YASIR ARMAN ON USG-SUDAN RELATIONS, ELECTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000396

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS KDEM SU
SUBJECT: YASIR ARMAN ON USG-SUDAN RELATIONS, ELECTIONS,
INTRA-SPLM DYNAMICS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: SPLM Deputy Secretary General Yasir Arman
has called on the USG to admit that it needs Khartoum as much
as it loathes it, and to recognize that in the absence of
"meaningful leverage" against the National Congress Party, it
must refocus its efforts on "internal mechanisms for change
in Sudan: the 2009 elections." Arman praised the appointment
of the new special envoy and expressed confidence that he has
the "right attitude and charisma" for the job. However,
Arman cautioned that renewed USG attempts to engage Khartoum
could be futile. "They will engage you until Washington's
political clock runs out," he warned, "and do so in a way
that does not even allow you to grasp that you are losing."
He also called for specific and consistent USG engagement
with all parties on the issue of Sudan's elections. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) ConGen PolOff met with Deputy Secretary General Yasir
Arman March 4 while he was in Juba for internal SPLM planning
meetings for the party's forthcoming national convention.
Arman's Juba travel was sandwiched between just-concluded
negotiations with NCP counterparts on the (still elusive)
national elections law and onward travel (with Abdelaziz
Helou) to Europe and then Darfur. Arman maintained that
despite recent agreement on percentages, the NCP would
hold-out on finalizing the elections law until it could be
assured of one thing: outright victory in the 2009 elections.
Arman contended the NCP has two avenues through which this
can be achieved: force the SPLM's agreement to form a
political alliance or manipulate the national census "to
ensure the numbers are in the NCP's favor." He claimed the
latter has been made more possible through the NCP's
"eleventh-hour alterations" to the census questionnaires.
(NOTE: In fact, GOSS Minister Luka Manoja signed off on the
NCP's proposed changes in November on behalf of the GOSS.
However, he did so without the knowledge or authority of
President Kiir. END NOTE.) Per Arman, an NCP/SPLM political
alliance has seen growing traction within Juba-based SPLM
circles despite his personal objections to such a coalition.


3. (C) Arman named GOSS Vice President Riek Machar as one of
the leading proponents of an NCP/SPLM coalition, but demurred
to single-out others, although he admitted they held cabinet
positions within the GOSS. The Deputy Secretary General
expressed frustration with the fact that the NCP is gaining
ground with its arguments that a 2009 election with NCP and
SPLM running on separate tickets could see mutual losses, and
thus an abrogation of the CPA. He conceded that many in the
SPLM now believe that an NCP/SPLM coalition is the safest way
to protect the South's right to the referendum in 2009 in the
face of lackluster NCP commitment to other areas of the peace
agreement. Arman clearly disagreed with the hypothesis, and
expressed concern that those closest to Kiir appeared to be
those most enamored of it. His own preference is that the
SPLM run on its own, noting that despite his personal rapport
with Northern opposition parties, recent actions by these
parties exposed inconsistencies which Arman viewed as
"dangerous and exploitable flaws" on any campaign trail.
However, Arman acknowledged that he had not discussed with
the GOSS President any electoral strategy when the two met on
March 2. "We're too focused on the national convention and
our efforts in Darfur. This is the busiest the party has
ever been."


4. (C) Arman conceded that while the SPLM is distracted by
the demands of convention-planning, the party is equally
paralyzed by the three choices that it faces regarding
elections at the national level: run alone, run with the NCP,
or run against the NCP with another opposition party.
(COMMENT: We find it striking that he did not name a fourth
paradoxical choice: who to run for the Presidency at the
national level. END COMMENT.) The first and third options
would prove most difficult, he noted, but the first, with the
right kind of commitment within the party and the right type
of aggressive engagement by "our friends the Americans" could
still yield a victory. Arman noted that the SPLM now has
380,000 registered members in the North (not including the
three states of Darfur) and that membership drives are
ongoing (quietly) within IDP camps in South and North Darfur.
"The figure makes me very happy," he continued, "while we
don't have 5 million as some have claimed, South Africa's
African National Congress announced only 600,000 at their
last convention -- and we're not done." While some contests
at the SPLM convention (the party's first in 14 years) would
be predictable -- such as the election of Salva Kiir Mayardit
to Party Chairman -- Arman predicted that some leadership
seats would see fierce competition. Arman was coy about his

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own aspirations, admitting he was not certain yet if he would
attempt to remain Deputy Secretary General, and reluctant to
indicate whether he held higher aspirations. "I have
ambitions for the SPLM, and for the transformation of Sudan.
The convention will see the SPLM consolidate its ranks,
tackle corruption, re-organize, and get back to the renewal
of the SPLM's vision and its commitment to that vision. That
is enough for me."


5. (C) Arman returned to the subject of SE Williamson's
visit, pointedly asking why the U.S. had not yet fully
engaged Sudan on the 2009 elections. "You should have direct
consultations with the Government of National Unity on this
subject," he counseled. "Jendayi should be making calls. I
was surprised that the Special Envoy did not raise it."
Darfur cannot be solved through external pressure, but
through internal change in Sudan, he continued. The 2009
elections will be the mechanism for that change -- "and you
need to take significant steps now to make sure they happen."
Bringing the conversation back to the hard choices facing the
SPLM, he noted "Don't treat us like Hamas and tell us you
don't like the outcome after it has been decided. Engage us
now." Arman commented that he had read the GNU transcript of
both of the SE's meetings with Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali
Nafie, and believed the SE "handled him well." However, he
cautioned, the U.S. must recognize obstacles to its success:
lack of leverage, the American political calendar, and "the
fact that you need Khartoum as much as you loathe them."
Pressed on the last point, Arman explained that Darfur could
not be stabilized without the assistance of Khartoum.
"Acquiescence is not the answer, they must complement your
efforts," he continued, "but instead they will play at
engaging you until time runs out. Darfur cannot be solved
through external pressure but through internal change in
Sudan. The only mechanism for such a phenomenon is
elections."


6. (C) COMMENT: Yasir's question on the status of USG
involvement with Sudan's progress toward the 2009 elections
has been heard elsewhere, and remains a serious point of
concern within the party. The SPLM fears that the U.S.,
distracted by Darfur, misses the larger issue of power in
Khartoum and the possibility that the NCP's hold on power
could be consolidated through (dubious but "good enough" for
Africa) democratic elections in Sudan. Despite the SPLM's own
waffling on elections, our statements (or lack thereof) are
viewed as a barometer for USG commitment to the SPLM and its
vision for Sudan's democratic transformation. While active
consideration of a coalition with the NCP is worrisome, Kiir
has not yet made a decision on elections personally. Arman
freely admits that intra-party stock-taking at the MaQ
convention will set the SPLM's elections agenda. Discussions
in Juba and elsewhere make it clear that a determination on
how (and with whom) to run will occur no sooner than summer
2008, one year in advance of planned elections if they occur
on time. End comment.
FERNANDEZ