture leading to
JEM-National Unity, led by Abdel Majid Dooda (Ref E). Both
UNDSS and UNAMID Head of Office Oyediran downplayed the
political and military weight of JEM-National Unity, noting
that the group--composed of Eringa tribesmen--has been
focused on local issues of security and community welfare in
the unsettled region.


11. (C) Contributing to the overall instability throughout
West Darfur, Oyediran held, is the GoS' "outsourcing" of
security to a range of armed groups, including the Popular
Movement for Rights and Democracy (PMRD),a predominantly
Massaleit faction from the Misterei area (southwest of El
Geneina) that split from JEM in June 2007 because of JAM,s
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to
create a fluid and potentially explosive security environment
in West Darfur.

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JURY STILL OUT ON UNAMID
--------------

KHARTOUM 00000408 003.2 OF 004




12. (SBU) Poloffs paid a courtesy call on the UNAMID Sector
West Commander, Senegalese Brigadier General Balle Keita, to
gain his views on security in his area of responsibility and
current challenges facing the peacekeeping force. Keita
articulated three priority areas for assistance: long-range
communications that are compatible with UNAMID police and
civilian components, additional armored personnel carriers
(APC) and more troops, along with the camps needed to
accommodate them. Notwithstanding current constraints, Keita
asserted, he has pushed units under his command to step up
patrols throughout the sector, including at night. He
remarked that this new operational tempo was having a
positive effect, proudly noting that the SAF in Zalingei
"complained that UNAMID was patrolling too much."


13. (SBU) Beyond expanding UNAMID,s visible presence, Keita
described his personal outreach efforts to IDPs, Arab tribes
and armed factions to explain the peacekeeping force's
mandate and capabilities. He acknowledged that the "jury is
still out" on UNAMID, especially in light of its inability to
take decisive steps to enhance security in the northern
corridor, and that the sector has no public information
officers or a humanitarian liaison. Poloffs highlighted the
importance of making a positive early impact on Darfurians'
perception of UNAMID; the Sector Commander concurred and
pleaded that UNAMID's civilian component and the
international community should expedite the delivery of quick
impact projects (QIP) to link the new UN force with tangible
progress on the ground.


14. (SBU) COMMENT: General Keita is among the most proactive
and progressive of UNAMID's commanders, as evidenced not only
by his analysis of the situation in West Darfur but also by
his operational initiative. He recognized the importance of
quickly erecting a UNAMID flag in Silea but pointed out that
he does not have sufficient troops (with only one company in
El Geneina itself) or adequate logistical support provided
through UNAMID's civilian component. Until either UNAMID
units arrive completely self-sufficient with an ability to
conduct long-range mobile patrols or UNAMID's Integrated
Support Services (ISS) can rapidly fulfill the operational
requirements of a re-positioned peacekeeping element,
UNAMID's ability to influence security and its credibility
will remain feeble. This means that West Darfur's volatile
and confusing political/military mix remains ready to erupt
at any time (especially given the chance of greater
instability in neighboring Chad). END COMMENT.

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POLITICS IN WEST DARFUR: NISS IN CHARGE
--------------


15. (C) Providing a view on the political landscape in West
Darfur, UNAMID and UNDSS contacts flatly stated that National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) unquestionably runs
the show in the state. (NOTE: NISS is headed by Abu Garoon
based in El Geneina. END NOTE.) West Darfur Governor Abdul
Gassim Imam, appointed under the power-sharing provisions of
the DPA and resting on the relatively weak constituency of
his Fur-dominated faction of the SLA, is only able to impact
local, non-security issues, according to UNAMID Head of
Office Oyediran. Notwithstanding his short political leash,
Imam has sought to expand the efforts of his line
ministries--for instance, in health and social affairs--and
allowed space for civil society activities.


16. (C) Head of UNAMID Civil Affairs in West Darfur Lameck
Kawiche noted to Poloffs that his focus remains on organizing
and strengthening civil society so that these groups can
better articulate their interests and, eventually,
participate in some form of peace process. He cited the
usual issues of import to these groups, including
compensation, land use, power and wealth sharing and
disarmament of Arab militias. Kawiche conceded that most
Darfurians he interacts with are not pre-occupied with a
peace process or the prospects of a Darfurian reconciliation
program, but want to see concrete improvements in security
and rule of law. He commented, too, that the paradigm of
interaction between the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and
Consultation (which has no permanent presence on the ground
anywhere in Darfur),Civil Affairs and the Joint Mediation
Support Team (JMST) has still not been clarified by UNAMID
leadership.

KHARTOUM 00000408 004.2 OF 004




17. (C) Asked how the political environment might be
positively influenced in West Darfur, Oyediran identified
three key areas to target. First, the Arab militias must be
squarely confronted and eventually disarmed. As UNDSS put
it, the "genie has been let out of the bottle," and figuring
out how to both contain them and, simultaneously, prevent
them from becoming spoilers are dual imperatives. Second,
Abdel Wahid needs to be co-opted. While he does not hold a
preponderance of rebel military strength in Darfur, he
controls the political center of gravity: hundreds of
thousands of IDPs, most of them Fur. Finally, Oyediran
stressed the importance of addressing the legitimate
grievances and concerns of West Darfur,s nomadic groups
(mostly Arab but also non-Arab like the Zaghawa),who contend
that they are politically and economically marginalized.


18. (C) Comment: UNAMID should be encouraged both in El
Fasher and via DPKO to step up patrols in Silea and
throughout the corridor north of El Geneina. There is now a
real opportunity for UNAMID to demonstrate its concern for
improving security and monitoring the situation in the area
of greatest conflict in Darfur in the last three months. To
be able to step up, however, UNAMID needs greater resources -
troops, transport and logistics - and needs it now.


19. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ