ISLAMIC PARTY EYES 2009 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000801

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY EYES 2009 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. JAKARTA 773

B. JAKARTA 768

C. JAKARTA 744

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Classified By: Acting Pol/C Stanley Harsha for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Flush with confidence and momentum following
two surprise victories in key regional elections last week
(reftels),the Islamic-oriented Prosperous Justice Party
(PKS) has re-discovered its swagger just in time to make a
mark on the 2009 national elections. By focusing on good
governance, job creation, and tolerance, the party has calmed
many of its skeptics and increased its popular appeal. While
the presidency is almost certainly still out of reach for the
party in 2009, PKS appears well positioned to improve its
standing in the Parliament and could realistically have a
shot at the vice presidency. At a minimum, most analysts
believe that in 2009 PKS will have greater leverage--and more
options--than it did in 2004 when it entered SBY's coalition
as a junior partner. END SUMMARY.

A NEW MODERATE TEMPLATE FOR VICTORY


2. (C) Last week was a good week for PKS by any standard.
All but left for dead in the April 13 West Java gubernatorial
race--Indonesia's largest province--PKS' candidate registered
a stunning upset over two better funded, and heavily favored
rivals. (Note: The election has not been certified yet, but
all leading polling agencies have already declared the race
for the PKS candidate.) Then, PKS followed up its signature
victory in West Java with another apparent win in North
Sumatera's April 16 governor's race. (Note: The North
Sumatera election is also awaiting official certification.)
While a variety of local factors figured prominently in the
two races, in both instances, PKS fielded religious moderates
with strong governing track records, and platforms that
zeroed in on bread and butter constituent concerns.


3. (C) In both West Java and North Sumatera, Islamic
fundamentalist doctrine was conspicuously absent from the PKS
campaign playbook. PKS--as has been the case in virtually
all local elections since 2004--did not campaign on sharia,
or any of the other religious issues often associated with
the party. Instead, the party kept its traditional base of
support happy by embracing its non-controversial image as the
party of Islamic cultural values, but also broadened its
appeal by branding itself as a competent agent of change.
According to PKS legislator Zulkieflimansyah, the results
spoke for themselves, and demonstrated the party would be a
force to be reckoned with in 2009.


4. (C) Both elections also stood as evidence of the growing
influence of the moderate wing of the party.
Zulkieflimansyah told poloffs that some radical elements of
PKS had become so discouraged with the direction of the party
that they had defected to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
During a highly publicized April 21 PKS book launch, party
leaders explicity rejected the idea of an Islamic state.
According to Zulkieflimansyah, the PKS party leadership had
recognized that PKS would have a relatively low political
ceiling if it did not broaden its appeal and establish its
modernist credentials. Piety alone could not feed people and
create jobs, he added.

2009 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS


5. (C) PKS appears to have re-captured its momentum and
swagger and is poised to make considerable gains in the 2009
legislative elections. While party insiders do not
necessarily share People's Consultative Assembly Chair (and
PKS party luminary) Hidayat Nur Wahid's optimism that PKS
will secure 20 percent of the parliamentary seats in 2009,
most party cadres think 12 to 15 percent of the seats is
realistic. Political analysts agree, and there is a growing

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consensus that PKS will take advantage of its strong
grassroots infrastructure (second only to Golkar) to leapfrog
the other three Islamic-oriented parties currently ahead of
it in the parliament. (Note: The United Development Party
(PPP) with 10.5 percent of the seats, the National Awakening
Party (PKB) with 10 percent of the seats, and the National
Mandate Party (PKB) with 9.5 percent of the seats, all
currently have a larger presence in the parliament than PKS.)


6. (C) If PKS does in fact win 12 to 15 percent or more of
the parliamentary seats in the April 2009 legislative
elections, the party will have the power to play a prominent
role in the 2009 presidential race. According to the current
presidential election law, the only eligible presidential
candidates are those nominated by parties, or coalitions,
which win either 15 percent of the seats in the DPR, or 20
percent of the overall legislative votes in the 2009
parliamentary election. Though this threshold will likely be
lowered to a more manageable level, even President
Yudhoyono's own Democratic Party may struggle to meet this
threshold on its own. PKS could end up being one of only
three parties capable of meeting the threshold by itself
(Note: Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P) are the others.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE


7. (C) PKS insiders readily admit that even if the party does
win enough parliamentary seats to nominate its own
presidential candidate in 2009, the party is not yet ready to
make a run for the top job. According to Zulkieflimansyah,
PKS is currently focused on developing a strong record of
good governance, as well as a pool of talented technocrats.
Zulkieflimansyah told poloff that PKS was eyeing 2014 as a
more realistic target for the presidency.


8. (C) Even though PKS apparently does not have designs on
the presidency, the vice-presidency might be another matter
entirely. PKS father figure Hidayat Nur Wahid, despite being
from Java island, is often mentioned as a possible running
mate for President Yudhoyono, and on many levels the pairing
could make strategic sense. If, for example, President
Yudhoyono does ultimately decide to part ways with Vice
President Kalla and Golkar, PKS could well be the largest
unaffiliated political party left standing (former President
Megawati is running with PDI-P). In such a scenario, as a
member of SBY's governing coalition and a parliamentary
heavyweight, PKS would perhaps constitute the most logical
political partner for SBY, especially if it does not have its
own designs on the presidency. As an added bonus for SBY,
Hidayat Nur Wahid is a popular national figure, and the two
reportedly get along.


9. (C) Even if PKS does not field its own president or
vice-president in 2009, PKS support will be coveted by all of
the candidates. This will give the party a seat at the table
for any and all presidential ticket discussions. In the
event President Yudhoyono's party struggles in 2009 and PKS
prospers, PKS will have serious leverage with the President
if he wishes to maintain the relationship. President
Yudhyoyono has all but acknowledged this
likelihood--dispatching trusted Finance Minister Mulyani to
the aforementioned PKS book launch, for example--and at a
minimum will have to offer the party more cabinet positions
to salvage the relationship (PKS currently has only two).
STOCK ON THE RISE


10. (C) The Prosperous Justice Party first rose to prominence
with its surprisingly strong performance in the 2004
legislative elections. PKS was quickly branded the "it"
Islamic party and seemed to have considerable growth
potential. A series of relatively uninspired performances in
local elections quickly followed, however, and much of the
PKS cachet seemed irrevocably lost.

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11. (c) By re-inventing itself once again as a tolerant,
competent agent of change, PKS appears to have tapped a
reservoir of disillusionment with the status quo, and
positioned itself for a strong showing in the 2009 national
elections. Already a major political force, the future looks
even brighter for PKS.
HUME