U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001278

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, T, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, PM, ISN
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: PREL MASS KNAR PTER ID
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE

REF: JAKARTA 749 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 27, the Ambassador and Imron Cotan,
the second-highest ranking official in the Indonesian
Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),discussed the training
of Indonesian police by U.S. military (special) forces.
Mission has suspended such training, most of it
counternarcotics training sponsored by the Joint Interagency
Task Force-West (JIATF-W),subsequent to the Indonesian
decision to reject the training of the police by the U.S.
military. While acknowledging the benefits of such training,
Cotan noted that the inclusion of a token number of
Indonesian special military force members in such training
might help to resolve the issue within the GOI. The
Ambassador said the USG would explore options and get back to
the GOI on possible ways forward. END SUMMARY.

TRYING TO RESTART MILITARY TRAINING OF POLICE


2. (C) On June 27, the Ambassador met DEPLU Secretary
General Imron Cotan, the second-highest ranking official in
DEPLU. The two reviewed the issue of training of Indonesian
police by U.S. military forces. The Ambassador noted that he
had received several requests from senior Indonesian civilian
and military officials in recent months to stop the training
of Indonesian police forces by U.S. military units (mostly
JIATF-W-sponsored counternarcotics training, such as the
BAKER IRON series). The Ambassador said he had informed U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM) of the request and PACOM had
canceled several events scheduled for the remainder of
FY-2008. Indonesian police officials, on the other hand, had
expressed support for the training of police by the U.S.
military and had urged that it continue. PACOM likewise
wanted to see the training continue.


3. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the benefits of the
training to Indonesia and urged that the GOI reconsider its
decision to stop the U.S. military from training Indonesian
police. The Ambassador explained that the U.S. military
offered the training because it had the necessary skill sets
and funding to provide the assistance. Since the GOI had
assigned the counternarcotics mission to the police, this
training went to the police. Alternative programs had a
smaller scope and were less effective.

GOI WANTS TRAINING BUT THERE IS RESENTMENT


4. (C) Cotan said Indonesia definitely benefited from such
counternarcotics training and confirmed that the Indonesian
police wanted to continue receiving it. The Indonesian
military, however, also wanted training. Yet the Army
Special Forces (KOPASSUS),which had unique capabilities in
the event of a security crisis, e.g., a terrorist attack, was
excluded from U.S. training. This caused resentment.


5. (C) Cotan noted that the issue of military-to-police
training was important and that failure to resolve it would
limit the bilateral military-to-military relationship. He
said he would talk to Defense Minister Sudarsono to see
whether a compromise could be found. One possibility, Cotan
suggested, might be to include several KOPASSUS members from
time to time in the training of police units. It might be
possible to build up from this modest start to a point where
the Indonesian military would no longer object to the U.S.
military's training of Indonesian police. Cotan noted that
Australia, which had also suspended engagement with KOPASSUS
in the past, had begun to reengage through small steps and
now had an effective training program involving KOPASSUS.
(As Mission understands it, U.S. law would prohibit U.S.
military training of Indonesian police units if any KOPASSUS
soldiers, even as few as three, were included.)

NEXT STEPS


JAKARTA 00001278 002 OF 002



6. (C) The Ambassador said the USG was also looking for
creative solutions. The Executive Branch had to be careful
to proceed with Congressional support, as any engagement with
KOPASSUS was a sensitive issue. He noted that the next
available opportunity for reinstating military-to-police
training would be the BAKER IRON marijuana eradication
exercise scheduled for October 2008 near Medan, Sumatra.
Planning for that exercise would need to begin several months
in advance.
HUME