FATAH-HAMAS AGREE TO RESUME DIALOGUE? OR NOT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 000504

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE. NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/PASCUAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018
TAGS: KWBG PGOV PREL PTER PHUM KPAL IS
SUBJECT: FATAH-HAMAS AGREE TO RESUME DIALOGUE? OR NOT?

REF: SANA'A 517

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. On March 19 and 20, Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh received PLO and Hamas delegations in Sana'a
to discuss an initiative calling for dialogue between Hamas
and PLO factions, including Fatah. On March 23, Fatah
Revolutionary Council (FRC) member and PLC Fatah-bloc leader
Azzam al-Ahmad and Hamas member Mousa Abu Marzouq signed the
"Sana'a Declaration," which did not meet all of Abu Mazen's
conditions for dialogue with Hamas. PLO Executive Committee
Secretary Yasser Abed Rabbo told the Consul General on March

SIPDIS
23 that Abu Mazen was "furious" about the declaration because
he opposes dialogue unless Hamas reverses the coup in Gaza,
accepts the legitimacy of the PA, and accepts all PLO
commitments. Nimer Hamad, Abu Mazen's Political Advisor told
ConGen Political Specialist and the media that al-Ahmad was
not authorized by Abu Mazen to sign the declaration and had
not consulted with the PA President, although al-Ahmad told
ConGen Specialist by phone from Sana'a that he had Abu
Mazen's backing. Fatah Central Committee (FCC) members,
including Ahmad Qureia (Abu Ala'a),publicly endorsed the
Sana'a Declaration March 24. End Summary.

Sana'a Declaration
--------------


2. (C) On March 19 and 20, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah
Saleh received PLO and Hamas delegations in Sana'a to discuss
reconciliation. The PLO delegation included Fatah
Revolutionary Council (FRC) member and PLC Fatah-bloc leader
Azzam al-Ahmad, PLO Executive Committee member Saleh Rafat,
DFLP member Qais Abu Lailah, and Palestinian Ambassador to
Yemen Ahmad al-Deek. The Hamas delegation came from Damascus
and included Deputy Head of the Hamas Political Bureau Mousa
Abu Marzouq and Hamas members Izzat Rishaq, Muhammad Nasser,
and Ihsan Qadous.


3. (SBU) The invitations to Sana'a were based on a Yemeni
initiative that called for dialogue between Hamas and PLO
factions, including Fatah, based on the following principles:
(1) abiding by PLO commitments and holding early presidential
and legislative elections, (2) resuming national dialogue on
the basis of: the 2005 Cairo and 2007 Mecca agreements; the
principle that the Palestinian people are an indivisible
entity; the fact that the PA consists of an elected
presidency, elected parliament, and an executive authority
represented by a national unity government; and adherence to
all elements of the Palestinian legitimacy, (3) emphasizing
the need for all Palestinians to respect and abide by the
Palestinian constitution and law, (4) establishing a national
unity government to include all factions proportionate to
their weight in the PLC, and (5) establishing a committee by
the Arab League including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Jordan.


4. (C) On March 23, talks resumed and al-Ahmad and Abu
Marzouq signed the "Sana'a Declaration," which read "We, the
representatives of Fatah and Hamas, agree to the Yemeni
initiative as a framework to resume dialogue between the two
movements to return the Palestinian situation to what it was
before the Gaza incidents."

Declaration Departs
from Initiative
--------------


5. (C) In the signed declaration, al-Ahmed accepted two
significant changes requested by Hamas: (1) changing language
to state that the Yemeni initiative is the framework for
dialogue rather than the basis for implementation and (2)
replacing language about restoring the status quo ante in
Gaza with language about restoring the overall Palestinian
situation, including in the West Bank. These two changes
stray from Abu Mazen's position that the Yemeni initiative is
the bottom line, rather than the starting point for
negotiations with Hamas and that Fatah will reconcile with
Hamas only if Hamas agrees to hand back control of Gaza to
the PA.

Reaction from Ramallah
--------------


6. (C) Al-Ahmad's actions produced an immediate negative
reaction in Ramallah. PLO Executive Committee Secretary
Yasser Abed Rabbo told the Consul General on March 23 that
al-Ahmad was "free-lancing and has his own agenda, including
getting rid of PM Fayyad's government." He added that
al-Ahmad is responsible for this "disaster" and that Abu

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Mazen is "furious" because he will only agree to
reconciliation if Hamas reverses the coup in Gaza, accepts
the legitimacy of the PA, and accepts all PLO commitments.
(Comment: Al-Ahmad was Deputy Prime Minister in the national
unity government and likely sees the return to dialogue as a
precursor to his return in a senior government position. End
Comment). Abed Rabbo also said Abu Mazen called al-Ahmad on
March 23 to complain about his signing the declaration and
stressed that talks should focus on implementing the Yemeni
initiative, with all of its conditions, including the return
of Gaza to PA control. Abed Rabbo said he will urge Abu
Mazen to inform President Saleh that there should be no
follow-on talks, except on the basis of implementation of the
original Yemeni initiative.


7. (C) Fatah members in Abu Mazen's office also told ConGen
Political Specialist that Abu Mazen did not authorize
al-Ahmad to sign the declaration. Nimer Hamad, Political
Advisor to Abu Mazen, told al-Jazeera television March 23
that al-Ahmad "committed a mistake" by signing the
declaration without consulting with Abu Mazen. As directed
by Abu Mazen, Spokesman for the President Nabil Abu Rudeineh
issued the following statement March 23: "Resumption of
dialogue ... must take place to implement the Yemeni proposal
and not to deal with it as a framework for dialogue because
this will not lead to any result. We want the implementation
of the proposal. We do not want talks over its articles."
(Note: Abu Rudeineh's statement reflects Abu Mazen's view
that Hamas must reverse the coup in Gaza, accept the
legitimacy of the PA, and accept all PLO commitments in order
to resume dialogue. End Note)

FCC Supports Declaration
--------------


8. (C) Fatah Central Committee (FCC) members, including
Ahmad Qureia (Abu Ala'a) and Hakim Bilawi, endorsed the
Sana'a Declaration during a March 24 meeting and issued the
following statement: "The Central Committee of Fatah
welcomed the outcome of the dialogue in Yemen which resulted
in signing a declaration following several days of discussion
sponsored by President Saleh." The statement also said the
FCC looks forward to the restoration of the status quo in
Gaza and national unity.

Al-Ahmad's Take on Declaration
--------------


9. (C) Al-Ahmad told media March 23 that he consulted with
the President's office before signing the declaration and he
looks forward to the Government of Yemen setting a date in
early April for future talks. By phone from Sana'a March 23,
al-Ahmad told ConGen Political Specialist that he agreed to
sign the document to avoid leaving Yemen empty-handed. He
emphasized, however, that core issues, such as Gaza and a
unity government, must be addressed during dialogue.
Al-Ahmad expressed anger with Yaser Abed Rabbo and Nabil Abu
Rudeineh who both "downplayed the signing of the
declaration," he said. Al-Ahmad said President Saleh will
ask the Arab Summit in Damascus March 29-30 to endorse the
initiative and wants to initiate a Fatah-Hamas dialogue April

5. He speculated, however, that "nothing new" will arise
from the initiative, because Hamas will have "the same old
positions."

Hamas' Response
--------------


10. (C) Hamas representatives told the media March 23-24
that the Sana'a Declaration is a guideline for reconciliation
talks, not a pre-condition, and that talks will begin April 5
with the first round in the West Bank or Gaza. They added
that the Palestinian Ambassador to Yemen, Ahmad al-Deek, will
issue invitations for these talks in early April.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Abu Mazen's poor management of this issue has left
him in a difficult spot. Palestinian public opinion
generally favors national reconciliation. By authorizing the
delegation to go to Sana'a, Abu Mazen sought to gain public
support, but to produce an outcome in which Hamas - not Fatah
- would be responsible for the breakdown. At the same time,
he emphasized to us that he would not compromise with Hamas.
The process in Sana'a got away from Abu Mazen, leaving him on
a slippery slope. If he proceeds with dialogue with Hamas,
the negotiations now underway with Israel cannot move
forward. If he steps back from the efforts at reconciliation
begun in Sana'a, he risks being blamed for the failure. The

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deep differences between Hamas and Fatah on the issues
suggest that an agreement is unlikely, but Abu Mazen may end
up paying a large political cost for this blunder.

WALLES