EAST TIMOR/INDONESIA COMMISSION COMPLETES REPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000672

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, DRL/PHD, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, EUR/WE
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TT ID
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR/INDONESIA COMMISSION COMPLETES REPORT
ON 1999 EVENTS

REF: A. JAKARTA 163


B. 07 JAKARTA 3339 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Timor Leste-Indonesia Commission of
Truth and Friendship (CTF) has completed its report and will
submit it to the two governments soon. The unanimous
findings hold both pro-Indonesian and pro-independence
militias responsible for gross human rights violations which
occurred in 1999. It also will indirectly implicate elements
of Indonesia's military. The report will not implicate
individuals nor hold the GOI responsible. Over all, an
Indonesian contact told us the report will be a tough read on
the Indonesian side. Hopefully, the frankness of the report
and its forward-leaning recommendations can help heal wounds
in the bilateral relationship. END SUMMARY.

REPORT IS COMPLETE


2. (C) Members of a key joint committee investigating human
rights abuses in East Timor in 1999 have completed their
report. Following the vote for independence in an August 30
referendum, pro-Indonesian militias killed over a thousand
East Timorese and displaced hundreds of thousands in a
scorched earth rampage. (Note: CTF Commissioner Wisber Loeis
told DepPol/C on April 1 that the Commission has completed
the final draft of its report in both the Indonesian and
English languages and is in the process of polishing the
report. The consensus findings will be presented to the
leaders of the two countries by the end of April. The two
governments will then decide when to publicly release it.)



3. (C) Members of CTF are drafting the executive summary.
Loeis said the two governments have been briefed thoroughly
enough on the findings that he is confident they will support
the report. Still, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's
Director General for Human Rights told Loeis recently that
the report will be a "bombshell" for the GOI in that it does
implicate elements of the military, and because it explicitly
finds gross human rights violations and crimes against
humanity.


4. (C) The process has been exhaustive and complex. The
350-page report was based on major UN findings--the
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation for East
Timor (CAVR) report and the Serious Crimes Unit report, as
well as transcripts from the GOI's Ad Hoc East Timor Tribunal
and the Indonesian Human Rights Commission fact-finding
report on human rights violations in East Timor, Loeis said.
CTF also relied on public and private hearings, public
workshops and extensive field interviews.


5. (C) Four American scholars assisted in the research and
drafting process. The Indonesian military (TNI) provided
substantial documentation but did not provide the daily field
reports that CTF requested. The report of record will be in
the Indonesian language for purposes of reference. The
report will be translated later into Portuguese and the East
Timorese language Tetun. Asked if the U.S. Embassy could get
a bootleg copy of the report before it is made public so that
we can prepare our reaction, Loeis agreed that this would be
desirable and said he would see if it was feasible.

ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY


6. (C) The report is apparently quite frank and to the
point. Loeis said militias were primarily responsible for
violations. Pro-integration militias committed the worst
violations including massacres and rapes while the
pro-independence militias' culpability was more limited to
forced detentions. The report will analyze the role of
militias district by district. The report also will detail

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all the actors involved, including institutions, such as
elements of the Indonesian military that supported violations
with arms, training, funds, or instructions. Institutional
blame will be at the local level, not rising to the level of
regional TNI commander, Loeis said.


7. (C) Its conclusions only go so far. Describing the
tenor of the report, Loeis said there was no evidence of any
high-level support or policy directions which contributed to
the violence. On the contrary, Jakarta instructions were for
security forces to remain neutral, to maintain calm and to
evacuate citizens. However, the report will find that a
reconstruction of events does indirectly implicate Indonesian
institutions. The report will describe a situation in which
everything went wrong, and officials at the local levels took
ad hoc actions which contributed to violence. Also, many of
the Indonesian security forces were from East Timor and they
left their posts to help themselves, friends and family,
Loeis asserted.


8. (C) Continuing, Loeis said some officials interpreted
their roles as a responsibility to help pro-integrationists
win the referendum, and thus provided arms and funds to
militias. Some TNI members left their posts to participate
in militia violence, such as one Special Forces (Kopassus)
sergeant who left his post to join a militia out of
nationalistic fervor. A regent (district head) is reported
to have instructed the military to detain citizens at
military headquarters. Some East Timorese pro-independence
Falantil fighters left their command to commit violations
outside the auspices of their commander, according to Loeis.


9. (C) Loeis recounted interviews with six police chiefs
recently assigned to East Timor because they were rising
stars who could handle challenging assignments, but who ended
up being blamed for the chaos that ensued. All six were in
tears when they recounted to CTF how the events hurt their
careers and ruined their lives, and those of their families,
Loeis recalled. Many officials tried to help as well, such
as one district military commander married to an East
Timorese who helped transport persons on both sides of the
conflict to safety. Many police helped get people to safety
in West Timor. (Note: See septel on recent turbulence
involving East Timorese refuges in West Timor.)


10. (C) One chapter in the report will give an overview of
events going back to 1975, referring to "the presence of
Indonesia" in East Timor, with a footnote that whether East
Timor was part of Indonesia or whether Indonesia was an
occupying force is a matter of debate.

LOOKING AHEAD


11. (C) The report is not only retrospective, but will have
recommendations for next steps, such as restorative
collective justice and human rights training for police and
military using lessons learned from 1999, Loeis said (see
reftels). CTF will recommend opening a "documentation and
conflict resolution center" in Dili, with a branch office in
Jakarta. CTF hopes that both governments will help to fund
this center and plans to request assistance from
international donors as well, including the USG, he said.


12. (C) In our estimation, the report as described will be a
major step forward in accountability but will not satisfy
critics who expect direct institutional responsibility and
individual responsibility to be assigned. However, the
report--given that its findings are reportedly unanimous and
the exhaustive process involved--should provide a way forward
to heal wounds, to strengthen Indonesian-East Timor ties and
to prevent future abuses. Points for a proposed USG response
are reviewed in ref A.

HUME