Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA1240
2008-06-25 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

LEAHY VETTING -- MISSION REQUESTS REVIEW OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM MAAR ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2698
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1240/01 1771001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251001Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9382
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0277
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5157
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0106
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2680
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1073
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0485
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0077
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3856
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2137
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2777
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0909
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2763
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001240 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, DRL, DRL/AWH;
G/TIP
NSC FOR EPHU
DOJ FOR AGO MUKASEY; DAAG SWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MAAR ID
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING -- MISSION REQUESTS REVIEW OF
PROPOSED CHANGES

JAKARTA 00001240 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, for reasons 1.4 (b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001240

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, DRL, DRL/AWH;
G/TIP
NSC FOR EPHU
DOJ FOR AGO MUKASEY; DAAG SWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MAAR ID
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING -- MISSION REQUESTS REVIEW OF
PROPOSED CHANGES

JAKARTA 00001240 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, for reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) This is an Action Request. Please see Para 10.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Recently proposed changes to the Leahy
human rights vetting process risk undermining U.S.-Indonesia
security cooperation and, ironically, contradict the law's
intent to promote human rights. The Secretary's 2005
decision to resume security assistance to Indonesia has
generated valuable cooperation, including in peacekeeping
(Lebanon and Darfur),counterterrorism and regional security.
President Bush told President Yudhoyono in June 2007 in
Sydney that he wanted to enhance our security relationship
and increase mil-mil cooperation.


3. (C) SUMMARY (CON'D): The Department's new vetting
requirements would, if finalized, undermine both the
Secretary's policy decision and the President's intention.
Embassy Jakarta intends to continue to seek opportunities to
expand mil-mil and police cooperation to implement these
policy directives, but is seriously constrained by these
vetting changes. We request high-level inter-agency review
of this expansion of vetting requirements before any new
policy is instituted. END SUMMARY.

NEGATIVE IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES


4. (C) The two proposed changes to the vetting process
would:

-- prohibit training of any member of a security force unit
with past human rights violations, even if the unit's
violations pre-dated (by many years) the arrival of the
individual in the unit; and

-- require, for the first time, the vetting of every
individual in a composite unit, rather than vetting the unit
commander only; this change would overload the vetting
process and effectively block much police and military
training.


5. (C) For years, Mission has practiced a diligent and
intrusive vetting process that has kept human rights abusers
from receiving USG assistance, thereby accomplishing Leahy
vetting goals. Prior to these recent changes, the Department
had never, to the best of our knowledge, 'vetted out' any

Indonesian that the Mission had recommended for training.
These recent changes to the Department's vetting policy are
creeping in without wide clearances in the Department or
front-channel notification to posts. Such sweeping changes
would affect security assistance programs in many parts of
the world and, Mission believes, require high level
inter-agency discussion.


6. (C) Not once has an Indonesian security official trained
by the USG and vetted by the Embassy using long-standing
Leahy criteria later been credibly alleged to have committed
gross human rights violations, which is the Leahy vetting
standard. The system here has worked, both to honor the
human rights intent of the vetting requirement and to allow
our security cooperation to proceed. If we cannot fully
engage with Indonesian security forces, we cannot fully train
the police and military units who would respond to terrorist
attacks in Indonesia and protect our Embassy. The Indonesian
contribution to the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation would not
have been possible; Indonesian police participation in Darfur
PKO would also be jeopardized.


JAKARTA 00001240 002.2 OF 003


THE VALUE OF ENGAGEMENT


7. (C) With Indonesia's democratic and security sector
reforms since 1999, there is no longer a trade off between
our security interests and human rights values in our
security assistance program here. Our assistance advances
both goals simultaneously. Our engagement and security
cooperation with security forces here since 2005 have
produced results, both in terms of operational improvements
and professionalization, as well as human rights practices.
Training has resulted in increased anti-trafficking efforts,
fewer abuses by police in controlling crowds, a four-fold
increase in disciplinary actions taken by police for ethics
and other violations, and senior military officers being
denied promotion into key positions because of their past
human rights records. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission
both advocate human rights training for security forces and
provide such training themselves, including for the Army
Special Forces (Kopassus) and
the police Mobile Brigade. These security forces advance
vital U.S. interests by assisting in peacekeeping operations
(PKOs),protecting U.S. facilities and citizens in Indonesia,
and fighting terrorism and human trafficking.


8. (C) Institution of these two changes to the vetting
process would seriously damage our police and military
training programs. Our INL-funded and, to a lesser extent,
DS/ATA-funded training of the Indonesian police would be
paralyzed. For INL programs in 2008, we have trained 1,172
police officers using composite units. Requiring each
individual to be vetted for a composite unit training
exercise would have increased the number of individuals
submitted for vetting by over 1,000 in the last six months,
overloading the vetting system here and in Washington and
bringing this crucial training to a virtual halt. These INL
programs include not only human rights training, e.g., an
international standard 'use of force' policy, but also
capacity-building programs in anti-human trafficking,
anti-illegal logging and other areas critical to U.S.
interests here.


9. (C) On the military side, the story is similar. Our IMET
and other training programs are designed to build
professionalism within the Indonesian military. There are
explicit human rights training programs, as well as training
for peacekeeping operations and disaster relief/emergency
response that would be damaged by the new vetting
requirements. Indonesian participation in UNIFIL--for which
we transported 850 Indonesian soldiers in a composite
unit--would not have been possible if we had been required to
vet each and every soldier. The Indonesian troops would
simply have not been able to participate, despite the fact
that Washington weighed in actively with all capitals
concerned to get the Indonesians there. On disaster relief
as well, our assistance is used to train first responders,
emergency management officials and civil affairs officers,
all essential for the GOI's response to a natural or man-made
disaster here--and there are many. Mission recently received
instructions to deny vetting to a m
ilitary officer who literally was not even born when his unit
was reportedly involved in human rights violations. How can
we explain to him and others like him that we value Indonesia
as a strategic partner and support Indonesia's desire for a
more active international role? U.S. action, such as this,
undermines our stated and actual policy toward Indonesia in
fundamental ways. These vetting changes need serious
high-level, inter-agency attention.

JAKARTA 00001240 003.2 OF 003



ACTION REQUEST


10. (C) We request a high-level inter-agency review of this
proposed expansion of vetting requirements before any new
policy is instituted. Meanwhile, we request that the two new
interpretations of vetting proceedings cited above be
suspended until this matter can be fully discussed and the
results of this policy discussion shared with posts via
official channels. Specifically and most urgently, we ask
that the vetting request for composite units of police slated
for training in the immediate future in the fields of
anti-trafficking, management systems, and public relations
(per Jakarta 1073, 1075 and 1077) be acted on immediately
based on vetting of the unit commanders, so that we are not
forced to cancel these important opportunities.

HUME

HUME