Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM101
2008-01-24 09:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

MINAWI OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. TRIP, BRIEFS

Tags:  PREL PGOV SU CD LY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9805
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0101/01 0240944
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 240944Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9773
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0277
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000101 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD LY
SUBJECT: MINAWI OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. TRIP, BRIEFS
ON LIBYA VISIT


KHARTOUM 00000101 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000101

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD LY
SUBJECT: MINAWI OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. TRIP, BRIEFS
ON LIBYA VISIT


KHARTOUM 00000101 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Senior Assistant to the President and Chairman of the
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Minni Minawi is enthusiastic
about a visit to Washington in the near future and has
requested that the trip focus on four themes: concrete
support for the military wing of the SLM and broadening the
perspective of the SLM's senior military commanders;
expanding political party capacity building programs in
preparation for the 2009 elections; developing a plan for
transforming the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
(TDRA) into a legitimate body; and structuring the Darfur
Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) so it can become
operational. Minawi is available to travel to the U.S. in
mid-February, and his delegation can remain outside Sudan for
a maximum of one week. He will weigh the potential risks of
visiting rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur in Paris en route
to Washington. Recently returned from a trip to Libya,
Minawi characterized his meetings in Tripoli as "meaningless"
and reported that Libya holds President Deby responsible for
the escalating confrontation between Chad and Sudan. End
summary.

--------------
Military Wing
--------------


2. (S) The SLM's top priority is securing financial support
for the movement's armed wing to stem the defection of
commanders and shore up the chain of command and control,
Senior Assistant to the President and SLM Chairman Minni
Minawi told Poloff on December 22. Beyond such support,
Minawi hopes to use a Washington visit to "educate" his
senior commanders. "I want to show them that Washington is
our friend, to open their mind to the future so that they
know that the military is not the only way." He said the
visit would provide the opportunity to underscore to the
commanders their "responsibilities" within the international
system and that the international community will support SLM

efforts toward a better future for Darfur if they fulfill
those responsibilities. He also said that it would be
important to conduct some public outreach activities to give
him and his commanders the opportunity to explain their
vision for Darfur and address their critics. Minawi proposed
that approximately 10 representatives from the military wing
of the SLM accompany him, including chief commander Jumah
Hagar.

--------------
Political Party Training
--------------


3. (C) Predicting that the National Congress Party (NCP) will
never allow real elections that could remove it from power
and somewhat doubtful that the 2009 elections will be held,
particularly in Darfur, Minawi said that it is still
important to continue preparing as if the elections will
occur. The SLM is enthusiastic about an expansion of
political party training for the movement. However, Minawi
and two members of SLM's senior leadership who attended his
meeting with Poloff asserted that it would not/not be
appropriate for the SLM delegation to remain outside Sudan
for more than one week or to participate in actual training
seminars. Their objective is to engage in discussions with
relevant USG officials and representatives from NGOs, such as
the International Republican Institute, to develop a plan for
executing a comprehensive training program for the party in
Sudan. "If we stay in Washington for too long or participate
in direct training, the National Congress Party will use
propaganda against us," said one of the senior SLM officials.
Minawi proposed that two representatives from the capacity
building office of the SLM participate in the delegation to
the U.S.


4. (C) Minawi said that he still hoped for a collaborative
political relationship with the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) leading up to 2009 but that it was difficult
to do so in the absence of a coherent SPLM position on the
elections. "Any slowness in the cooperation with the SPLM is
not from the SLM side," said Minawi, who explained that "the
main SPLM" remains undecided on whether elections are in its
interest and on whether to join in a coalition with the
National Congress Party (NCP),which would preclude

KHARTOUM 00000101 002.2 OF 003


cooperation with the SLM. A Minawi advisor who attended the
recent celebration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
in Wau noted that First Vice President and SPLM Chairman
Salva Kiir had said that Sudan should avoid the "Kenyan
experience." "Salva wants elections but is afraid of what
could happen," speculated Minawi.

--------------
TDRA and DRDF
--------------


5. (C) Overcoming the perception in Darfur that the TDRA is a
tool of Zaghawa patronage and converting it into a
"legitimate governing body" remains critical to the SLM, as
does operationalizing the DRDF, according to Minawi. He was
adamant that TDRA Secretary General Mohammed Soliman and DRDF
head Abduljabar Dousa participate in the Washington visit.
Minawi suggested that the TDRA needs the capacity to
implement "projects" in Darfur to demonstrate to the public
that it serves their interests. He also requested that the
visit to Washington include meetings at the World Bank,
including with Robert Zoellick. (Note: Poloff will follow up
directly with Soliman and Dousa within the next few days on
more specific areas of potential USG support for their
institutions within the context of a Washington visit and
report septel. End note.)

--------------
Abdulwahid Layover
--------------


6. (C) Minawi was open to the suggestion of visiting rival
SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur in Paris en route to Washington
but wanted to weigh the potential risks of an attempted
meeting given Abdulwahid's unpredictability. Minawi said
that he could not risk traveling to Paris only to have
Abdulwahid refuse to see him. Minawi recalled that
Abdulwahid ceased contact with him in early 2007 after Minawi
refused to join him in Europe. He attempted to contact
Abdulwahid in early December using a mobile number provided
by a French diplomat. After reaching him, Abdulwahid claimed
that "it was too loud on the street" and he would call back.
After receiving no return phone call, Minawi later found the
number disconnected. He said that he would attempt to reach
Abdulwahid again and gauge his state of mind before deciding
on whether to travel to Paris.

--------------
Libya Trip Disappointing
--------------


7. (C) Disappointed that his January 14-20 visit to Tripoli
did not result in any tangible expression of support for the
SLM, Minawi characterized his meetings with Libyan officials,
including MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki and
Deputy External Security Organization Chief Abdullah Sanousi,
as "meaningless." Minawi did not meet with Leader Muammar
al-Qadhafi, who was outside the country during most of the
visit. In addition to requesting financial support for his
movement, Minawi said that he had protested the detention of
"hundreds" of Darfurians in Libyan jails. Acknowledging that
they were residing in Libya illegally--primarily in Benghazi
and Tripoli--Minawi said they should be returned to Darfur
rather than held incommunicado. Not finding a receptive
audience among his Libyan interlocutors on this issue, Minawi
pledged to put it on the agenda of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

-------------- -
Tripoli Backs Chad in Confrontation with Sudan
-------------- -


8. (C) Tripoli was preoccupied with the growing confrontation
between Sudan and Chad, said Minawi, and Libya held President
Deby responsible for escalating tensions. Minawi disputed
the Libyan analysis, however, noting that while Chadian
opposition elements continued to find safe quarter inside
Sudan, none of the major Sudanese rebel groups were currently
in Chad. Sanousi admitted, according to Minawi, that
Khartoum in fact paid many of the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) non-signatory rebel factions to remain outside of the
peace process because it was not interested in genuine
negotiations. Minawi plans to travel to N'djamena in the
near future. The focus of his trip will be to see Deby--to
seek financial assistance, he intimated--though he downplayed
this fact in his travel request to President Bashir.


KHARTOUM 00000101 003.2 OF 003


--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Irrespective of Minawi's weak political position in
Khartoum and Darfur, he holds the fourth highest post in the
national government and had a very public meeting with
President Bush during his last visit to Washington in 2006.
While Minawi does not expect a White House visit (or even a
meeting with the Secretary),the public profile of his trip
must be commensurate with that of a visiting dignitary and
not of an international visitors program participant or we
risk weakening rather than strengthening his position. Post
will forward suggestions for the structure of a Washington
visit to AF/SPG. End comment.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ