Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA521
2008-03-14 04:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

PAPUA -- CONTINUED IMPATIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION

Tags:  PGOV PINS KDEM ID 
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0521/01 0740425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140425Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8327
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2175
RUCNTXD/AMEMBASSY MAJURO PRIORITY 0036
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 3723
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 0131
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1668
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2422
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000521 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, DRL/AWH
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM ID
SUBJECT: PAPUA -- CONTINUED IMPATIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION
OF AUTONOMY

REF: JAKARTA 478 AND PREVIOUS

JAKARTA 00000521 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, DRL/AWH
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM ID
SUBJECT: PAPUA -- CONTINUED IMPATIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION
OF AUTONOMY

REF: JAKARTA 478 AND PREVIOUS

JAKARTA 00000521 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Many Papuans remain impatient with the slow
pace of GOI implementation of the provinces' Special Autonomy
Law, which is supposed to give the region enhanced
self-governing powers. President Yudhoyono is moving to
resolve one outstanding issue, the legal status of West
Papua, which the GOI wants to include under autonomy
provisions. The longer it takes to implement autonomy, the
more tensions will bubble up in the already restive region.
END SUMMARY.

PAPUANS QUESTION SPECIAL AUTONOMY


2. (SBU) The past week has witnessed an uptick in Papuan
criticism of the lagging implementation of the 2001 Special
Autonomy Law. (Note: Under the 2001 Special Autonomy Law,
the provincial government assumes responsibility for all
areas of governance except foreign affairs, defense and
security, fiscal and monetary policy, religious affairs and
justice. The law also returns most of the revenue generated
by the province, which had been paid to the central
government, to provincial authorities. End note.) Student
groups recently held peaceful demonstrations in favor of a
referendum on Papuan self-determination in Jayapura and
Manokwari, the respective capitals of Papua and West Papua
provinces. Student leaders argue that the promised economic
benefits of Special Autonomy have yet to reach Papuans, and
promise more rallies in cities and towns across the two
provinces. So far, the rallies have been small--100-200
participants each--and peaceful. There are no reports of
arrests connected with the demonstrations.


3. (C) Some Papuan leaders have joined the fray. Agus Alua,
chairman of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP),has also
publicly called for a dialogue on Special Autonomy. Speaking
to reporters, Alua agreed with the students that Special
Autonomy had failed to deliver expected benefits. He called
on the national government to renegotiate the 2001 deal with
Papuans. Another leader, Papuan People's Council Chairman

Forkorus Yaboysembut, told poloff he believed the central
government had no intention of fully ceding key powers to the
provincial government.

PROGRESS ON LEGAL STATUS OF WEST PAPUA


4. (C) President Yudhoyono promised to resolve at least one
outstanding issue: the legal status of West Papua Province.
Speaking after a March 5 meeting with Papuan leaders in
Jakarta, President Yudhoyono promised to issue a presidential
regulation that would settle the matter. (Note: President
Megawati created West Papua--then called West Irian
Jaya--through a January 2003 presidential order. The
existence of West Papua remains controversial, and in legal
limbo, because it was not created according to the procedures
set out in the 2001 Special Autonomy Law for Papua.)
Yudhoyono promised to issue the new edict by the end of May.


5. (C) The new regulation would bring West Papua fully under
the Special Autonomy law. This would include guaranteeing
West Papua a share of the funds that Jakarta returns to the
province under the law. (Note: The governors of Papua and
West Papua have already agreed to share Special Autonomy
funds, but this arrangement is not codified in law.) The new
regulation would also create a coordinating body to work with
external donors on behalf of both provinces.


6. (C) Yudhoyono also promised to institute a moratorium on
the creation of new provinces in Papua. The frequent rumors
that the central government plans to subdivide Papua into
further provinces fuels Papuan suspicions about Jakarta's
"divide and rule" tactics.


7. (C) Papuan leaders pressed Yudhoyono hard to secure this
commitment. Simon Morin, a Papuan member of the national
legislature (DPR) who participated in the meeting with
Yudhoyono, told poloff that Papuan leaders reminded Yudhoyono

JAKARTA 00000521 002.2 OF 002


that because the region overwhelmingly supported him in the
2004 election, he owed them a favor.

ENOUGH BLAME TO GO AROUND


8. (C) During a March 6 panel discussion, Forum Papua--a
group of senior Jakarta-based Papua watchers which includes
current and former GOI officials, journalists and
academics--criticized Papuan leaders for not doing their part
to implement Special Autonomy. Theo Waimuri, a senior Papuan
civil servant and former Indonesian Ambassador to Namibia,
chided Papua's regents (district chiefs) for "obstructing"
Special Autonomy. Panel members suggested that Governor
Suebu's efforts to reach Papuans directly at the village
level had alienated the regents and other local officials.
As a result, the regents were attempting to block some of the
governor's key development initiatives.


9. (C) Corruption and a lack of human capital in Papua also
undermined the implementation of Special Autonomy, panelists
agreed. Under Special Autonomy, Jakarta returns a
significant portion of revenue from Papua's vast natural
resources to the provincial government. Much of that
money--nearly 30 trillion rupiah, or USD 3 billion--remains
unspent. For one thing, the central government has failed to
issue the administrative regulations necessary for the
provincial government to begin spending the money. Further,
the provincial government lacks the administrative structures
and human capabilities to carry out Governor Suebu's
ambitious development plans.


10. (C) Jakarta came in for a share of criticism too.
Jayapura religious leader Karel Phil Erari echoed a familiar
Papuan theme: that the central government has failed to
consult with Papuans on key issues. The most recent example,
he said, was Jakarta's issuance of the May 2007 presidential
instruction on accelerated economic development in Papua
without having adequately consulted Papuans. He agreed,
however, that Vice President Kalla's recent visit to Jayapura
had made Papuans feel more included in Jakarta's decision
making. Still, Papua Forum members agreed that Jakarta
should make a more conscious effort to engage Papuans in a
dialogue over issues of capital-province relations.

A NEED FOR FAST PROGRESS


11. (C) The longer it takes to implement autonomy
provisions, the more tensions will bubble up in the already
restive region. Papua is one of the poorest regions in the
country and badly needs progress in development. In
addition, there is the political issue--many Papuans continue
to feel that decision-making is outside of their control and
Jakarta has too large a role. While this may not be
accurate, the GOI continues to make serious mistakes, such as
its recent banning of a book considered separatist-inclined,
and its arrest and trial of a human rights activist (reftel).


HUME