Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA806
2008-04-22 10:10:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

NAMRU-2 -- MEDICAL RESEARCH UNIT'S DAYS MAY BE

Tags:  PREL MARR TBIO AMED ID 
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VZCZCXRO4434
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0806/01 1131010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221010Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8782
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2381
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1866
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2574
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/BUMED WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RULSAAV/NAVMEDRSCHCEN SILVER SPRING MD
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000806 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, G, G/OES, AIAG C.PATTERSON
NSC FOR E.PHU
OSD FOR P.IPSEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR TBIO AMED ID
SUBJECT: NAMRU-2 -- MEDICAL RESEARCH UNIT'S DAYS MAY BE
NUMBERED

REF: A. JAKARTA 804

B. JAKARTA 673 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume for reasons 1.4 (b+d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000806

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, G, G/OES, AIAG C.PATTERSON
NSC FOR E.PHU
OSD FOR P.IPSEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR TBIO AMED ID
SUBJECT: NAMRU-2 -- MEDICAL RESEARCH UNIT'S DAYS MAY BE
NUMBERED

REF: A. JAKARTA 804

B. JAKARTA 673 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume for reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The days of the Naval
Medical Research Unit in Jakarta (NAMRU-2) may be numbered.
The Minister of Health is actively campaigning against it,
the media are giving increasing play to her wild accusations
and legislators are calling for the unit's closure (ref a).
The silence from Washington regarding further negotiations is
being interpreted as a loss of interest in NAMRU's future.
Both GOI and USG are rapidly losing control of the issue. If
we want to keep NAMRU here, we must resume negotiations on an
MOU governing NAMRU's operations as soon as possible.
Mission again requests the Department provide a substantive
response to the Indonesian draft MOU text submitted for USG
review in November 2007. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.


2. (C) NAMRU has long had detractors here, but many have
recognized its assistance to national health authorities in
identifying and studying tropical diseases. That perception
is gradually eroding. The few leaders within the Indonesian
government who have supported NAMRU's continued operation are
increasingly fighting an uphill battle against opponents who
see it as an infringement on Indonesian sovereignty and
accuse it of nefarious activities.


3. (C) Lacking legal status since the termination of the
previous MOU in 2000, NAMRU had been able to operate normally
until March 31 when it received a letter from the Ministry of
Health that prohibited sample sharing with NAMRU. This move
seems to be linked to Indonesia's dispute with the World
Health Organization over the handling of human avian
influenza specimens.


4. (C) Reftels have detailed the increasingly hostile
campaign of Health Minister Supari against NAMRU. President
Yudhoyono has so far failed to reign in the outspoken
minister, a possible sign that opponents are gaining the
upper hand. Supari has called NAMRU an intelligence and
weapons-research arm of the USG. Several legislators have
echoed this charge, some going so far as to call for NAMRU's
closure. The issue is beginning to catch on with the press
and is taking on a life of its own (ref a). As reported
previously, President Yudhoyono was known to disagree with
Supari's allegations but declined to take action. The
deteriorating public climate now makes such a move
increasingly risky for him politically.


5. (S) Questioned about the case, Foreign Minister Wirajuda
said on April 21 that NAMRU researchers had no need for
immunity because NAMRU was a research unit, not a diplomatic
mission. Wirajuda noted that the USG-proposed text insisted
on diplomatic immunity for all U.S. NAMRU staff. Wirajuda's
remarks are his first pubic statement on the issue, to our
knowledge. They also raise the stakes significantly. From
the start of the negotiations it has been understood between
the two sides that this was the most difficult issue, and
would be the final issue to be resolved. Given that
Wirajuda's ministry has the lead on the MOU negotiations, his
bringing this negative view out into the open represents a
setback for the U.S. position.


6. (S) Presidential adviser Dino Djalal, perhaps the primary
champion within the GOI of keeping NAMRU in Jakarta, was
considered to hold the keys to the decision on diplomatic
immunity and other potentially unresolvable issues. Given
the delay in Washington's response, however, Djalal has
become increasingly frustrated. He now is also coming under
direct public attack, with one legislator, after asserting
NAMRU was a U.S. intelligence operation, accusing Djalal of
receiving benefits from the USG in return for his support.


7. (C) It is not clear whether the situation can be
reversed. The only hope of doing so, however, now lies in
quick and dramatic progress toward agreement on a new

JAKARTA 00000806 002 OF 002


Memorandum of Understanding. This would give President
Yudhoyono a reason to undercut Supari and her supporters. It
would also vindicate those key officials in the GOI who have
gone out on a considerable limb to work with us in the belief
that NAMRU benefits Indonesia.

HUME