ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP, T, PM, ISN
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN
JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS ID
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Admiral Keating's April 9-11 visit to
Jakarta offers an opportunity to move the bilateral mil-mil
relationship forward. The visit should focus on further
defining the long-term partnership and our shared regional
security objectives. We should also review the robust
bilateral agenda of mil-to-mil activities and underscore U.S.
support for Indonesia's peacekeeping contributions.
Indonesia also plans to purchase F-16's, which is positive.
At the same time, we should alert Indonesian policymakers
that Jakarta's failure to take further steps toward TNI
accountability continues to stifle expansion of our mil-mil
ties. END SUMMARY.

A VITAL PARTNER


2. (C) Indonesia is helping to advance the regional security
agenda and should be encouraged to do more. Indonesia will
host the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference in August 2008.
In 2009, Indonesia will host the GARUDA SHIELD multilateral
peacekeeping training exercise as a Capstone event. Other
important events taking place in Indonesia this year include
a Unified Engagement Air Force Exercise, a Tendon Valiant
Medical Readiness Exercise, an annual Maritime Tri-border
Security Conference and a Pacific Armies Management Seminar
(PAMS). These events give Indonesia the opportunity to
deepen its security cooperation with the United States and
Indonesia's neighbors.


3. (C) Indonesia has finally agreed to our proposal for
maritime surveillance systems in the Strait of Malacca and
the Sulawesi Sea using Section 1206 funding. We should
commend Indonesian interlocutors, particularly Defense
Minister Sudarsono, TNI Commander Santoso and Navy Chief
Sumaryono, for taking the necessary steps to ensure
Indonesia's support for this assistance. Over the next few
years this project will improve Indonesia's ability to
monitor maritime activity in these strategic waters, to the
benefit of Indonesia and the United States. We will look for
opportunities in future funding to expand this capability to
other maritime areas as well.

PLANNED F-16 PURCHASE


4. (C) Indonesian plans to purchase U.S. aircraft continue
to move forward. Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsuddin
told DAO on April 3 that Indonesia intended to buy new F-16
fighters beginning in 2010. This is the firmest statement
yet from the Department of Defense on this purchase.
Indonesia will also begin this year to refurbish its fleet of
23 C-130s, according to Sjamsuddin, four of them in 2008 and
five of them in 2009. How all of this would be funded is not
yet clear. But the clear message, particularly of the F-16
plans, is that Indonesia increasingly regards the United
States as a reliable arms supplier.

KEY MESSAGES


5. (C) These developments are all evidence of the importance
of Indonesia for the United States (and vice versa) in
Southeast Asia and of the growing bilateral military
cooperation between our two countries. We expect that
cooperation to continue to grow. Over the past year, the
relationship has matured further, and we continue to work to
develop a strategic center of identified shared interests and
common objectives. We suggest the following key messages for
use with Indonesian interlocutors:


6. (C) ACCOUNTABILITY: As part of our calibrated strategy
of re-engagement with the Army Special Forces (Kopassus),
Mission had approved a Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) between USPACOM and Kopassus for April. However, the
Department of State decided it was unable to approve the
proposed Kopassus participants whom Mission had vetted for
the event. After consultations with Congress, the Department

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decided that there would be no engagement with Kopassus until
the accountability issues regarding past Kopassus human
rights abuses were resolved. Mission continues to believe
that engagement offers the best way forward.


7. (C) The United States remains committed to enhanced
military-to-military engagement with Indonesia. In
discussions with Indonesian officials, however, it is
important to emphasize that until Indonesia demonstrates some
measure of accountability for past human rights abuses, the
road to engagement will be rocky. The government of
Indonesia can have a positive influence on Washington's
concerns regarding Kopassus by taking visible actions. The
Supreme Court's recent acquittal of East Timor militia leader
Enrico Guterres would appear to be a step backward in this
regard, although human rights groups are looking to the
soon-to-be-released report of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Truth
and Friendship Commission to make recommendations on how to
move forward.


8. (C) GROWING ENGAGEMENT: That said, there are many
positive elements in the relationship and we want to preserve
and build upon those elements. We will move forward wherever
we can. The annual Strategic Dialogue and the Defense
Discussions have improved steadily each year and now entail
serious, substantive exchanges as partners with a common
goal. The Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) is robust
yet focused and reflects a purposeful plan of development.
Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Indonesia in FY2008
stands at $13 million, up considerably from FY2007, and IMET
has held steady at about $1 million. (Note: Indonesia will
likely lose the $2.7 million "bonus" FMF funding over lack of
accountability.) These programs represent the U.S.
commitment to help transform the TNI into a modern,
professional force.


9. (C) MARITIME SECURITY: Indonesia is an important partner
in maritime security. Indonesia's needs are still vast and
its resources are still limited, and we want to help where we
can. The maritime surveillance systems that we are
installing in the Malacca Strait and the Sulawesi Sea are a
start. We will look for other areas of common interest where
we can help as well. As this capability grows, Indonesia
should think about how it will exercise its jurisdiction over
its waters and what objectives it wishes to accomplish.


10. (C) Improved maritime capability will allow the
government of Indonesia to regain control of its waterways
against misuse. One potential area involves transnational
crime, including terrorism, illegal logging and fishing,
trafficking in humans and endangered species. Another
involves proliferation, particularly of weapons of mass
destruction. With capability in hand, Indonesia can begin to
take a more realistic look at how the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and Global Initiative (GI) can help
Indonesia to meet its nonproliferation commitments,
obligations and policy goals. We continue to stress that PSI
and GI can serve Indonesia's interests.


11. (C) PEACEKEEPING: The United States welcomes
Indonesia's contributions to international peacekeeping
missions, exemplified in the Garuda XXIII battalion within
UNIFIL in Lebanon, now in its second year, and the Formed
Police Unit (FPU) now in training for deployment to Darfur,
Sudan as part of the UN-African Union forces there. We were
glad to be able to provide transport for the initial Garuda
XXIII deployment and stand ready to assist again where
possible.


12. (C) One potential opportunity would be Indonesia's plans
to establish a peacekeeping training center. We understand
various sites are being considered, including Bandung and
Tangerang (a city near Jakarta). If this will be a
military-only training facility, we may be able to provide
assistance under the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI). (Note: Funds were available for that purpose

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previously, but they disappeared because Indonesia was not
ready to use them.) If Indonesia is ready to move ahead, we
will try to secure funding.

HUME