APRIL 27TH ATTACK ON VICTORY DAY CEREMONY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001067

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: APRIL 27TH ATTACK ON VICTORY DAY CEREMONY

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons (b) and (d)


1. (C/REL ISAF) SUMMARY: Afghan authorities believe that
at least three and possibly as many as seven individuals
carried out the April 27 attack against the Victory Day
ceremony presided over by President Karzai and attended by
IRoA senior officials, politicians and other Afghan VIPs
from across the ethnic and political spectrum, and the
diplomatic corps. The response by Afghan security forces
was quick and professional. Casualties among the audience
and security forces include two killed and 11 wounded.
Three attackers were killed and three suspects are being
questioned; the investigation is ongoing. Finger-pointing
among Afghan security agencies began almost immediately,
and Parliament has called the Ministers of Defense and
Interior and the Director of the National Directorate for
Security (NDS) to testify today (April 29) on the attack
and their agencies' role in planning the event. All three
survived no-confidence votes. Embassy has not detected
thus far any wavering on the part of Afghan officials or
international partners on the IRoA's ability to follow
through on the plan to turn over full security
responsibility for Kabul to Afghan authorities by August

2008. The text of the Ambassador's April 29 public
statement regarding the attack is at para 8.


2. (C/REL ISAF) Synopsis of Attack: On 27 April 08 at
approximately 0945, insurgents, working from a third story
room in a hotel approximately 400 meters from the site,
fired upon the Victory Day ceremonies in central Kabul.
They targeted the reviewing stands where President Karzai
and other Afghan and foreign dignitaries (including
Ambassador Wood) were seated. The attack was launched
by at least three individuals armed with a PKM machine
gun, AK-47s and rifle-mounted 40mm grenades (not mortars
as earlier reported). The attackers initiated their fire
during the midst of a 21-gun salute (cannon fire) which
initially caused confusion among Afghan security forces
and spectators. Although the attackers had line-of-sight
to the center of the parade grounds, their weapons fire
was limited to indirect, non-aimed fire. Both President
Karzai and Ambassador Wood were safely evacuated to their
nearby motorcades. (Embassy Diplomatic Security agents
also evacuated the British Ambassador to the U.S.
Embassy.) According to IRoA officials, one Afghan
Member of Parliament and one 10-year old child were
killed in the attack, and 11 Afghan VIPS and spectators
were wounded. (Soldiers assembled in the parade grounds
for the ceremonial pass and review were carrying
unloaded weapons and had been searched by the PPS
before entering the parade grounds.)


3. (C/REL ISAF) IRoA security forces from the Presidential
Protective Service (PPS) and National Directorate for
Security's Directorate-10 (NDS D-10) quickly pinpointed the
source of the attack, returned fire, and within minutes
entered the hotel where they discovered three individuals
in a third-floor room. Two were already deceased and the
third died moments later from apparent shrapnel wounds.
It is unclear whether the three had been hit by police
gunfire or purposely or accidentally detonated their own
grenades or both. Authorities detained three individuals
whom they encountered coming down the hotel stairs as they
entered; the three are currently in NDS custody and being
questioned. Authorities are also detaining over 200 other
individuals for questioning who sought shelter in the
hotel basement. PPS and NDS claim that the room containing
the three armed insurgents was pad-locked from the outside
upon their entry into the hotel indicating that the three
had outside support. Both the Taliban and HIG have
publicly claimed responsibility, but there is no evidence
that anyone other than the Taliban was involved.


4. (C/REL ISAF) Response of Security Forces: By all
accounts, the PPS and NDS D-10 officers responded in a
timely and professional manner with both the evacuation of
Karzai and the counter-fire to the attack site. Security
for the event was a shared responsibility among several
agencies including the PPS, NDS DS-10 and other NDS
operatives, the Kabul City Police, and Defense Ministry
personnel. There has been fingerpointing among the various
security organizations involved, and the IRoA is

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conducting an internal review to pinpoint responsibility
and to identify weaknesses that need to be addressed.
State/Diplomatic Security mentors are also conducting an
internal review with the PPS leadership to determine
appropriate corrective actions.


5. (C/REL ISAF) Political Fallout: The media have
denounced the Afghan Government for having failed to
prevent the attack. Former mujahadeen, including Members
of Parliament, reacted emotionally, interpreting the
attack on the anniversary of the defeat of Soviet forces
to be a direct affront to their honor. President Karzai
has also speculated about dismissing one or all of the
MOD, MOI and NDS chiefs. On April 28, the Ambassador
relayed a message to parliamentary leaders, emphasizing
the need for solidarity in the face of an attack on all
the Afghans represented at the event and urging that
the focus remain on defeating those responsible. The
Ministers of Defense and Interior and the NDS Director
were called before Parliament to testify today (April 29)
on the attack and their agencies' role in planning the
event. They survived no-confidence votes.


6. (C/REL ISAF) Impact on Kabul Security Arrangements:
Early indications are that Afghan officials and key Allies
(UK, the Netherlands, Canada) do not believe the April 27
attack will or should have any impact on Afghan authorities
taking responsibility for Kabul city security in August
2008, in keeping with Karzai's commitment at the NATO
Summit in Bucharest. We are not aware at this time of any
wavering on the part of Allies to meet this objective.
Post notes the helpful public comments by UNSRSG Eide
affirming his expectation that the security transition will
take place on schedule.


7. (U) Text of the Statement by U.S. Ambassador William
Wood on the Victory Day Attack:

The flag at the American Embassy is flying at half
mast today in memorial to National Assembly member
Samkanai and other victims of the Taliban attack two
days ago. In addition to President Karzai and
international dignitaries, Afghan leaders from every
ethnic group, linguistic group, Islamic group, and
political group were attacked in the reviewing stand.
This was an attack by the Taliban against all of
Afghanistan on a day when all of Afghanistan was
celebrating with pride a great national victory.
All of Afghanistan should react in solidarity
against the attackers. The United States expresses
its deepest condolences to all those who were
victims of this attack and to their families and
friends.

Tragically, the attackers succeeded in getting close
enough to fire some shots. The security institutions
of Afghanistan defeated the attack within 120 seconds
of the first shot and performed in a skilled,
professional, and disciplined way during the attack.
The United States expresses its solidarity with those
forces and salutes their heroism and dedication.

For my part, I look forward to attending next year's
Victory Day parade.
WOOD