Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM388
2008-03-16 15:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

VIEWS ON MARCH 1 BORDER SKIRMISHES FROM SOUTH OF

Tags:  PREL PINS MARR MPOS SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6246
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0388/01 0761507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161507Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000388 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2023
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MPOS SU
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON MARCH 1 BORDER SKIRMISHES FROM SOUTH OF
THE BORDER

REF: A. KHARTOUM 308


B. HOTR IIR 6 890 0155 08

C. KHARTOUM 328

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000388

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2023
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MPOS SU
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON MARCH 1 BORDER SKIRMISHES FROM SOUTH OF
THE BORDER

REF: A. KHARTOUM 308


B. HOTR IIR 6 890 0155 08

C. KHARTOUM 328

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Discussions with senior UN and UNMIS
officials in Juba and Aweil, in addition to follow-on
discussions with various elements of the SPLA, place March 1
skirmishes not in the disputed region of Abyei but south of
the Kiir River near Rumaker, Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.
UNMIS officials in Aweil point to growing SPLA tensions with
SAF or SAF-aligned forces as the cause of not only
December-January skirmishes, but also "SAF border probes"
dating to October 2007 that occurred amidst senior-level
discussions on redeployment at both the Khartoum and Juba
level. This leads Post to conclude that a series of
incidents have occurred (and are likely to continue) along
the South Darfur/Southern Kordofan/Northern Bahr el Ghazal
borders. Movement by both armies appears to show that both
sides are attempting to carve out resource-rich territory on
either side of the 1956 border. Both the SPLA and SAF are
using military pressure to affect resolution of the Abyei
impasse. END SUMMARY.

--------------
UN ASSERTS MARCH 1 VIOLENCE OCCURRED IN SOUTH
--------------


2. (C) Aweil's UN Resident Coordinator (RC) Mohammed Khan
told ConGen PolOff on March 6 that "he was absolutely
certain" that the March 1 skirmishes (REFTEL) between SPLA
and SAF-supported popular defense forces occurred in Northern
Bahr el Ghazal state near the village of Rumaker, about 50
kilometers south of the River Kiir in Northern Bahr el Ghazal
state (NBEG). (NOTE: The Kiir River is also known as the Bahr
el Arab. END NOTE.) Military observers from the UNMIS Aweil
Team Site showed ConGen PolOff their maps on which they have
plotted incidents within NBEG and the region. The March 1
incident dips well below what is the currently-accepted as
the 1956 border. UNMIS RC and Milobs detailed to PolOff
accounts relayed to them - by Rumaker residents and by
transiting traders - of repeated attacks by heavily-armed

"muhajadeen" against SPLA positions around Rumaker. UNMIS
Civil Affairs Chief Samantha Barnes told PolOff on March 4
that UN DSS believes that at least 70 PDF members had been
killed, and a "well-equipped force of at least 1,000" took
part in the attacks. UN DSS personnel traveled with Poloff
to Aweil and then onwards to Rumaker for a site assessment
that day. Briefing Poloff on the return flight to Juba, UN
DSS personnel commented "a gun-mounted truck is a fairly
remarkable acquisition for a Misseriya herdsman." Pressed as
to whether he believed Misseriya tribesmen were behind the
March 1 attacks, he expressed his view that ethnic Misseriya
allegedly accepting monetary inducement to enlist hardly
warranted "the herdsman moniker." "These were not provoked
shepherds," he stressed, "this was PDF." SPLA sources told
ConGen staff that they had seized 5 SAF prisoners during the
March 1 NBEG raids, and intended to raise this issue at the
next Joint Defense Board meeting.

--------------
SPLA ACTIONS BELIE WORDS -- TO A DEGREE
--------------


3. (C) Post notes that SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak
told ConGen staff March 1 that the SPLA had been attacked by
SAF-supported PDF forces at three positions along the River
Kiir (Ref A). Juba-based sources told ConGen Defense Liaison
Officer that the SPLA had positioned at least one "screening
element" north of the river in what is Southern Kordofan.
Similar reports also place a second SPLA unit near Grinti
south of the Kiir, but straddling the NBEG border. (Ref B).
It is entirely possible that SPLA/Misseriya skirmishes
attributed to "undisciplined" SPLA could have been initiated
by this northern-most unit in response to infiltration by
SAF-supported PDF forces southward into NBEG. UNMIS RCs in
Aweil and Juba have no reports from UNMIS RC Abyei that
corroborate March 3 media accounts about offensive operations
by the SPLA, nor does UN DSS/Juba.


4. (C) SPLA U.S. Liaison Officer Colonel Dut Paul Garang told
ConGen PolOff March 5 that Major General Piang had "traveled
to the front" on March 3 to meet with SPLA units "around" the
Kiir River. ConGen PolOff confirmed in discussions with NBEG
Security Director and NBEG Deputy Governor on March 7 that
Piang had presided over state-level security meetings in
Aweil, had met with the SPLA's 15th Brigade in Winjik (NBEG),
and had traveled to the towns of Majok Yienthiu (NBEG),and

KHARTOUM 00000388 002 OF 003


Abyei. USG-contract military advisors told PolOff March 5
that Piang's travel was linked to March 1 concerns voiced by
SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak about what Ajak termed "a
marked decline in intelligence gathering" by SPLA forces
along the 1956 border. (COMMENT: Piang's duties within the
SPLA include operations and training -- making assertions of
a discipline problem (Ref C) or possibly the need for updated
marching orders to SPLA units (related to observation and
reporting) equally plausible. END NOTE.)

--------------
NBEG PERSPECTIVE ON CLASHES PAST AND PRESENT
--------------


5. (C) RC Khan reviewed October-February PDF and SPLA
movements in the NBEG border region, noting that there was
direct SAF-SPLA conflict on October 10, 2007 following
provocation by SAF military assigned to a garrison outside of
Majok Yienthiu. One hundred SAF had moved out of the
garrison and, according to Khan, attacked an SPLA unit moving
westward across Majok Yienthiu toward Rumaker. That incident
and the ensuing violence led to road closures from Malualkon
to Warawar and Rumaker northwards to the border by the SPLA.
(COMMENT: This meant the Aweil-Meriem highway was blocked
from the South by the SPLA and from the North by SAF-back
PDF, isolating Abyei and NBEG from goods and services. END
COMMENT). Khan maintains that the road closures were meant
not to put restive tensions into check but rather to shroud
SPLA activities along the border region.


6. (C) According to Khan, UNMIS/Juba chief David Gressly
raised access issues on behalf of WFP and other UN
humanitarian agencies with the NBEG Governor in mid-January.
The Governor flatly refused to permit UN access to the
northeast corner of NBEG state, claiming "the SPLA is open
and transparent with you, and then suffers the consequences
of attacks by well-informed SAF. Yet when SAF restricts your
movement around Abyei, there are no complaints, and Khartoum
suffers no consequences. We are tired of being punished for
being the only group that adheres to the rules." Queried as
to whether recent redeployment by SAF out of NBEG has
improved the SPLA's outlook, Khan laughed. "Those barracks
over there -- they are full of SAF, and their numbers grow
each evening. That means the SPLA (present only as part of
the JIU) is outnumbered two-to-one in their own state
capital!" (COMMENT: This is similar to descriptions of SAF
presence in Bentiu (Unity State),Renk and Malakal (Upper
Nile state) where GOSS and SPLA officials have alleged that
SAF have merely retreated-in-place into civilian life by
shedding their uniforms (and keeping their weapons) rather
than affecting full redeployment northward. These SAF are
supposedly ready to take up their arms when necessary. END
COMMENT).

--------------
NBEG PERSPECTIVES ON ABYEI REGION VIOLENCE
--------------


7. (C) Aweil Peace Commissioner Lino Adub, recently returned
from Muglad, similarly reviewed for ConGen PolOff SAF and
SAF-aligned PDF movements within Southern Kordofan state
following the SPLM's December 2007 appointment of Edward Lino
as the party's interim administrator for Abyei. According to
Adub, Misseriya clashed with Southern Sudan Police Services
(SSPS) in Ariik, south of Abyei town. (NOTE: Demobilized SPLA
and SPLA aligned militias were placed into the SSPS in the
Spring of 2006. SSPS presence in the Abyei environs
technically violates the CPA, as the South's police force
does not have jurisdiction in Southern Kordofan state. END
NOTE.) Regional tensions simmered through February 7, when
the SPLA-escorted convoy of the Commissioner of Abiemnon came
under fire from a passing convoy of SAF. The ensuing gun
battle, which resulted in forces taking offensive positions
on opposite sides of the roadway and saw a dozen dead and
twenty-plus wounded. Adub claims that following the fire
fight SAF bribed Misseriya to close the roadways. Blockades
of road North of Abyei town leading into Muglad were in place
by February 8. On February 9, despite the presence of a
joint investigating committee on the same road, Misseriya
militia attacked a commercial bus traveling past the site of
the February 7 skirmish, resulting in the death of seven
passengers. Dinka residents fearing repercussions moved
temporarily from Abyei to (formerly SPLA-controlled) Agok,
and on February 12 the largely Misseriya security committee
met in Diffa and invited SPLA General Valentino (engaged in
Ngo Dinka-Misseriya shuttle diplomacy since late January) to
participate in the meeting. Simultaneously, Ngok Dinka and
Misseriya leaders met in Abyei town and held discussions
which resulted in the subsequent shaky peace pact that still
holds to this day. Adub noted that the peace pact calls for

KHARTOUM 00000388 003 OF 003


an agreement to stop road blockades impacting the Abyei
region, commits the parties to a joint investigation of the
February 7 incident, and establishes a joint dispute
resolution mechanism to limit the outbreak of future conflict
at the tribal level. As NBEG Peace Commissioner, Adub and
his Unity State counterpart will have observer status at
subsequent Misseriya/Ngok Dinka discussions.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) While at least one chapter of the March 1 attacks has
been verified as occurring in the South, therefore making it
unlikely that the SPLA were the aggressors, the nuances are
important. Post has reported that the SPLA took company-sized
units from other locations throughout the South and deployed
them (to division-sized strength) at points along the 1956
border. SPLA observers assert this is chiefly to hide SPLA
redeployment, and we are inclined to believe them. Both
sides are maneuvering and cheating but the SAF has been much
more brazen, with overt SAF incursions into Upper Nile in the
winter of 2007, gun-mounted truck supported "Misseriya"
incursions into the South in December/January, and
SAF-instigated violence in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in both
October 2007 and March 2008. More recent reliance by the SAF
on predominantly-Misseriya PDF suggests a return by Khartoum
to its well-worn strategy of divide and conquer through the
spread of fear and distrust among the inhabitants of the
Abyei region and the North/South border area more broadly.
We note, however, that while the SPLA claims to have
recovered SAF insignia and ID cards from the dead, there is
no external mechanism through which to verify "Misseriya
herdsmen" versus PDF militiamen who happen to be Misseriya.


9. (C) COMMENT CON'T: Motivation for recent SAF-assisted
attacks remains a question. Two theories circulate within
diplomatic circles: probing of SPLA strength along the
North/South border or a (perhaps mutual) attempt to establish
the 1956 border through military might. The Bahr el Ghazal
region and western areas of Southern Kordofan are rich in
mineral deposits. Continued lack of clarity regarding border
demarcation for troops on either side of the North/South
border has given both parties ample leeway to argue that they
are justified in maintaining their present positions. This
argues for the urgent deployment of formed and functional
JIUs to the area, enhanced UNMIS oversight and unfettered
access for border demarcation -- both of which are long
overdue.
FERNANDEZ