UNAMID SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADADA MILDLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001724

SIPDIS

FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013
TAGS: POL PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADADA MILDLY
RECEPTIVE TO U.S.-LED DARFUR MONITORING MISSION

REF: A. STATE 122270

B. KHARTOUM 1697

C. KHARTOUM 1698

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (
b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA Fernandez briefed UNAMID Joint Special
Representative Adada on the proposed U.S.-led
Darfur-ceasefire monitoring mission on November 26 (reftel
a). While Adada appeared mildly receptive to the idea
initially, he urged that the U.S. work to get rebel movements
to the negotiating table and later that day he and NISS
Director Salah Gosh jointly told the press that UNAMID itself
is ready and able to immediately monitor the Darfur
ceasefire. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 26, CDA Fernandez met with UNAMID Joint
Special Representative Rudolphe Adada to brief him on ref.
(A) proposal for a U.S.-led international mission to monitor
a Darfur ceasefire. Charge Fernandez began by saying that
while the U.S. understands that ceasefire monitoring is
properly and eventually the role of UNAMID, it is proposing
that the U.S. lead a &bridging mechanism8 until UNAMID is
ready to take up the mission. The CDA remarked that the
unilateral ceasefire declared by President Bashir on November
12 already is falling apart, but might still be salvaged if
action is taken quickly. Drawing on talking points in reftel
a, he explained that he already had presented the U.S. idea
to GoS officials Mutriff Saddiq and Salah Gosh on November 23
(refs. B and C),and both had been initially, if vaguely,
receptive.


3. (C) CDA Fernandez explained that the U.S. is proposing
that it lead an international team to initially monitor the
Darfur ceasefire. This mission would be similar to the one
that the U.S. had successfully led earlier in support of the
CPA in the Nuba Mountains and in South Sudan. Monitoring
would be carried out by a private, probably U.S., company
contracted and paid for by the USG. The monitors themselves
would probably be retired military personnel with significant
experience. The monitors could be multi-national, not
exclusively American.


4. (C) Adada asked about the desirability of employing a
private company vis-a-vis UNAMID to monitor the ceasefire.
The Charge repeated that the U.S. mission would be only an
interim measure until UNAMID is ready to take on the mission
itself. He noted that the primary constraint in deploying
such a force will be logistical, the same challenges that are
hampering the deployment of UNAMID. Adada added that the
challenges were more political than logistical, the rebels
would balk. Logistically, such a team would be hard-pressed
to match the resources that UNAMID already has on the ground.


5. (C) Adada opined that, before any monitors can be
deployed, it will be necessary to convince the rebel
movements to support the ceasefire. CDA Fernandez agreed
this was a good point, but argued that the U.S. monitoring
proposal could serve as a means to get the rebels to commit
to the ceasefire. The rebels do not trust the GoS and are
unfortunately if unfairly suspicious of UNAMID as well. A
U.S.-led mission might help overcome these suspicions. An
effective Darfur ceasefire, he said, could require three
stages. First the rebels will need to be brought in, then a
comprehensive ceasefire declared. Finally the monitors would
quickly deploy. Adada recalled the collapse of the last
Ceasefire Commission, and especially the controversy about
per diems for rebel commanders, as an object lesson in
failure. CDA reminded Adada that the CFC finally collapsed
when the GOS arrested the JEM reps to the Ceasefire
Commission.


6. (C) Adada noted that UNAMID will require approval from
New York to work with a private firm. The Charge replied
that the U.S. understands this. It is floating the idea
first with the GoS to see whether it would be acceptable, as
an initials step, then with UNAMID. If the GoS agrees, New
York, Washington, and Khartoum will need to work together on
the implementation. Adada remarked that if Khartoum firmly
commits to the idea, he saw no reason why it should be a
problem for New York. The Charge promised to provide Adada
with a copy of the U.S. diplomatic note delivered to the GNU
containing outlining the proposal. (Note: A copy of the
dipnote was emailed to Adada later the same day. End note.)

KHARTOUM 00001724 002 OF 002


Adada promised to communicate the information to New York.


7. (C) Adada continued that Joint Chief Mediator Bassole is
now working with the rebel movements to convince them to join
in the ceasefire. He said that the movements have been
arguing &We don,t need a ceasefire, we need a framework for
a political settlement.8 CDA Fernandez agreed that it is
critical to get the movements to commit. He added that JEM
is both the most important group bring on board and the most
skeptical.


8. (C) Adada said that NISS Director Salah Gosh had called
him, urgently seeking a meeting. He and Gosh would be
meeting immediately after Adada,s meeting with the Charge.
CDA Fernandez commented that Gosh may want to discuss with
Adada the U.S. monitoring proposal. (Note: Following
Adada,s meeting with Gosh, the two held a joint press
conference, at which they declared that UNAMID is now ready
and able to monitor the still illusory ceasefire. End note.)



9. (C) Comment: Adada was noncommittal, but appeared mildly
receptive to the idea of an interim U.S.-led monitoring
mission at his meeting with the Charge. However, his joint
statement with Gosh later in the day on UNAMID,s ability to
perform the monitoring mission unassisted does not bode well
for a final acceptance of the U.S.-led initiative, either by
Khartoum or by UNAMID. The reality is that such an
initiative is more of a challenge to UNAMID, to its monopoly
on monitoring and supervision, than to either the Khartoum
regime or to the rebels. An independent, US-led, Darfur
Monitoring Team would reveal violence by both Khartoum and
the rebels, but also passivity and inaction by UNAMID.
FERNANDEZ