Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA744
2008-04-14 08:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

"SHOCK RESULT" -- ISLAMIC PARTY LEADS IN KEY

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6816
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0744/01 1050859
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140859Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8680
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2327
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY IMMEDIATE 3759
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4927
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0980
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0915
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1754
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4520
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1814
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2539
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2592
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0704
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000744 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, DRL, DRL/AWH
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: "SHOCK RESULT" -- ISLAMIC PARTY LEADS IN KEY
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

REF: A. JAKARTA - OPS CENTER 04-13-08 TELCON


B. JAKARTA 684

C. JAKARTA 633

D. 07 JAKARTA 2156

E. 06 JAKARTA 13419

JAKARTA 00000744 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000744

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, DRL, DRL/AWH
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: "SHOCK RESULT" -- ISLAMIC PARTY LEADS IN KEY
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

REF: A. JAKARTA - OPS CENTER 04-13-08 TELCON


B. JAKARTA 684

C. JAKARTA 633

D. 07 JAKARTA 2156

E. 06 JAKARTA 13419

JAKARTA 00000744 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Islamic-oriented Prosperous Justice
Party (PKS) appears to have registered a stunning electoral
upset in West Java, Indonesia's most populace province. Five
reputable polling outfits have declared the PKS gubernatorial
candidate the winner over better-known rivals. If validated,
the victory would provide PKS with significant momentum in
advance of the 2009 elections. President Yudhoyono supported
the losing incumbent and, for him, the result--driven at
least in part by rising anxiety over higher food prices--is
potentially ominous. END SUMMARY.

BY THE NUMBERS


2. (U) Indonesia's most populace province--West Java--held
its first-ever direct election for governor on April 13.
Nearly 65 percent of West Java's 27.9 million eligible voters
cast their ballots during an election-day process that
unfolded without incident. POL FSN visited several polling
sites in Bandung, the provincial capital, and witnessed
residents lined up peaceably. President Yudhoyono and the
First Lady voted in Bogor, a major West Javan city. (Note:
The President hails from East Java, but has been a resident
of Bogor--which is close to Jakarta--for years.)


3. (SBU) In terms of the outcome, the screaming headline of
the April 14 Jakarta Post, Indonesia's major English-language
daily, said it all: "EARLY COUNTS SHOW SHOCK RESULT IN WEST
JAVA ELECTION." While the official results will not be
certified until April 20, five polling organizations have
declared PKS candidate Ahmad Heryawan the winner by an
average of nearly five percentage points over his closest
rival. Unofficial preliminary numbers from the West Java
Electoral Commission mirrored the polling agency figures.
The combined average vote distribution from the five polling
outfits was as follows (these figures keep changing as votes

come in, but the PKS candidate is always in the lead by
several percentage points):

Ahmad Heryawan and Dede Yusuf (PKS and PAN)...........40
percent
Agum Gumelar and Nu'man Abdul Hakim (PDI-P and PPP)...35
percent
Danny Setiawan and Iwan Sulandjana (Golkar and PD)....25
percent

HOW WEST JAVA WAS WON


4. (SBU) For most election observers, Ahmad Heryawan's
apparent victory can be considered nothing less than
stunning. Heryawan was pitted against incumbent Danny
Setiawan, the President's choice and the candidate of the
formidable Golkar political machine, and former
Transportation Minister Agum Gumelar of the equally powerful
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P).


5. (C) In this fight, Heryawan's odds seemed slim at best.
Pre-election polling suggested that the race between Setiawan
and Gumelar would be close, with Heryawan trailing behind as
a distant third (he was only supported by 12 percent of the
respondents in a recent pre-election poll). Some Mission
contacts thought Setiawan would prevail, but most considered
Gumelar the favorite; no one seemed to believe Heryawan had a
chance, even his PKS supporters.

JAKARTA 00000744 002.2 OF 003




6. (C) Four key factors appear to have contributed to
Heryawan's apparent victory.

-- First and foremost, as is true across Indonesia (see Ref
B),higher commodity prices have taken a toll on the average
West Java resident. Though West Java is considered a
relatively rich province, these rising costs and a lower
average standard of living contributed to a sense of anxiety
and an anti-incumbent mood.

-- A second issue was the low (by Indonesian standards)
turnout on election-day. While the energetic PKS machinery
reportedly succeeded in turning out the vote in its suburban
Jakarta strongholds, Golkar and PDI-P did not apparently have
as much luck in getting their vote out.

-- Third, whereas Golkar and PDI-P had joined forces to
defeat PKS in other races, in West Java the two parties
fielded separate candidates, effectively dividing the
secular-oriented vote.

-- Lastly, West Java has a relatively conservative Islamic
population, fertile ground for PKS.


7. (C) Lacking the financial resources to go toe-to-toe with
its better financed rivals, PKS opted instead to fuse Ahmad
Heryawan's strong governing credentials with Dede Yusuf's
star power. (Note: Heryawan was a successful provincial
bureaucrat while Yusuf is a well known movie actor.) The two
relentlessly hammered away at a campaign theme that focused
on Islamic values, economic growth, infrastructure repair,
and improved education, a message that apparently resonated
with working class voters disaffected by the status quo.


8. (C) As Rulita Wijayaningdyah, Treasurer of the Building
and Wood Workers Union, told Labatt, blue collar voters
turned out in droves for PKS primarily because the ticket
represented change. Combined with the party's traditional
base of support among younger Muslim intellectuals in the
Jakarta suburbs, the support from working class voters made
the difference for PKS.

A SIGNATURE WIN FOR PKS


9. (C) Though not the largest Islamic political party in
Indonesia, PKS was widely viewed nationally as the Islamic
party with the most momentum following its strong performance
in the 2004 legislative elections. (Note: PKS secured just
over eight percent of the parliamentary seats in 2004, after
registering only slightly more than one percent of the vote
in 1999.) However, successive, demoralizing defeats in the
high profile gubernatorial races in Banten and Jakarta (Refs
D and E) appeared to have brought that status into question.
Another electoral belly flop in West Java could have added to
a growing perception that PKS held limited appeal outside of
conservative, Islamic circles.


10. (C) Following its stunning victory, PKS now looks like
it secured the party's biggest prize at the most opportune
possible time, providing the party with a huge boost just one
year before the legislative and national elections. Party
leaders were understandably triumphant after the first "quick
count" polls were released, confident the success on the
local West Java stage would lead to national success next
year. PKS parliamentarian Zulkieflimansyah told poloff that
the party's ability to win an election in such a key area
indicated that PKS was in position "to do very well in 2009."


LOCAL RACE WITH NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

JAKARTA 00000744 003.2 OF 003




11. (C) The results were a real shock. West Java's size and
recent history of mirroring national results on the local
level point to its potential to serve as a barometer for the
2009 national elections. An incumbent backed by Indonesia's
largest party, Golkar, and the President's own political
vehicle, the Democratic Party, lost in spectacular fashion,
succumbing to a wave of angst over rising food prices and
increasing poverty. Put it this way, the incumbent
apparently failed to get even 30 percent of the vote, with
the two opposition parties netting over 70 percent. That is
a very strong anti-incumbent mood.


12. (C) Looking ahead to the 2009 legislative and
presidential elections, two other key gubernatorial races
will take place this year that could potentially serve as
crucial data points for gauging the national mood: June 22
in Central Java and July 23 in East Java. As with West Java,
these two elections will revolve around local issues, yet
will also help measure the depth of frustration with the
economic forces making life for the average Indonesian more
difficult. The level of frustration in West Java was
profound enough that it sparked one of the most surprising
election results in Indonesia's relatively short democratic
history. If President Yudhoyono is not scared yet, he should
be.

HUME