EAST TIMOR/INDONESIA FINAL REPORT HOLDS GOI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000825

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, DRL/PHD, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, EUR/WE
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TT ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR/INDONESIA FINAL REPORT HOLDS GOI
INSTITUTIONS ACCOUNTABLE

REF: A. JAKARTA 672

B. JAKARTA 163

C. 07 JAKARTA 3339 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: According to the Executive Summary of the
Timor Leste-Indonesia Commission of Truth and Friendship
(CTF)--shown to DepPol/C by an insider on April 22--the final
report holds the GOI institutionally responsible for gross
human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. The report
cites military personnel, police and civilian authorities for
contributing to the violence through cooperation with
pro-integration militias.


2. (S) SUMMARY (Con'd): The report--key conclusions of
which follow below--goes on to assert that Indonesia "bears
state responsibility" for the violations. Though the report
does not recommend prosecutions, helpfully the report also
does not recommend amnesty for anyone. It does recommend
human rights training. While falling short of holding high
ranking officials or central commands responsible, the report
as summarized holds institutions and their members in the
field responsible in clear and powerful language. Based on
our review, the report should be viewed as an honest attempt
to ascribe accountability for the 1999 violations and a
sincere attempt to redress the causes. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) A reliable source with the CTF shared the final
version of the CTF Executive Summary on April 22. This
Indonesian source (strictly protect) asked that all reference
to the source and the fact that we saw the report be kept
confidential as it has not been officially shared with either

SIPDIS
of the two governments. The Executive Summary and the full
text of the final report will be presented to the Presidents
of the two countries within the next few days. (Note: The
CTF was established in December 2004 with the mandate to
establish the conclusive truth regarding the events prior to
and immediately after the 1999 referendum on East Timor's
independence. It has ten members, five each from Indonesia
and Timor-Leste.


4. (S) The Summary concluded:

-- "Gross human rights violations in the form of crimes
against humanity did occur" and "these included murder, rape
and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal
detention, and forcible transfer and deportation carried out
against the civilian population."

-- "The Commission concluded that there was institutional
responsibility for these violations." The Summary continued
that "the persistent patterns of organized, institutional
involvement" in GHRVs "provide the basis for its conclusions
about institutional responsibility." From "a moral and
political perspective the respective states must accept state
responsibility for the violations" as "linked to their
institutions."


5. (S) Citing lack of judicial investigations and
cooperation by the United Nations, the report is far less
harsh on the East Timor pro-independence forces, stating that
the pro-independence groups "were responsible for gross human
rights violations in the form of illegal detentions that
targeted civilians who were perceived as pro-autonomy
supporters."

GOI COLLABORATION WITH PARAMILITARY FORCES


6. (S) The Summary explained two flaws in Indonesian
political culture at the time which allowed violations to
occur in 1999:


JAKARTA 00000825 002 OF 003


-- First, because of the Indonesia military's (TNI) dual
function of military and civilian responsibilities, the TNI
was "deeply involved in the social and political domains,
while simultaneously conducting internal military operations.
The combination of a large military influence and a weak
control function in the form of the civilian administration
implied low accountability in government policies and opened
the way to perpetration of violence by involved
institutions." A situation of active conflict in formal
"peacetime" combined with weak rule of law, made it difficult
to hold authorities accountable for their actions.

-- Second, the "Sishankamrata system" allowed paramilitary
groups comprised of civilians to act as legal auxiliaries to
the military and receive public funding." Patterns of
"co-perpetration and support arose" due to "structural
interconnections between the TNI and militia and other
paramilitary groups that had developed over time," the report
explained. At "the operational level these institutions all
acted together in the pursuit of the common goal of defeating
the pro-independence movement."

EVIDENCE LEAVES NO DOUBT


7. (S) The Summary explained how "the evidence left no doubt
that pro-autonomy (pro-Indonesia) militias were the primary
direct perpetrators" of GHRVs. This included "murder,
systematic rape, torture, severe deprivation of physical
liberty, and deportation and forcible transfer" "so clear
that there could be no doubt of their institutional
responsibility for these crimes."


8. (S) The Summary continued, "TNI personnel, police, and
civilian authorities consistently and systematically
cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of
significant ways that contributed to the perpetration of the
crimes." TNI personnel sometimes directly participated in
the operations and the crimes, and sometimes TNI offices
directed the operations and were "present when the crimes
were committed." Furthermore, "TNI commanders in East Timor
controlled the supply, distribution, and use of weapons to
militia groups and did so in an organized manner," and they
knew the weapons were being used to commit" GHRVs "as part of
the pro-autonomy campaign." TNI members helped in "planning
and organization of joint operations that frequently included
TNI personnel and officers." Local TNI headquarters "were
used for illegal detentions where torture and sexual
violence" took place.


9. (S) Civilian officials also were involved in the
operations and "provided material support." When police were
not involved, "they were almost completely ineffective in
preventing them and in providing security for the civilian
population," the Summary stated.


10. (S) "This kind of sustained and coordinated activity
involving many forms of support, encouragement, and
co-perpetration forms the basis of the Commission's
conclusion that TNI, Polri, and civilian government all bear
institutional responsibility for these crimes," the Summary
concluded.

HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING RECOMMENDED


11. (S) Under its recommendations, the Summary stated: "A
key component of such institutional reforms is promoting a
culture of accountability in the institutions whose
responsibility it is to maintain peace and security. Based
on this principle and in accordance with its Terms of
Reference and considerations of procedural justice, the
Commission made no recommendation for amnesty or
rehabilitation of any individuals or groups."


JAKARTA 00000825 003 OF 003



12. (S) The Summary cited "lack of effective commitment to
rule of law and accountability in military and security
forces in 1999," and recommended a series of institutional
reforms including:

-- A human rights training program focused on the role of
security forces and intelligence organizations in situations
of political conflict, mass demonstrations and civil unrest
and emphasizing the obligation of the military and
intelligence forces to remain neutral in political
controversies and elections.

-- A human rights training program focused on the role of
civil institutions in planning and working to prevent civil
and political conflict through mediation, etc.

-- The promotion of institutional reforms that enhance the
authority of institutions charged with the investigation and
prosecutions of human rights violations alleged to have been
perpetrated by members of the armed forces, police or other
security agencies.

-- Specialized training for military, police and civilian
officials to promote protection of women and children and
prevention of sexual exploitation.


13. (S) The report also recommended the establishment of a
"Documentation and Conflict Resolution Center" to promote
understanding of the past between the peoples of the two
nations. Other recommendations included ones on joint border
and security policy, conflict resolution and services for
victims, resolving economic asset issues, formation of a
Commission for Disappeared Persons."

OVERALL ASSESSMENT


14. (S) Our source with the CTF told DepPol/C that the
Summary and the Report are final and limited copies are being
made on April 24 to disseminate to the two governments. The
two leaders can question the report but must accept it in its
entirely, the source told us.


15. (S) The CTF Executive Summary clearly described a report
that holds few punches. It furthermore makes some very
important recommendations. Our source let us see the advance
copy of the Summary hoping that the USG would help support
the CTF when it releases the report. The report will be
painful for the GOI and human rights groups will see the
report as an opportunity to seek legal justice for
individuals never held accountable. We think that the USG
should carefully review the report after it is released and
support the process. Suggested press guidance is cited in
ref B.

HUME