UGANDA'S CHIEF LRA NEGOTIATOR ON PEACE AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000424

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDA'S CHIEF LRA NEGOTIATOR ON PEACE AGREEMENT

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: Uganda's Internal Affairs Minister and lead
negotiator with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),Ruhakana
Rugunda, believes that the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) will
be signed, but has serious reservations about the LRA's
willingness to implement it. Rugunda believes that some LRA
will assemble, but does not believe Kony will sign or come
out of the bush. Nonetheless, the Government would implement
its obligations and expected the international observers to
support the Agreement's provisions. Rugunda encouraged a
strong, clear message from the U.S. in support of the FPA.
He also said that the Ugandan Government was prepared to deal
with LRA leader Joseph Kony decisively if he did not comply
with the Agreement, and requested U.S. help to persuade
Congolese President Kabila to assist, if needed. The GOU
believes the Governments of Southern Sudan and Central
African Republic (CAR) would be cooperative. However, if
Kony continued to move in the direction of Darfur and did not
pose a threat to the security of southern Sudan, Rugunda said
that it might not be worth Ugandan resources to pursue him.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) On March 18, Ambassador Browning, DCM, and P/E
Chief met with Ruhakana Rugunda, the Ugandan Government's
chief LRA negotiator, to discuss the status of the peace
process in advance of the Ambassador's meeting with President
Museveni. Rugunda said that the next steps were for the FPA
to be signed, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to assemble,
the Government to establish the Special Division of the High
Court, and then to request a deferral of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) warrants from the UNSC.

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SIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, MONITORING THE FPA
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3. (C) Rugunda believes that LRA chief negotiator, Dr. David
Matsanga, will get authority to sign the FPA. The Government
did not expect the LRA to fully assemble at Rikwangba,
according to Rugunda. Per the agreement, after the signing,
the LRA has one month to assemble before the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration begins. Rugunda warned
that the implementation of the Agreement would not "follow
the letter," but that the Government intended on moving
forward on its obligations. He expected the international
community to press the parties to implement the Agreement.
Ambassador Browning assured Rugunda that the U.S. was in full
support of the peace process and would continue assisting as
needed to pursue parallel, but complementary tracks. The
Ambassador noted that our primary goal was to resolve the LRA
as a security threat.


4. (C) Rugunda stated that the Government's preference was
for the process to end peacefully, but that if LRA leader
Joseph Kony did not want that, the GOU would bring the
conflict to an end "by any other way." Rugunda emphasized
that "we were almost there" and that the GOU would take any
steps and use any means to bring closure. The Ambassador
asked how the success or failure of an agreement signed by
Dr. David Matsanga without Kony's personal compliance would
be measured. Rugunda responded that he expected the
Government, mediator, and international observers to monitor
the implementation closely. Rugunda said that if Kony did
not assemble, it would be cause for the "guarantors," the
U.N., African observers, EU, Norway, Canada, and the United
States to determine the level of LRA compliance. Rugunda
said that the international community, led by "the great
power," the United States, had a responsibility to ensure
implementation. When pressed, Rugunda acknowledged the U.S.
was an "observer," not a "guarantor" to the Agreement, but he
stressd that "the commitment" was there.


5. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns that there could be
differences of opinion among the international signatories to
the Agreement on the level of compliance. Rugunda said that
with sober monitoring, and meetings among the parties and
signatories, more time could be given to the LRA to comply.
Rugunda reiterated that the GOU was committed to implement
its obligations; some LRA were ready to come out through the
agreement or other means; and that if Kony did not, he could
be dealt with through other means. However, if the LRA's
movements in CAR and toward Chad continued, immediate action
might be need to enforce the agreements on the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement (CHA),and Ceasefire. (Note: The LRA
movements are in violation of the CHA. End Note.)

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NEXT STEPS
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6. (SBU) Rugunda said a strong, clear U.S. press statement
supporting the Agreement would help bring the process to
final closure. Such a statement, according to Rugunda,
should reaffirm support for a peaceful resolution to the
conflict, and call on the parties to sign and fulfill their
obligations and expeditiously implement the agreement.


7. (C) Rugunda reiterated his opinion that the agreement
would be signed because Kony would not be seen as delaying or
rejecting peace, due to pressure from northern Ugandans.
However, Rugunda said, Kony will not sign himself or come in.
Rugunda said that there was a 30-60 day implementation
period that would determine Kony's intentions. Kony was not
likely to assemble, but the timeframe could allow others to
do so. Rugunda did not believe it would be necessary to wait
out the 30 days, but it would be "good politics" on the
Government's part to do so. The GOU would play a leadership
role during the transition period and be willing to grant a
grace period if it appeared that LRA members were trying to
assemble but prevented to do so by logistics problems.


8. (C) The Ugandan Government remains in touch with key
allies, including southern Sudan, CAR, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). Rugunda said that the GOU might
need U.S. help with Congolese President Kabila to allow the
UPDF to go after the LRA militarily. The GOU believes that
Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir and CAR's Bozizie,
despite his weak position, would be cooperative if needed to
deal with Kony "decisively."


9. (C) Rugunda said it might not be worth the GOU's effort
to go after Kony militarily if he continued to move in CAR
and toward Chad. Rugunda stated that it "was always
Khartoum's plan to use Kony's rebels as a mercenary force"
and that the GOU would act to prevent any destabilization of
southern Sudan. If Kony proceeded to Darfur, it might not be
worth Ugandan resources to chase him. If he was in DRC, he
could be "accessed." Rugunda noted that Kabila had agreed
with Museveni in Arusha in September 2007 that force could be
used against the LRA. Rugunda requested the U.S. to persuade
Kabila that Kony must be dealt with decisively if he failed
to implement the agreement. Rugunda said that Kabila's shift
in attitude should be encouraged and supported.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) The Government views the FPA as an opportunity to
bring closure to the Juba Peace Process, diplomatically or
militarily. Rugunda may not be privy to the Ugandan
military's operational planning, but our contacts confirm
that Kony's movement away from the DRC also has complicated
military planning and could change Uganda's "Plan B"
calculations.


BROWNING