Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM178
2008-02-05 11:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

TFCD01: FRANCE LIMITS ENGAGEMENT WITH KHARTOUM

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SU CD LY FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9714
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0178 0361113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051113Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9891
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0285
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000178 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SU CD LY FR
SUBJECT: TFCD01: FRANCE LIMITS ENGAGEMENT WITH KHARTOUM

REF: KHARTOUM 00116

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SU CD LY FR
SUBJECT: TFCD01: FRANCE LIMITS ENGAGEMENT WITH KHARTOUM

REF: KHARTOUM 00116

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) France has not engaged with the Sudanese Government at
any level since the Chadian opposition attempted to overthrow
President Deby's regime in recent days, French First
Secretary Arnaud Suquet told Poloff on February 4. French

SIPDIS
Ambassador Christine Robichon has received no instructions
from Paris to demarche the Sudanese Government and was
scheduled to depart the country on pre-planned leave on
February 4. The French diplomat said that no officials in
Paris have called Khartoum since the Chadian crisis began,
adding that "we are waiting for the dust to settle." Paris
is confident that the Chadian Government will survive, said
Suquet, suggesting that Deby lured the Chadian opposition to
N'djamena to "eliminate them" and that the rebels' supply
lines are now overextended.


2. (C) If Paris becomes "truly displeased" with Khartoum,
Suquet speculated, the Quai d'Orsay will call in the Sudanese
Ambassador in Paris. The French Embassy intends to maintain
a "low profile" in the coming days, anticipating that a
complete route of the Chadian opposition could lead to
"harder times" in the France-Sudan relationship.


3. (C) The last interaction between French diplomats in
Khartoum and Sudanese officials came just after Chadian
aircraft bombed targets within Sudan in early January.
During meetings with Robichon in the days after this
incident, senior Sudanese officials expressed adamant
opposition to the deployment of EUFOR, according to Suquet.
Despite its low-key approach in Khartoum, Paris is convinced
of Sudan's robust support for the Chadian opposition.


4. (C) Suquet characterized the recent confrontation as a
Sudanese attempt to draw the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM)--one of Darfur's most formidable, Zaghawa-dominated
rebel factions--out of Sudan and into Chad where they could
be defeated by Khartoum's proxies (reftel). The French
official confirmed third-party reports that Sudanese Defense
Minister Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein--who had spent several
days in West Darfur at the end of January--had returned to El
Geneina in the last 72 hours and that a new column of several
hundred Chadian rebels had crossed the Chadian border from
West Darfur on February 4.


5. (C) French officials put little stock in the prospects of
external mediation to defuse the crisis, and Suquet intimated
that a military solution is more likely. A Libyan-Congolese
attempt to broker a cease-fire had collapsed, he said, and
Deby remained a "military man." Regarding public reports
that France is airlifting arms from Tripoli to re-supply
Chadian forces--despite earlier indications that Libya held
Deby responsible for escalating Sudan-Chad tensions--Suquet
suggested that Leader Qaddhafi wants to maintain "a balance."
(Comment: If Tripoli believes that Khartoum over-played its
hand in Chad, it has additional levers--such as support for
Darfur rebel factions with which it has strong ties, such as
JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity--to express its
displeasure. End comment.)


6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ