Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA1574
2008-08-20 01:01:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

(S) POSSIBLE SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK (UAV) TO

Tags:  PREL PARM MASS ID SN 
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VZCZCXRO4370
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1574/01 2330101
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200101Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9837
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0192
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2127
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5313
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2383
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2921
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4827
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2967
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001574 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, T, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM, ISN, ISN/C,
PM/RSAT, ISN/CPI, ISN/MTR
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP/APSA D.WALTON
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS ID SN
SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK (UAV) TO
SINGAPORE--INDONESIAN REACTIONS

REF: SINGAPORE 834

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001574

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, T, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM, ISN, ISN/C,
PM/RSAT, ISN/CPI, ISN/MTR
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP/APSA D.WALTON
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS ID SN
SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK (UAV) TO
SINGAPORE--INDONESIAN REACTIONS

REF: SINGAPORE 834

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Mission appreciates reftel's solicitation
of comment on a possible sale of the Global Hawk Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to Singapore and has reviewed the
implications of the proposed sale. In terms of the GOI's
response, the Indonesian military's reaction is likely to be
muted, although civilian officials would be critical, given
their focus on multilateral arms control. Indonesia's vocal
and highly nationalistic parliament would probably criticize
the deal.


2. (S) SUMMARY (Con'd): The proposed sale, if it moved
forward, would complicate our efforts to convince Indonesia
to support some key USG nonproliferation priorities. Such
reactions from Indonesia should be considered in making any
decision on this matter. END SUMMARY.

MILITARY REACTION PROBABLY MUTED


3. (S) Regarding the Global Hawk's implications for military
capabilities in the region, the Indonesian Military's (TNI)
reaction is likely to be relatively muted. The TNI
acknowledges that the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces
(RSAF) possesses vastly superior military capabilities,
including airborne surveillance. The sale of Global Hawk
would not substantially change the balance of forces in the
region. While unhappy that Indonesia continues to lag far
behind its neighbors, the TNI would probably not make an
issue of Singapore's possession of Global Hawk. Indonesia
has no prospect in the near future of purchasing Global Hawk
and may not have the necessary infrastructure to support it
for some time. The TNI knows this.

POLITICAL FALLOUT LIKELY


4. (S) The potentially significant downside of a Global Hawk
sale to Singapore lies elsewhere. The sale would almost
certainly complicate our efforts to engage Indonesia on
nonproliferation priorities. This is an area where major
U.S. policy priorities are at stake and a considerable amount
of time and energy has been invested.



5. (S) Although Indonesia is not a signatory to the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR),GOI officials would see the
sale as undermining that regime and, by implication, other
arms control areas. Indonesian officials often criticize
what they see as inconsistent U.S. support for multilateral
arms control regimes. The Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEPLU) has a long-standing commitment to multilateral arms
control and disarmament efforts and has enormous influence on
the GOI's interagency nonproliferation agenda. DEPLU would
probably view the introduction of this new technology into
the region as an act of proliferation.


6. (S) DEPLU's proliferation concerns would be increased if
the USG actively worked to reclassify Global Hawk as an MTCR
Category II item in order to allow the sale to proceed. The
GOI has criticized the United States-India Civil Nuclear
Agreement and claimed that it undermines the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They have charged that the
U.S. has a double standard on nuclear issues--opposing Iran's
nuclear program while doing nothing about Israel's alleged
program. Indonesian officials pointed to these concerns when
they explained their decision to abstain on UNSCR 1803
regarding Iran's nuclear program. The sale would open the
United States to claims that it is selective in its
application of arms control principles.


7. (S) The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the

JAKARTA 00001574 002 OF 002


Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be the two most
immediate concrete USG nonproliferation priorities that would
suffer from the impact of a Global Hawk sale. Indonesia has
been only marginally helpful regarding the Iranian nuclear
program matter, stressing that Iran has a "right" to develop
(peaceful) nuclear technology while downplaying Iran's clear
duties to the international community. That perspective
would become much harder to shape, particularly if the sale
were perceived as a sign of U.S. double standards. Indonesia
chairs the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Working
Group, and frequently speaks for the NAM on this issue in
multilateral fora, including in the United Nations.
Additionally, it would become more difficult to convince
Indonesia to endorse PSI, an important global and regional
priority.

LEGISLATURE A WILD CARD


8. (S) Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR),which is
playing an increasingly prominent role in foreign policy,
could be expected to react critically to the proposed Global
Hawk sale. DPR members have blocked the proposed
Indonesia-Singapore Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on
nationalist grounds. They argued that the DCA favored
Singapore, particularly the provisions allowing RSAF
exercises in Indonesian territory. A Global Hawk sale would
associate the United States with the hostility directed
toward the Singapore DCA, increasing resistance to
U.S.-Indonesia relations in the security sector and
elsewhere.


9. (S) At least some DPR members would grasp the full
implications of Singapore's possession of a UAV that could
traverse Indonesian airspace without the GOI's knowledge and
conduct surveillance deep into Indonesian territory. Many
legislators are prone to stoking nationalist sentiments, and
the United States and Singapore are favorite targets.
Genuine nationalists would seize on Global Hawk's capability
to violate Indonesian territorial integrity. As the country
that provided the technology to Singapore, the United States
would likely receive a fair share of their wrath.

BOTTOM LINE


10. (S) Although Singapore is an important partner in the
region, the United States needs to weigh the potential
benefits of this sale, as proposed, against the likely
negative consequences regarding USG arms control priorities
and U.S.-Indonesia relations.

HUME