Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KAMPALA1579
2008-12-10 14:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY LIVING IN A FOOL'S PARADISE

Tags:  PGOV PREL UG SU CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7050
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1579/01 3451429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101429Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0965
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001579 

SIPDIS

///C O R R E C T E D C O P Y/// (ADDING "CLASSIFIED BY" AND "REASON"
LINE ONLY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL UG SU CG
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY LIVING IN A FOOL'S PARADISE

KAMPALA 00001579 001.2 OF 003


Classified by: P/E Chief, Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).

REF: A. KAMPALA 1552

B. KAMPALA 1561

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001579

SIPDIS

///C O R R E C T E D C O P Y/// (ADDING "CLASSIFIED BY" AND "REASON"
LINE ONLY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL UG SU CG
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY LIVING IN A FOOL'S PARADISE

KAMPALA 00001579 001.2 OF 003


Classified by: P/E Chief, Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).

REF: A. KAMPALA 1552

B. KAMPALA 1561


1. (C) Summary: Government of Uganda (GOU) lead negotiator
Ruhukana Rugunda described Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
leader Joseph Kony as "living in a fool's paradise" after
hearing the details of Kony's meeting with a delegation of
northern elders on November 29. The meeting was the first
time Kony had spoken his mind to any such group since
September 2007. Accounts of the encounter reveal that Kony
and his senior officers are living in a reality shaped by
isolation and misinformation about the outside world. Kony
cannot understand why no one is listening to him and why he
is not benefiting from the peace process. In the wake of
Kony's refusal to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA),
Government of Southern Sudan Mediator Riek Machar and LRA
delegation leader David Matsanga traveled to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda in a probably vain attempt
to salvage dialogue in the face of Kony's intransigence. End
Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
VISIT WITH THE CHAIRMAN
- - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (U) The LRA delegation, northern elders, religious
leaders, and parliamentarians traveled to Rikwangba on
November 28 to meet with LRA leader Joseph Kony (refs A and
B). This was billed as the last attempt to persuade Kony to
sign the FPA. A signing ceremony was planned for November

30. The group moved approximately five kilometers outside
the assembly area to a temporary LRA encampment, where they
spent two nights sleeping outside next to a campfire. Kony
stopped by to acknowledge their presence on the evening of
November 28 and returned on November 29 to meet with them
from 1300 to 1800. The group went through three security
checkpoints where they were rigorously searched and subjected
to rough treatment. Michael Otim, Director of the NGO Forum
in Gulu, said that in the past, there had not been any
security checks. The planned discussion about the FPA turned
out to be a one-sided diatribe by Kony with difficult,

sometimes heated, follow-up meetings with senior LRA officers
(ref A).

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (SBU) Kony told the group that he did not trust his
previous negotiators and that he wanted to reconstitute the
team in order to conclude negotiations before Christmas. In
one instance, Kony railed against Martin Ojul, Matsanga's
predecessor, and said that he could not accept the Protocol
on Accountability and Reconciliation, which is the heart of
the FPA and which had been negotiated by Ojul. He stated
that he could not accept an agreement negotiated by "thieves"
who stole donor money and were being paid by the GOU. Kony
said that he needs to reconstitute his negotiating team to
get rid of the thieves. He re-affirmed support for Matsanga
as the delegation leader and said that delegation member
Justine Labeja is the only person he trusts.


4. (SBU) Kony claimed that UN Special Envoy for LRA-Affected
Areas Joachim Chissano promised that the GOU would go to the
UNSC to request the deferment of the ICC warrants after the
Accountability and Reconciliation Protocol was signed on June
27, 2007. Kony complained that the GOU had not gone to the
UNSC and that this was a sign of bad faith. (Note: Kony is
misinformed on the timing of the approach to the UNSC.
Chissano's team did not tell Kony that the GOU would go to
the UNSC after signing the protocol. Chissano insisted that
Kony sign the FPA before going to the UNSC. End Note.)


5. (C) After complaining that the GOU had paid off his
negotiators, Kony demanded to know where "his money" from
Museveni was. Kony said on one occasion that he was supposed
to receive $10,000 from the GOU, but it was blocked by GOSS
mediator Riek Machar. (Note: GOU officials confirm that
Museveni sent Kony the $10,000 that was diverted by the
mediation team. End Note.) Kony said that Museveni needs to
give him money to prove the GOU's seriousness toward the
process.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
FACING INTERNAL DISSENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Otim confirmed previous reporting about pressure on
Kony from other senior LRA officers (ref A). In a private
meeting with the Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Acana, Kony
said that "I have internal problems. Some people in the
group need to feel part of the process. If something comes

KAMPALA 00001579 002.2 OF 003


Classified by: P/E Chief, Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).

through from the Government of Uganda, there has to be
something in it for them." Otim reports a similar, more
vicious encounter with BG Dominic Ongwen, who frightened the
group of elders into thinking they were about to be executed.
Ongwen said that if Kony signs the FPA as it is, without
clearly defined packages and positions outlining the future
of the senior LRA commander, they would kill him. Ongwen
reportedly was reprimanded later in a LRA High Command
meeting and said nothing the following day.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
BETRAYAL BY THE ACHOLI
- - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Kony lashed out at a number of Acholi leaders and
acted disrespectfully to the traditional leader of his own
clan. He complained that Gulu District Chairman Norbert Mao
should stop public comments alleging that the LRA received
ammunition from Khartoum in an airdrop. He challenged Mao to
produce the evidence. Kony then asked "what is wrong with
the LRA receiving help from the Arabs when the UPDF is
getting assistance from the Americans?" Kony stated that Mao
should have come to see firsthand the effectiveness of
Khartoum weaponry. Otim said that the group interpreted this
as a confirmation of a continued lifeline from Khartoum. He
and other members of the group noted the new Sudanese
uniforms and other "gadgets" and military trappings in the
camp.


8. (C) Kony's uncle, Thomas Otim, handed over seven
suitcases to the LRA. Michael Otim said that Kony's uncle
was allegedly carrying equipment that could detect aircraft
at night.


9. (SBU) Kony only had kind words for Ugandan President
Museveni, who has been taking care of his mother for 15
years. He said that he wanted to talk to Museveni directly
and tasked Matsanga to get the latest telephone numbers from
the Government.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MACHAR AND MATSANGA PLEAD KONY'S CASE IN THE REGION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (SBU) After the GOU put an end to its participation in
the Juba Peace Process on DATE, Machar wrote a letter to
Presidents Kabila and Museveni urging a continuation of peace
talks. Machar, Matsanga, and the LRA delegation traveled to
Kinshasa on December 4 and Kampala from December 5 to 8 to
brief Presidents Kabila and Museveni on their ideas for the
future of the peace process. Upon arrival at the airport,
Machar and Matsanga told P/E Chief that Kabila had been
receptive to their message, which was to keep an open line of
dialogue with Kony, albeit in a scaled down manner. Machar's
basic point was that it was less expensive to maintain
dialogue than to pursue a military option which could
re-ignite LRA attacks on civilian populations.


11. (SBU) Matsanga said he told Kabila that it was clear
that the GOU would not go to the UNSC without Kony's
signature on the FPA. Matsanga argued that Kony's signature
was not important, but implementation of the agreement was
critical. Machar also told Kabila that because Congolese
citizens are now LRA victims, the DRC could make the request
to the UNSC for the ICC warrants to be deferred. Matsanga
claimed to have lined up British support for this move.
Kabila was non-committal about going to the UNSC, according
to Matsanga.


12. (C) Matsanga told P/E Chief that he would bring his
satellite telephone to Museveni so that Kony could call the
President. During Machar and Matsanga's December 8 meeting,
Museveni said that he would be willing to have direct contact
with Kony. (Note: The call did not happen in the meeting,
but Matsanga later told P/E Chief that he has a private
number to arrange for Kony to use. Museveni has been waiting
for Kony to call him since December 2006, when he first gave
the LRA his numbers. Museveni did have a brief conversation
with then LRA Deputy Vincent Otti. End Note.) Matsanga
described the meeting with Museveni as "fantastical" (meaning
positive) and said that Museveni agreed not to attack Kony.
Machar and Matsanga requested that Museveni sign the peace
agreement unilaterally. Museveni remained non-committal and
said he would think about it, according to Minister of
Internal Affairs Ruhukana Rugunda, who was in the meeting.
Museveni only agreed to talk to Kony directly should he call.
The Government position, according to Rugunda, is that no
funding or food be provided to the LRA until Kony fulfills
his commitment to assembly at Rikwangba, southern Sudan.

- - - -
COMMENT

KAMPALA 00001579 003.2 OF 003


Classified by: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).

- - - -


13. (C) Machar and Matsanga may have heard what they wanted
to hear and come away from the regional meetings with the
belief that there is support for continued peace talks. They
essentially presented options to Kabila and Museveni that do
not change the negative dynamic of the peace process. Machar
and Matsanga may genuinely believe that the costs of
continuing dialogue in some form are lower than pursuing a
military option. Most observers question the quality of any
dialogue with Kony after his shoddy treatment of the Acholi
elders and parliamentarians and his insistence that the ICC
warrants be lifted, which is contingent upon him signing the
FPA.
BROWNING