Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1327
2008-09-01 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

GOSS VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON ELECTIONS AND ICC

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL PREF DPKO SOCI UNSC AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKH #1327/01 2451328
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O 011328Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1775
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001327 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PREF DPKO SOCI UNSC AU SU
SUBJECT: GOSS VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON ELECTIONS AND ICC

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001327

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PREF DPKO SOCI UNSC AU SU
SUBJECT: GOSS VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON ELECTIONS AND ICC

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) Vice
President Riek Machar maintains that the SPLM has committed
itself to elections at all costs, and that the party has
refused to allow itself to be held hostage by declining
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The VP
claims to have been tasked to reach out to the NCP to
influence their thinking on Bashir and thereby improve the
SPLM,s competitiveness at the national level. Machar said he
believes President Bashir,s political career is over, but
noted the President nonetheless used his Juba visit to launch
his presidential campaign against &his only true
competition.8 He dismissed ICC-related &doomsday
scenarios8 about the abrogation of the CPA and demise of the
nation, noting &Garang fell and Sudan continued, so it will
with Bashir.8 END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In a meeting with ConGen staff August 29, GOSS VP
Machar rejected concerns over the slow pace of border
demarcation, asserting &we will not hold elections hostage
for anything( we will go forward with elections because they
will usher in a new political system in Sudan.8 He
similarly eschewed reservations over the possibility of
renewed controversy over the census come December, noting his
belief ) as the South,s point-man on elections ) that
voter constituencies did not have to be delineated on the
basis of census results. The upcoming 2009 elections, despite
the complexity of 12 separate ballot papers in an otherwise
illiterate South and 8 ballot papers in the North, he argued,
were essential for Sudan,s return to democracy. (COMMENT: In
essence, Machar argued that elections ) and their attendant
requirements (national-level legislative reforms, security
requirements, etc.) have re-ordered the CPA,s timeline )
and at least in his opinion made some elements more

malleable. Not everyone in the party shares his
forward-leaning views. END COMMENT.)


3. (SBU) Machar stressed that the groundwork was being laid
for elections despite evident delays. While not yet decreed
by President Bashir, the parties had reached consensus on not
only the NEC chair and vice chair, but also - as a result of
negotiations led by SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum - on
the seven remaining commissioners. While hesitant to
disclose names, the VP allowed that two Southerners and five
Northerners &broadly representative8 of the North had been
agreed upon and endorsed by Presidents Bashir and Kiir.
Additionally, the parties had reached agreement on the
composition of the Council of Political Parties. An
announcement will be issued &any day now,8 he claimed.


4. (SBU) The Vice President believes Bashir used his visit to
Juba to launch his presidential campaign against &his only
true competition8 (the SPLM,s Salva Kiir). Indicative of
just how much the Bashir visit to Juba went off the rails,
however, Machar allowed that he and GNU Vice President Ali
Osman Taha had agreed in Khartoum that Bashir would announce
the NEC while in Juba on August 27. Machar claimed that
Bashir abandoned the plan in a fit of pique when informed
that his Southern schedule would not include a public rally.
GNU presidential staffers had initially omitted it by
accident from the schedule sent down to Juba. The GOSS
Presidency, in a moment of political hardball, had decided to
enact the President,s schedule &as stipulated8 ) this
despite attempts by the same staffers to later correct their
own omission. &They did not want us to assist with his
program,8 Machar said with a smile, &and we were relieved
not to have to deal with the possibility of banners publicly
undermining the SPLM,s position on the ICC.8


5. (SBU) Machar was highly dismissive of doomsday scenarios
linked to Bashir,s presumptive ICC indictment. &If he
faces trial, he faces trial,8 he said glibly, &Sudan is not
Bashir, it must go on. Garang fell and Sudan continued, so
it will with Bashir.8 Machar maintained that Bashir,s
&political career is over,8 and that the SPLM is trying to
send him messages to that effect. The VP claimed that the
July 2008 SPLM Political Bureau formalized his own role in
such an effort, and tasked him to reach out to both NCP
&progressives8 and hardliner Nafie Ali Nafie,s wing in
order to influence their thinking on Bashir, and inter alia,
the SPLM,s viability at the national level. He alluded to
recent discussions within the NCP centered on the question of
whether the party could, according to Machar, &tolerate
Bashir enough to take them through the elections, and then

KHARTOUM 00001327 002 OF 002


have him step down.8


6. (SBU) Machar affirmed that the SPLM will be contesting the
national presidency, but noted that opinions varied on the
wisdom of Kiir,s own candidacy. According to Machar, one
wing within the twenty-seven member SPLM Political Bureau
believed it was ¬ right8 for Kiir to contest the
position. Machar described this faction,s philosophy as
follows: &If 2011 is what people want, we should concede the
presidency to the NCP and let the people decide. What happens
in the North is a problem for the Northerners to handle, not
something for the SPLM to take on as a party.8 Not only did
Machar note that such a viewpoint represented a minority
faction within the SPLM, but also underscored that the
majority of the Political Bureau members had argued against
such thinking, adding that &we should not give the NCP the
impression we won,t run against them8 ) even if Kiir
himself is not interested in running.


7. (SBU) In a description very much indicative of Kiir,s own
indecision on the matter, Machar also noted that the same
majority within the SPLM leadership shot down a request by
some in the party to &select and declare an alternate
candidate now.8 While in Juba, Bashir was reportedly
equally uncertain of Kiir,s stance on the issue. On the
margins of his August 27 public events in Juba, Bashir at one
point turned to Kiir and stated &maybe it,s time for people
to have r new leadership within the party, and it,s our job
to bring up new people within these groups?8 Machar claims
he jumped in to fill the silence, jovially asking Bashir if
he was suggesting that neither he, nor the President, should
run for their respective positions in 2009. Bashir
reportedly did not respond to the prod.


8. (C) Comment: While Kiir has indicated to some, including
recent visitors to Juba, that he does not want to stand for
the Presidency at the national level, according to some
within the GOSS Presidency, events in Abyei and the ICC have
increasingly made him more open about the possibility. It
remains clear that in order to keep the pressure on the NCP
and not abandon their restless constituencies in the Nuba
Mountains and Blue Nile (and to a lesser extent further
north,) the SPLM will continue to say that Kiir will run for
the national presidency, while waiting until closer to the
elections to make a definitive decision.
FERNANDEZ