AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BURMA, SECURITY ISSUES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000735

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/EX, OFM
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS AMGT KREC ID BM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BURMA, SECURITY ISSUES WITH
KEY GOI OFFICIAL

REF: A. STATE 36706

B. JAKARTA 702

C. JAKARTA 696

D. JAKARTA 524

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Hume pressed key USG
priorities--including Burma, counterterrorism, mil-mil
cooperation and diplomatic privileges--in an April 9 meeting
with Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number-two official
at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). Cotan did not
commit to Indonesian support in the UN Security Council for a
statement re Burma. He added that the GOI was planning to
convene an informal meeting of several Asian countries
(China, India, Thailand, Japan) to discuss Burma at the UN.


2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): On the security side, the
Ambassador expressed concern about the appearance in
Indonesia of glossy Islamic extremist publications and DVD's.
Cotan said the GOI would look into it. Re defense ties,
Cotan noted that Indonesia supported mil-mil cooperation.
That said, U.S. military training for the Indonesian police
was problematic and the GOI preferred that such training to
be done on a police-police basis. He promised to address the
issue of diplomatic privileges. END SUMMARY.

BURMA


3. (C) Ambassador Hume urged Indonesia to support a UNSC
Presidential Statement (PRST) on Burma (Ref A). He noted
that the Burmese regime refuses to cooperate with UN Special
Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and ignores international demands for
genuine reforms. Gambari said that a PRST would be helpful
supporting his mission; countries that supported the UN
effort like Indonesia should therefore support the PRST, the
Ambassador argued. He also reminded Cotan that FM Wirajuda
told A/S Hill last week that Indonesia would try to work
toward a consensus on this matter.


4. (C) Cotan responded that while Indonesia supported
Gambari's mission, it was not yet convinced that a UNSC PRST
was appropriate at this point. He also explained that
Indonesia was planning to convene an informal meeting of
regional states at the UN to discuss ways to support
Gambari's mission. FM Wirajuda has instructed PermRep
Natalegawa to organize the meeting, and he has already
approached China, India, Japan and Thailand about
participating.

COUNTERTERRORISM


5. (C) The Ambassador told Cotan that we are concerned about
the appearance of professionally produced and seemingly
well-funded jihadi publications and videos in the Indonesian
market (Ref D). The Ambassador also pointed to recent
statements by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir that seemed to threaten
foreign tourists in Indonesia. Indonesia has made
significant progress against Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other
terrorist organizations. Developments such as these ran
counter to that generally positive CT trend, the Ambassador
asserted. (Note: Separately, the Russian Ambassador had
raised the publications issue with us--and DEPLU--because
several of the publications contained stories supporting
Chechen extremists. The Australian DCM also told us that the
GOA was concerned about Ba'asyir's latest comments.)


6. (C) Cotan was surprised by the quality of the jihadi
publications and videos and promised to look into the matter.
He reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to fighting terrorism
and to cooperating with the United States on this issue.
(Note: Cotan also raised the matter of detained JI terrorist
operative Hambali--see septel.)

MILITARY TIES


7. (C) Turning to defense ties, the Ambassador explained
that the United States was committed to reestablishing a

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fully normalized relationship with the Indonesian military
(TNI). The recent cancellation of planned training for
Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) was a temporary
setback, the Ambassador said; we would find a way to move
forward. He noted, however, that the USG remained concerned
about accountability for past human rights violations by the
military. In that regard, the recent release of convicted
Timor Leste militia leader Eurico Guterres (Ref B),and the
sentence handed down for a peaceful flag raising in Maluku
(Ref C),did not help convince skeptics that Indonesia had
made progress on human rights.


8. (C) Cotan assured the Ambassador that the Indonesian
government remained focused on human rights. He asserted
that that the Guterres and Maluku cases were results of
judicial processes that the government could not control.


9. (C) On his own volition, SecGen Cotan also affirmed that
the Indonesian Government was committed to strong mil-mil
ties with the United States. He noted, however, that the
Indonesian National Police (INP) have responsibility for
counterterrorism activities in Indonesia. As a result, INP
cannot receive counterterrorism or other training from the
U.S. military. According to Cotan, the GOI had decided that
mil-mil and police-police cooperation were acceptable while
mil-police cooperation was not. (Note: Cotan explained that
senior GOI officials had recently met to clarify this policy.
Septel reviews this issue.)


10. (C) Cotan also explained that some in the military
pointed to what they believed were continued USG restrictions
on military sales and training as evidence of a lack of U.S.
commitment to mil-mil ties. According to Cotan, DEPLU and
other GOI agencies continued "to educate" Indonesian
officials on this issue.

SHIPMENTS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES


11. (SBU) The Ambassador pressed Cotan for progress on
problems affecting shipments and other diplomatic privileges.
He explained that shipments of both personal and official
vehicles and other property have been delayed, sometimes by
several months. This situation caused the Embassy to pay
significant storage and costs and hurt both Mission
operations and staff morale. Ambassador Hume also noted that
some DEPLU employees have requested "gifts" before performing
important tasks, such as processing diplomatic ID cards.


12. (SBU) Cotan said he was aware of the problem and DEPLU
was taking steps to address it. He had already reprimanded
several DEPLU employees in connection with these problems.
Further, the Foreign Minister has approved the dismissal or
reassignment of other DEPLU employees, although no action has
yet been taken toward this end. Cotan gave no indication of
a time-line for improving the situation.

HUME