CHAD: RFC'S ERDIMI PLANS LAND GRAB WHILE OTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000397

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU CD FR
SUBJECT: CHAD: RFC'S ERDIMI PLANS LAND GRAB WHILE OTHER
REBELS MOVE TO TOPPLE DEBY

REF: A. KHARTOUM 00311

B. KHARTOUM 00385

KHARTOUM 00000397 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)

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Summary
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1. (C) As other Chadian rebel factions conspire to topple
President Idriss Deby, RFC leader Timan Erdimi plans to
"occupy" as much territory as possible and then negotiate
with a transitional government to achieve his political
objectives, he told Poloff in Khartoum on March 15.
Explaining that rival opposition leaders Mahamat Nouri and
Ahmed Soubian are incapable of conceptualizing or executing a
strategy to govern the country, Erdimi confirmed other
reports that he resisted Sudanese pressure to ally with the
other rebel movements. Describing Chad under Deby as a
country without any effective institutions that is dominated
by a corrupt and exploitative Zaghawa elite, Erdimi pledged
to institute a "strong state and strong rule of law." Though
Erdimi claimed that Deby has rebuffed his overtures for
political dialogue, Senior Assistant to the President Minni
Minawi--who is attempting to mediate between Erdimi and Deby,
both fellow Zaghawas--characterized Erdimi's demands as
unrealistic but indicated that senior RFC commanders want to
"change Deby's mentality rather than Deby's government." End
summary.

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RFC Strategy: Occupy Territory
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2. (C) Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) leader Timan Erdimi
told Poloff on March 15 in Khartoum that while he will not
participate in joint "combat operations" with the Chadian
rebels allied with Mahamat Nouri, Abdelwahid Aboud, and Ahmed
Soubian--the "National Alliance"--he shares their desire to
unseat President Idriss Deby. As the National Alliance
topples Deby's government, Erdimi plans to send his forces
into Chad to "occupy" as much land as possible. According to
this strategy, he would then negotiate with the transitional
government to secure agreement on his two principal
objectives: 1) Top posts for him and his movement in a new
Chadian regime and 2) Retention of his forces. He said that
he is waiting for the National Alliance "to organize itself"
and that once he receives word that they have crossed into
Chad, he will tell his own forces to begin the offensive.


3. (C) Erdimi estimated that the National Alliance consists
of 3,000 fighters and confidently predicted that they would
be able to overthrow the regime, even without the help of the
RFC's slightly less robust force. "There is no army any
more," said Erdimi, claiming that as the National Alliance's
fighters advance toward N'djamena, the force will swell with
volunteers. Purporting to maintain contact with Medecins
Sans Frontiers, the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, and other humanitarian organizations, Erdimi
claimed that the opposition will coordinate its offensive
with aid agencies to ensure minimal impact on civilians.

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Nouri, Soubian Have No "Program"
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4. (C) Confirming reports that he has resisted Sudanese
pressure to ally with the other movements (Refs. A and B),
Erdimi said he told National Congress Party (NCP) officials,
including Director General of the National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, that such an alliance
would require a common political platform. Nouri and
Soubian, however, are only focused on overthrowing Deby and
do not have a "program for the country" beyond changing the
regime, said Erdimi. He questioned whether either of these
other rebel leaders could conceptualize--not to mention
execute--a strategy for governing Chad. "It will just be
more of the same if they're in power," said Erdimi.

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RFC Doesn't "Work" for Sudan

KHARTOUM 00000397 002.2 OF 004


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5. (C) Admitting that Sudan is "not happy" about his decision
to go it alone, Erdimi said that "he could not work for them
(the NCP)." He downplayed Sudan's influence on the Chadian
opposition, explaining that all previous Chadian
insurgencies--including the first coup in 1966--and Deby
himself, were launched out of Darfur, irrespective of the
state of Chad-Sudan bilateral relations. "Everything always
comes from the East," said Erdimi. Asked what he would do if
the NCP tried to keep him in Khartoum, he declared he would
"beat the drum" and stimulate public pressure for his
release. "This is our program," continued Erdimi. "If it
pleases the U.S. or pleases Sudan, that's not our concern."

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Chad Needs Strong State, Rule of Law
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6. (C) The most pressing issue confronting Chad is the
interplay between politicians and the military, diagnosed
Erdimi. Nouri and Soubian--as well as the numerous
international experts from the UN, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and elsewhere--have never
understood this dynamic, which explains why attempts to
modernize the country have failed. By contrast, Erdimi
pledged to establish "institutions of law" that would
regulate the military's power and mitigate tribal tensions.
Until these institutions are in place, elections are
impossible. "They (Nouri and Soubian) say they will give
power to the people," said Erdimi. "What people? Where are
they? Chad is like Darfur--it needs a strong state and
strong rule of law."

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Deby: Corrupt and Ineffectual
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7. (C) Erdimi, a Zaghawa who is Deby's nephew, slammed the
current Chadian government for its corruption and ineffectual
leadership, painting a picture of a discriminatory and
out-of-control regime. "Idriss does not know how to govern a
country," said Erdimi. "He entertains himself. He reigns;
he does not govern. There are no institutions outside of his
patronage."


8. (C) Deby's autocratic style has allowed the Zaghawa to act
with impunity throughout the country, said Erdimi, ignoring
the rule of law and victimizing the other ethnic groups
through wanton violence, including murder and rape. "The
Zaghawa profit from the absence of the state," lamented
Erdimi. "This is disgusting. The government is one day
bound to change, and we will have to live with all the
others. We must be citizens like all the rest, not above
them." Erdimi alleged that Deby has even brought Zaghawa
kinsmen from Sudan to fill senior government posts.

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Opposed to JEM But Sympathetic to SLM
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9. (C) Blaming the Chadian government for causing instability
in the Central African Republic, Congo and Darfur, Erdimi
confirmeQnwx
C3ion
with President Bashir. Deby's meddling in regional affairs
~QMQ!MI-dimi. Erdimi underscored that he would
"never become involved in internal Sudanese politics like
Deby," stating explicitly that the Darfur issue "is not our
affair."


10. (C) He nonetheless expressed some sympathy for the Sudan
Liberation Movement's (SLM) political goals to end the
marginalization of Darfur. "We understand the conflict with
the jalabas (derogatory slang for the traditional Arab ruling
elite in Sudan)," he said. He characterized the violence
perpetrated against civilians by Arab militias in Darfur as
the "humanitarian catastrophe of the century" and said that,
once in power, he would work to protect the IDPs in Chad by

KHARTOUM 00000397 003.2 OF 004


moving them away from the volatile border. Erdimi also said
that the new governing institutions he promised to erect
would benefit the IDPs. Though not opposed to EUFOR in
principle, he said that the force could only remain in
country after Deby's fall if it fulfilled its mandate of
protecting civilians rather than serving as a tool of French
influence in the country.

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Open to Negotiations?
--------------


11. (C) Erdimi claimed that he is "open to negotiations" but
that Deby has refused his overtures at political dialogue.
"In one hand, I have the kalash (slang for a Kalashnikov) and
in the other, I have peace." His demands include the post of
Prime Minister so that he can establish an effective
administration and the retention of his forces to guarantee
that Deby adheres to the agreement. "Idriss can stay as the
head of state, but we will run the country," he said. Erdimi
dismissed the utility of international guarantees for a
negotiated political settlement, saying that Deby has broken
all previous commitments and faced little international
outcry. "Our guarantee is our own forces," he stated.

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Frustration with the West
--------------


12. (C) Expressing frustration for the U.S. and Europe's
preference to preserve the status quo in N'djamena and
criticizing France for having no long-term strategy for Chad,
Erdimi boasted that the rebels could defeat Western forces.
"The Americans and the French will never accept the deaths of
any of their soldiers," he said. "We just have to kill one
Western soldier, and the force will withdraw." Erdimi cited
the public outcry surrounding the recent death of one EUFOR
soldier as affirmation of his analysis. He said that he is
not interested in political dialogue with France, claiming
that he last interacted with French officials in 2006 when
approached by French intelligence. (Note: This claim
contradicts Foreign Minister Deng Alor's assertion, reported
in Ref. B, that France recently signaled to Erdimi that it is
"ready for new leadership" in N'djamena. End note.)

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Minawi Mediates
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13. (C) In a subsequent meeting with CDA Fernandez and Poloff
on March 15, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader
Minni Minawi--who maintains regular contact with Erdimi, a
fellow Zaghawa--described his efforts to forge a negotiated
settlement. He denied Erdimi's assertions that Deby rejected
political dialogue. Instead, Minawi reported that Erdimi's
demands were conveyed in writing to a delegation led by Deby
loyalist Ahmed Togoy, who had planned to present them to Deby
on March 15.


14. (C) However, Minawi said he told Erdimi on March 14 that
his demands--the post of prime minister, retention of forces,
and compensation--are unrealistic. To maintain an ethnic
balance, the post of prime minister must be held by a Chadian
Southerner, according to Minawi, who warned Erdimi that
refusal to negotiate will "make the situation worse for the
African tribes in Chad."


15. (C) Minawi indicated that the RFC commanders are more
flexible than Erdimi and want to "change Deby's mentality
rather than Deby's government." One senior RFC commander,
Mohammed Hano, admitted to Minawi that Erdimi has a "personal
problem" with Deby and will never negotiate but that the
majority of the RFC want to prevent a protracted struggle
with other Zaghawa. Minawi continues to pass messages
between Erdimi and Deby in an attempt to start a dialogue
and, during his last conversation with Deby by phone on March
13, gained a commitment from the Chadian president to "open
the gate to negotiate" as long as Libya is not involved in
the mediation.


16. (C) Neither the National Alliance nor the RFC can unseat
Deby alone, predicted Minawi. The RFC is not large enough to

KHARTOUM 00000397 004.2 OF 004


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the RFC and precipitated their withdrawal from N'djamena.

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Comment
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17. (C) Erdimi's scenario for a Chad post-Deby is more
concrete than those of other Chadian opposition
representatives met by Post in the last week (Ref. B). It is
noteworthy, however, that in contrast to Soubian and
Abdelwahid Aboud's supporters, his emphasis is on
establishing a strong central government rather than paying
lip service to democracy, transparency, and elections. While
it also seems apparent that he is willing to exert somewhat
more independence from Khartoum than his rival rebel
leaders--as exemplified by his rejection of an alliance with
Nouri and Soubian and his expression of solidarity with the
SLM--an Erdimi regime in N'djamena will still strengthen the
NCP's hand within Sudan and throughout the region. Erdimi's
strategy of seizing as much territory as possible and then
negotiating with triumphant rebels in N'djamena sounds to us
like a recipe for anarchy and protracted conflict. End
comment.


18. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ