Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM39
2008-01-11 11:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

LOOKING AHEAD ON THE SUDAN AEC

Tags:  PGOV PREL AU UN SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9724
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0039 0111117
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111117Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9685
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000039 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD ON THE SUDAN AEC

REF: KHARTOUM 036

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD ON THE SUDAN AEC

REF: KHARTOUM 036

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Norway's Ambassador to Khartoum, in his capacity as
Interim AEC (Assessment and Evaluation Commission) Chairman
called AEC working group chairs (US, UK, Norway, Italy,
Netherlands) together to survey the way ahead for the
Commission over the next few months. UK Ambassador reported
on the steps taken to get former UK Ambassador to Egypt Derek
Plumley accepted as the new AEC Chairman. She noted that the
National Congress Party (NCP) had held an internal meeting on
Dec 24 to discuss the nomination. NCP rep to the AEC Dr.
Said al-Khatib subsequently told her that the Sudanese
preferred that a senior UK minister should formally present
the nomination to the Sudanese Government. Presidential
Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail suggested as an alternative a
letter from the UK Foreign Minister to Sudanese MFA Deng Alor
or from PM Brown to President Al-Bashir and FVP Salva Kiir.


2. (C) UK Ambassador noted that, now that the SPLM has
returned to the Government of National Unity, the NCP seems
to have no sense of urgency about a new AEC Chairman. They
see it as a way of squeezing some more attention and
recognition from the international community, especially from
the UK, before acquiescing to Plumley. She said that Minister
Lord Maloch Brown was already intending to come to Sudan at
the end of January, so that could be an opportunity to
officially present the candidature (again) to the two
parties. Al-Khatib had also implied that there would be no
major changes in the makeup of the composition of the AEC
with the possible exception of "adding one country"
(speculation is that the Sudanese want to add China to the
AEC).


3. (C) Italian Ambassador remarked that instability in Kenya
probably precludes any sort of IGAD summit and that the IGAD
Partners Forum is also on hold. Norway highlighted the
importance of an enhanced UN role at the AEC but this has
been stymied by the skepticism of Assistant SRSG Tayye
Brooke-Zerihoun. Zerihoun's departure at the end of January
may make it easier for UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi to engage with the
Commission. It was agreed to set up an ad hoc drafting
committee, headed by the UK, to come up with draft terms of
reference for the July 2008 mid-year review and to come up
with a list of priorities for each working group for the next
6 months.


4. (C) Norwegian Ambassador asked about the next Sudan
Consortium, supposedly scheduled for March, as a possible
opportunity to stress CPA implementation. The Norwegians
were willing to host an "Oslo 2" but some Sudanese officials
had intimated that they preferred Paris as a site. This was
an odd choice since Paris was not a major donor for the CPA.
The World Bank, which should take the lead in organizing, had
not really engaged on this event yet. Several present noted
that past meetings had been more "pledging conferences" and
had stayed away from political issues.


5. (C) The Norwegians also detailed their last attempt to get
Sudanese acceptance of a Nordic unit for UNAMID. They had
met with the new GNU Minister of Cabinet Affairs (SPLM
SecGen) Pagan Amun. Amun had checked with the NCP and was
told that the Nordics were unacceptable for three reasons:
such a unit would attract Al-Qa'ida attention which may
already be increasing in Sudan, some in the NCP believe that
the Engineering Unit could be part of a Western plot to
overthrow the NCP linking up with Darfur rebels and EUFOR in
Chad, and finally, President Al-Bashir had already publicly
rejected them and to backtrack now would be embarrassing to
the President. US CDA noted that none of these reasons had
anything to do with past excuses by the Sudanese which had
been that the Nordic offer was too late or extraneous to the
African makeup of the force.


6. (C) Comment: With the two parties to the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) currently enjoying a brief honeymoon
(reftel),real interest by the SPLM and NCP in the hard work
of the Commission has shriveled. Key issues like Abyei are
now the purview of the Office of the Presidency. In the long
run, we expect the two sides to resume their traditional
roles at the AEC: the NCP will focus on form over substance,
on procedural and bureaucratic manuevering. The SPLM will
really engage only if their frustrations once again begin to
mount and they feel the need for additional fora to pressure
the NCP and garner foreign support for their positions. End
comment.



FERNANDEZ