Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA99
2008-01-17 03:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA SHOWS RESULTS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID 
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VZCZCXRO4432
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0099/01 0170329
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170329Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7665
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1881
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1520
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3622
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1415
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2242
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0516
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000099 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, DS
INL FOR BOULDIN
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ
DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANY/ST. HILLARE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
TREASURY FOR PHILLIPP
NSC FOR E. PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA SHOWS RESULTS

REF: A. JAKARTA 07 3375

B. JAKARTA 07 3182

C. JAKARTA 07 2852

D. JAKARTA 07 1620

E. JAKARTA 07 0194

F. JAKARTA 06 7393

JAKARTA 00000099 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, DS
INL FOR BOULDIN
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ
DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANY/ST. HILLARE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
TREASURY FOR PHILLIPP
NSC FOR E. PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA SHOWS RESULTS

REF: A. JAKARTA 07 3375

B. JAKARTA 07 3182

C. JAKARTA 07 2852

D. JAKARTA 07 1620

E. JAKARTA 07 0194

F. JAKARTA 06 7393

JAKARTA 00000099 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Three years into the Yudhoyono
Administration, Jakarta remains stalwart in its commitment to
put terrorists behind bars. Vigorous efforts by GOI law
enforcement during the past year have dismantled several
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror cells and further reduced the
ability of radical groups to carry out attacks. Equally
important, the GOI is improving the public's perception of
its efforts to the point where violent, radical groups no
longer receive the support from the larger Islamic community
that they enjoyed a few years ago.


2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): The government is also keeping
terrorists in prison longer and has instituted a selective
de-radicalization effort which has yielded promising results.
While there continue to be weak links in the GOI's efforts,
the overall picture is highly positive. USG support is
helping make a difference. END SUMMARY.

POLICE EFFECTIVE IN SULAWESI
--------------

3. (S) Indonesia experienced a second consecutive year
without a major terrorist incident in 2007. The Indonesian
National Police (INP) scored major successes in breaking up
terrorist cells linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other
violent Islamic extremist organizations. As in past years,
USG-trained INP Detachment 88 units (SD-88) led the charge,
with significant support from the INP's so-called "Team
Bomb." The first key breakthrough came in January, when the
INP conducted two raids against a radical stronghold in Poso,
Central Sulawesi. The second raid deployed 500 security
force personnel against a large group of suspected terrorists

and their supporters, who were armed with small arms and
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The raids netted 28
captured, and subsequent operations added five more. The
raids spurred a dramatic improvement in the previously tense
situation in Central Sulawesi as many of the remaining
militants fled the region (ref E).


4. (SBU) In March, information gained from the Poso suspects
helped INP to initiate a series of raids in Central and East
Java which resulted in the arrest of several members of the
so-called "military wing" of JI and the much-publicized
seizure of a large cache of explosives in East Java. In
June, INP's SD-88 in Central Java arrested several key JI
terrorist operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad
Syahroni (aka Zarkasih) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana
(aka Ainal Bahri). The arrest of Afghanistan veteran Dujana
was particularly valuable, as he had been actively overseeing
the stockpiling and movement of weaponry and had been
involved in several JI attacks in recent years (ref D).

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS
--------------

5. (C) The Yudhoyono administration also made substantial
progress in the propaganda war against JI and its allies in

2007. January raids spurred criticism from radical Muslim
leaders who accused the INP of being heavy-handed and
persecuting Muslims. This argument was deflated when the GOI
charged 17 Poso Christians with terrorism in the murder of
two Muslims in 2006. (Note: all 17 were eventually

JAKARTA 00000099 002.2 OF 004


convicted.) After the March and June raids, the INP invited
the press to film seized weapons and explosives caches and to
interview Dujana and other arrestees. The transparency of
press reports undercut radicals' claims that the terrorists
were "victims" of police aggression. Predictions that the
police would become the target of attacks by militants failed
to materialize. Moreover, lawsuits brought against the INP
by Abu Dujana's wife and JI co-founder and spiritual leader
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir did not create the expected groundswell of
public attention and were eventually thrown out of court.

MILITARY ROLE IN CT
--------------

6. (C) After the October 2005 terrorist attacks in Bali (the
last major one in Indonesia) Yudhoyono called for the
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) to assist the INP in CT
activities. With the INP's separation from the TNI in 2001,
the TNI was removed from domestic law enforcement, but the
INP's intelligence capabilities remain underdeveloped. The
TNI's primary CT function continues to be intelligence
collection and surveillance. The Department of State's
Diplomatic Security Anti-terrorism Assistance Program
(DS/ATA) plans to provide training in intelligence gathering
techniques to SD-88 to bolster its capabilities and lessen
its dependence on the TNI for CT intelligence.


7. (C) TNI Army Special Forces units (KOPASSUS) form the
backbone of the TNI's crisis response capacity. The elite
force possesses skills--such as anti-hijacking, hostage
rescue and explosive ordnance disposal. All TNI units
continue to have shortages of specialized equipment,
training, funding and experience, and interagency rivalry
with the INP is still common. As with the INP, targeted
foreign assistance to fund essential training and equipment
for TNI would improve its crisis response capacity and
ability to assist the INP in CT operations.

WINNING IN THE COURTROOM
--------------

8. (C) The GOI has also made efforts to ensure that arrested
terrorists are successfully prosecuted. All of the key
suspects arrested by the INP in 2007 were brought to Jakarta
for trial, where prosecutors and judges are more experienced.
This not only reduced the possibility for terrorists and
their supporters to manipulate the judicial process, it also
put the cases directly under the USG-supported Attorney
General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime
(ref B). This elite group won convictions against all 13
JI-linked terrorists brought to trial in 2007, including Poso
JI leader Hasanuddin, four men who participated in the 2005
schoolgirl beheadings, and four others who were involved in
the 2005 Tentena market bombings (ref C). The AGO's office
also won convictions against the 17 Poso Christians. Most of
those convicted received sentences of between 14 and 19
years. Task Force prosecutors worked closely with SD-88
officials in reviewing the evidence and ensuring that key
witnesses from other regions testified. The Task Force is
currently prosecuting Abu Dujana, Zarkasih and approximately
10 other JI members arrested in the March and June raids.
The Dujana trial has been a particular focus, and the Task
Force's top prosecutors are handling the case.

STAYING IN PRISON LONGER
--------------

9. (U) Other legal institutions are showing greater resolve
against terrorists, reflecting the GOI's growing confidence
in fighting terrorism. In September, the Supreme Court
rejected the final appeals of three men on death row for
carrying out the 2002 Bali bombings. The Court also upheld

JAKARTA 00000099 003.2 OF 004


the life sentence imposed on JI trainer and recruiter Subur
Sugiyarto. In October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights
announced that convicted terrorists would no longer be given
automatic sentence remissions at major holidays, as other
prisoners enjoy.

DE-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS
--------------

10. (SBU) In 2007, the INP made greater use of selective
efforts to "de-radicalize" convicted terrorists. The program
identifies individuals who appear open to more moderate
teachings. INP officials provide spiritual support to the
men and modest financial support to their families. In some
cases, notably those of Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron, the
"reformed" terrorists are allowed to meet with recent
arrestees to make theological arguments against violence.
The program also aims to improve intelligence collection from
those arrested, and to reduce opportunities for terrorist
recruitment inside prisons. While the program has scored
some successes--largely due to the efforts of individual INP
officials--it has not become formalized and often ends the
moment the terrorists move from police custody into the
prison system.

TERROR FINANCE - ASSET FREEZING
--------------

11. (C) Indonesia's implementation of asset freezing under
UNSC resolutions such as UN 1267 (for Al Qaeda-related
assets) remains weak. Although the GOI has not recently
opposed any U.S.-initiated designations, it also has not
undertaken measures to identify, seize or freeze
terrorist-related assets. There are three major problems:
a) an overly bureaucratic procedure involving three GOI
agencies; b) understaffing at the Foreign Ministry's
Directorate for International Security and Disarmament; and
c) lack of technical capacity of the banking system to find
and freeze assets. These problems are compounded by the high
incidence of similar names in Indonesian society, a poorly
functioning credit bureau, and slow delivery of information
from the central bank. While the GOI acknowledges its
obligations under the UN process, it has not made terrorist
asset freezing a high priority.


12. (C) Our inquiries have verified that UN 1267 and similar
UN asset-freezing designations either have not been issued in
a timely manner by the GOI to the banking system, or have not
been issued at all. Asset-freezing implementation takes days
or weeks after a UN announcement, which allows the terrorist
to shift funds without penalty. That said, we do not believe
that many terrorist assets would be found in the formal
banking sector here. There are multiple ways to move money
and other assets within Indonesia and across borders which
are difficult to trace. An effective asset-freezing
procedure would hinder the terrorist's ability to transfer
assets, but it is not clear when the GOI will dedicate
sufficient resources to this important task.

BREAKING CONNECTIONS
--------------

13. (C) While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been
impressive, more could be done in some areas. Despite INP
successes in Sulawesi and Central Java, JI networks and
sleeper cells likely remain intact and have the capacity to
go operational with little warning. Moreover, Malaysian JI
operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, suspected of
involvement in nearly every major terrorist attack in
Indonesia since 2002, remains at large. GOI's CT
Coordinating Desk remains hamstrung by limited funding and a
reluctance to grant it too much public visibility. Most

JAKARTA 00000099 004.2 OF 004


importantly, the GOI needs to address weaknesses in the
prison system, where convicted terrorists are often able to
maintain ties to their communities and to recruit new members
into groups like JI. The problem is exacerbated by a lack of
coordination between the INP and corrections officials. As
more and more terrorists complete their sentences and are
released into society, it will be important to ensure that
former links among these terrorists do not re-establish
themselves.

USG SUPPORT MAKES A DIFFERENCE
--------------

14. (S) The DOS and DOD work together in Indonesia to assist
the GOI with a variety of programs to promote awareness of
counterterrorism issues and support a Rewards For
Justice-style program (ref F). The DS/ATA continues to
provide training and equipment to SD-88, while the Embassy's
political section CT program uses DOD Military Information
Support Team funds to help the GOI sponsor counterterrorism
seminars, sports diplomacy events and television programs to
educate the general public about the threat of terrorism and
how the public can assist in stopping it. Regional 911-style
police tip lines will begin in early 2008, and a national
line is planned for the end of 2008. State/INL support for
the AGO's Task Force has been vital to improving both the
expertise and the morale of the prosecutors handling
terrorist cases.


15. (C) A few years ago, the GOI seemed daunted by the
challenge of counterterrorism. Over the past three years,
President Yudhoyono's cautious but resolute engagement on
counterterrorism has won the support of most Indonesians, the
overwhelming majority of whom reject terrorism. Concerted
leadership, sustained effort and foreign assistance have all
played roles in the GOI's success. JI and its radical
associates remain a security threat to both Western and
domestic targets, but that threat has been severely weakened.


16. (U) One other positive note, which confirms the success
of Indonesia's CT efforts, is the rising number of tourists
who are again coming to Bali. Almost 1.7 million foreign
tourists visited the island in 2007, including nearly 50,000
U.S. citizens. This figure is up considerably from the 1.25
million who visited in 2006.
HUME