Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA434
2008-03-03 09:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

IRAN/UNSC -- PRESSING INDONESIA TO SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL PARM UNSC ID IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ8688
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #0434/01 0630933
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030933Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8206
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2109
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1619
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 2383
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0153
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0821
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T JAKARTA 000434 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/I, IO, IO/UNP
NSC FOR J.JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM UNSC ID IR
SUBJECT: IRAN/UNSC -- PRESSING INDONESIA TO SUPPORT
RESOLUTION

REF: JAKARTA 423 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

S E C R E T JAKARTA 000434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/I, IO, IO/UNP
NSC FOR J.JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM UNSC ID IR
SUBJECT: IRAN/UNSC -- PRESSING INDONESIA TO SUPPORT
RESOLUTION

REF: JAKARTA 423 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Mission continued efforts to convince
Indonesia to support the draft UNSC resolution on Iran's
nuclear program. A senior GOI official told the Ambassador
on March 3 that Indonesia acknowledged Iran's continued
enrichment activities and recognized the strength of UNSC
support for another resolution. Indonesia would not vote
against the resolution, but President Yudhoyono had yet to
decide whether Indonesia would abstain or vote yes.
According to UK Embassy contact, FonSec Miliband also called
FM Wirajuda and made key points. Mission continued to
underscore key points with the Office of the President. END
SUMMARY.

PRESSING INDONESIA TO GET TO "YES"


2. (S) Ambassador Hume met March 3 with Secretary General
Imron Cotan, the number-two official at the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),and urged Indonesia to support the
draft UNSC resolution on Iran's nuclear program. The
Ambassador said we understood that Libya, South Africa and
Vietnam--Council members previously reluctant to support the
resolution--had decided to vote yes. He emphasized that the
support of Libya and South Africa was especially important as
those two states had given up their own nuclear programs.
Indonesia would not want to be the only country on the
council that did not join the consensus in favor of the
resolution.


3. (S) The Ambassador also explained that the draft
resolution now included language which addressed the concerns
of some UNSC members. Specifically, the text acknowledged
Iran's right under the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear
power once the international community was confident of the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. The
GOI should note this: the resolution was fair and balanced.


4. (S) The Ambassador said an Indonesian abstention would
send the wrong signal in advance of President Yudhoyono's
planned March 10-11 trip to Iran (reftel). Indonesia's
failure to support the resolution would give Iranian

President Ahmedinedjad the opportunity to use SBY's trip for
propaganda purposes.

BALL IN PRESIDENT'S COURT


5. (S) Cotan acknowledged that Indonesia knew that all other
UNSC members were prepared to support the resolution. He
added, however, that it would be very difficult for the GOI
to explain a "yes" vote to the Indonesian legislature and the
Indonesian public without the IAEA having uncovered a
"smoking gun." He also noted that Iran had made progress
accounting for seven of the ten areas that the IAEA was
investigating. Cotan agreed, however, that Iran's continued
enrichment activities and failure to account for past weapons
development activities were problematic.


6. (S) Cotan said Indonesia would not vote against the
resolution, but that the decision between voting yes and an
abstention was now in President Yudhoyono's hands. Cotan
added that DEPLU understood the USG position and had conveyed
the U.S. arguments to the President. FM Wirajuda, who was in
the UK for a conference, continued to discuss the matter with
the President, Cotan said.


7. (S) Turning to a separate issue, Cotan also raised the
situation in Gaza with the Ambassador. Cotan called Israeli
military actions in Gaza "excessive and disproportionate,"
and called on the United States to make a renewed effort to
facilitate peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. He
said the unresolved conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians was at the root of terrorist violence around the
world, including past terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Cotan
added that Indonesia was committed to supporting the peace
process begun at Annapolis and asked that the United States
redouble its efforts to bring the parties together. The
Ambassador promised to convey Indonesian views to Washington.



UK PHONE CALL


8. (S) We learned separately from the British Embassy that
Foreign Secretary Miliband called FM Wirajuda and urged
Indonesia to support the resolution. Wirajuda did not reveal
to Miliband how Indonesia intended to vote. FM Wirajuda also
published an op-ed piece on the Iran nuclear issue in March 1
edition of the leading Indonesian-language daily "Kompas."
In that article, Wirajuda acknowledged that Iran had not met
all its nonproliferation obligations. However, he suggested
that the problem would be better dealt with through the IAEA
rather than through another UNSC resolution. Wirajuda
indicated that Indonesia would vote according to its "free
and active foreign policy" and its national interest. (Note:
Mission has e-mailed the text of the article to EAP/MTS and
USUN.)

ENGAGING THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT


9. (S) Mission also continued to engage the President's
Office. The DCM on March 3 provided a copy of the draft
resolution to key Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal. He
highlighted to Djalal that the text now included language
which addressed the concerns of Security Council members,
such as Libya and South Africa.

HUME