IRAN/ETHNIC GROUPS: AN ETHNIC RIGHTS ACTIVIST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000601

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2028
TAGS: PREF PHUM PINS IR TU AZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/ETHNIC GROUPS: AN ETHNIC RIGHTS ACTIVIST
DESCRIBES THE "AZERI ETHNIC MOVEMENT" IN IRAN

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ section chief Geoff Odlum; Reason 1.5 (d
).


1. (S) Summary: An Iranian-Azeri journalist told us
November 29 that the June 2006 ethnic Azeri demonstrations
against authorities in northwest Iran were "an awakening" for
the Azeri ethnic movement and led the regime to conclude it
was a threat to stability. He described a diffuse ethnic
movement, with different groups pursuing a spectrum of goals
from simply enjoying more cultural and linguistic rights, to
equal status for the Azeri language, to political autonomy,
to independence. Although "organically linked,", he said the
groups sometimes work together and sometimes do not. He said
the general consensus is to focus on cultural and linguistic
freedom, deferring political goals to the longer-term. He
claimed growing contacts between ethnic Azeri and Ahwaz Arab
groups in Iran, and growing tensions with Iran's Kurds. He
described differing approaches to his movement from the IRGC
and MOIS, believing the MOIS protected him from the IRGC
while he was in jail. He asked for USG views about the
ethnic Azeri movement, warned the USG not to use the Azeri
movement as a tool simply to raise pressure on Iran, and
urged the USG to issue more careful statements of support for
ethnic Iranian Azeri desires to enjoy freely their own
language and culture. End Summary.


2. (S) On the margins of an Iran human rights conference in
Istanbul (septel),ConGen Istanbul's NEA "Iran Watcher" met
discreetly with Ali Hamed Iman (strictly protect),an
Iranian-Azeri journalist and activist. Iman was only willing
to meet off the premises of the conference, in the company of
an intermediary. He felt under constant scrutiny from
Iranian security services, which he said were aware of his
travel to Istanbul and possibly surveilling him. Iman was
formerly the editor of a leading Tabriz-based newspaper,
"Tabrik Shams", which the GOI shut down in summer 2006
following widespread protests in northwest Iran in reaction
to the May 2006 publication in a Tehran daily of a derogatory
cartoon of a cockroach representing an Iranian-Azeri. Iman
had written an editorial criticizing the GOI's slow reaction
to condemning that caricature, which led security forces to
arrest and jail him in June 2006. He was freed after several
months but his paper was permanently shut down and he
received a lifetime ban against publishing in Iran. He still
lives in Tabriz, and now publishes "AzerTurk", a monthly
magazine focusing on Iranian-Azeri literature and culture
(www.azarturk.com),which is published in Canada. He is
trying to start up a tourism-oriented organization that will
encourage Iranian-Azeri expatriates to travel back to
northwest Iran for cultural and familial visits and raise
international awareness of Iranian-Azeri culture. Iman was
nervous meeting with us, but he explained that the risk was
worth the benefit of being able to convey to the USG the
challenges the Iranian-Azeri "movement" is facing and of
hearing USG views about ethnic Azeri activism inside Iran.


The Iranian-Azeri "struggle" continues
--------------


3. (C) Iman characterized the Azeri population in northwest
Iran as facing similar economic and political challenges as
other Iranians, while additionally feeling a sense of
suspended momentum in the population's efforts to highlight
to the regime their particular cultural and linguistic
grievances. He characterized the May-June 2006
demonstrations as "an awakening" for the Iranian-Azeri
movement, which he said "surprised and even frightened both
the regime and us" by showing just how widely and deeply in
the region the sense of Azeri ethnicity was felt, and by
showing regime leaders the power that Azeri ethnic identity
has in bringing Iranians to the streets. "It was good news
and bad news for us, because it showed the world that we are
a legitimate ethnic movement, but it also convinced the
regime that it needed to treat us as a threat to stability."
Following the demonstrations the regime jailed hundreds of
ethnic Azeri leaders and activists, including Iman, and did
so again in February 2007 following a second round of smaller
but still widespread demonstrations. As a "precaution,", the
regime again detained known ethnic Azeri leaders in May 2007
and May 2008, to prevent them from leading commemorative
demonstrations.

"The MOIS protected me from the IRGC"
--------------


4. (C) Iman described a GOI that reflexively sees any ethnic
movement inside Iran as a threat against the system, a
perspective shared even by regime leaders who themselves are

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of Azeri ethnicity like Supreme Leader Khamenei, IRGC
Commander Safavi, and several other current GOI Ministers.
The regime recognizes that Iranian Azeris generally were
strong supporters of the Islamic Revolution and of Ayatollah
Khomeini, and are well integrated into Iranian daily life.
Some regime leaders, according to Iman, remain "quietly
sympathetic" to the desire of Iranian-Azeris to enjoy freely
their own language and culture, but "as long as Iran is under
threat of a regime change" even sympathetic regime officials
are afraid to allow any freedom. Some are afraid that giving
freedom of linguistic expression will lead down a slippery
slope of further social or political demands. Other regime
officials do not want to open the door "even a crack" to
allow Turkey any more influence in northwest Iran. "The
result is a policy of oppression, the easiest policy response
for the regime to make."


5. (S) But even in pursuing oppressive tactics against the
Iranian-Azeris, Iman acknowledged, there are nuanced
differences in the way different regime elements operate. He
identified a half-dozen regime security organizations --
IRGC, MOIS, Ministry of Interior forces, Judiciary police,
local and provincial police, and Basiji among them -- that
are involved in monitoring, harassing, and arresting Iranian
Azeri activists. He said the IRGC is by far the toughest.
Iman was arrested in June 2006 by local police who handed him
over to the MOIS "because they didn't want the IRGC to get
its hands on me and kill me." He said the MOIS focused its
questions on the Azeri ethnic movement's leadership and
motives, and seemed most interested in confirming that the
Azeri movement's aims were not regime overthrow or regional
secession. He believes (or was led by his MOIS interrogators
to believe) that the MOIS was resisting intense pressure from
above to turn him over to the IRGC. Iman believes the MOIS
protected him from certain IRGC torture. The MOIS, however,
has continued to make clear its redlines to Iman, the
overstepping of which would lead to renewed detention.
"Every time I return from travel abroad, they ask me to meet
with them at a hotel in Tabriz and explain what I did on my
trip. As long as I have only been attending academic
conferences or doing work with my magazine, they don't detain
me. So far."

Our movement has a spectrum of goals
--------------


6. (C) Asked whether the ethnic Iranian Azeri movement was
unified or diffuse, Iman said the overall movement "is not
one voice or one leader at the moment." He described a
broad, "free-flowing" and flexible ethnic movement, rather
than a rigid pyramid structure or formal political party. He
said most of the "30 million" ethnic Azeris in Iran (comment:
the 2008 CIA World Factbook indicates an Azeri population of
around 16 million, i.e. 24% of the estimated 2008 Iranian
population of 68.9 million inhabitants),simply want to
exercise the right to use and enjoy the Azeri language and
culture freely, including receiving a university-level
education in Azeri. Smaller groups are actively pushing for
more formalized cultural and linguistic equality, for example
by making Azeri an official language of Iran. Some groups
within the movement are more political, and seek degrees of
political and legal autonomy through peaceful achievement of
more federalist treatment by the regime of its ethnic
provinces. The smallest of the groups, Iman explained, seek
full "south Azerbaijan" independence from Iran. These,
however, are fringe groups, which he said are dangerous to
the movement, as they invite the harshest regime crack-down.
The main groups are "organically linked" but not
systematically coordinated. "Sometimes we work together,
sometimes we don't."


7. (C) Iman said he is not involved in the Southern
Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM),a
pro-independence or pro-autonomy group (observers differ over
SANAM's ultimate goals) which reportedly has chapters in
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States. Asked if his
movement received help from inside Turkey, he said no. "We
get no support from Turkish groups." He suggested that
Iranian-Azeris living in Turkey have "a different agenda,"
and admitted he is suspicious of them.


8. (C) Iman said there is a general consensus within the
movement to focus for now on cultural issues. "These are
safer" and allow Iranian-Azeri activists more room to
operate. Since summer 2006, the real near-term goal is to
keep the movement together, functioning, and re-building.
The mid-term goal is to secure more cultural and social
freedoms, focusing on Azeri language and culture. Political
goals should be postponed to the longer-term, he cautioned,

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and violence should never be used to secure such goals. As
long as the movement's goals are modest, moderate and
peaceful, he added, the movement will be able to rely on
quiet support from "friends" inside the GOI. Meanwhile, his
efforts to promote cultural events, disseminate cultural
magazines, and start-up cultural websites, are helping create
a grassroots organization and structure that eventually could
become effective as a political movement.

Helping the Ahwaz, but wary of the Kurds
--------------


9. (C) The Iranian Azeri movement, according to Iman, is the
most successful ethnic rights movement in Iran, because of
its flexible structure and measured aims. "All other ethnic
groups in Iran are rigid and ideological." But some, such as
the Ahwaz Arabs in southwest Iran, have started to make
contact with the ethic Azeri movement, to learn how they are
organized and perhaps follow their model.


10. (C) At the same time, there is growing friction between
Iranian Azeris and Iranian Kurds, Iman warned. He said the
anti-Kurdish feeling in northwest Iran was "explosive", and
that the situation was very sensitive. "It is almost at a
point of violence between us", though he did not identify the
specific cause of the tensions. Asked if the GOI might be
manipulating those tensions to keep both ethnic groups
off-balance and focused on each other rather than the regime,
Iman thought probably not, characterizing the regime as
"smart enough to stay out of it." A regime effort to provoke
Kurdish-Azeri tensions would only lead to anti-regime
backlash by both groups, he felt.

Inside vs. Outside
--------------


11. (C) Noting that this was the first trip he has ever
taken to Turkey, Iman said he enjoys more regular travel to
Canada and Europe. An Iranian-American friend has promised
to help him set up a visa interview this summer at the U.S.
Embassy in Stockholm, on his next trip there. (He said that
posts in the region that issues visas to Iranians, including
Embassy Ankara, ConGen Istanbul, and ConGen Dubai, have a
reputation among many Iranians as being tougher on Iranian
applicants than U.S. Embassies in Western Europe, so many are
now looking to Stockholm, Paris, and elsewhere.)


12. (C) He acknowledged that he is in touch with several
Iranian-Azeri groups in Europe, "but the real struggle is in
Iran, and the real work is what we are doing in Iran." He
admitted there are some tensions between the "outside" groups
and the "inside" groups. Iman criticized most expatriate
groups as doing very little. "They raise some funds, but
that's really it." He said the most active fund-raising
groups are in Germany and Sweden, though few of those
activists ever try to return to Iran. He said he proceeds
cautiously with them, for fear that those groups, or "their
foreign sponsors" will taint his own efforts and put him at
greater risk.

What does Washington want?
--------------


13. (S) Iman underscored that the risk of meeting with a US
diplomat was outweighed by the benefit of using that contact
to better understand USG views of the Azeri ethnic movement
in Iran. He warned that the USG must not try to manipulate
the Iranian-Azeri movement or use it only as a tool to
pressure the regime. He said the movement has been betrayed
in the past by Realpolitik realities, as when the Soviet
Union turned in movement leaders to the Shah and even to
Khomeini, after promising to support Iranian-Azeri autonomy.
"Don't think of this movement as a bargaining chip."
Moreover, he cautioned that "if the U.S. cuts a deal with the
Iranian government, and it does not specifically protect
ethnic groups' rights, the regime will think it has free rein
to crush us." Iman assessed that most Iranian-Azeris believe
USG support for their ethnic and cultural rights is "thin and
self-serving", not genuine.


14. (C) Iman continued his cautionary critique, complaining
that the USG does not focus its attention enough on the
plight of ethnic Azeris in Iran. He claimed the Voice of
America is "run by Monarchists" who only care about ethnic
Persian issues and rarely report on ethnic minorities. The
USG should give more genuine attention to ethnic rights in
Iran, he pleaded. Statements of concerns from Washington or
the UN, spotlighting the denial of Azeri rights to use their
language and practice their culture, are helpful. But they

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must be carefully worded. "Such statements cannot be
associated with regime change or the nuclear program. They
must be statements on ethnic rights that stand alone.
Otherwise the regime will paint us as foreign agents." He
reiterated his primary concern -- that the real motive behind
any new USG support for the ethnic Azeri movement would be to
pressure the regime from within, not because of genuine human
rights-related concerns for Azeris in Iran. "We would
welcome more statements of support, supporting our linguistic
and cultural rights, and our cultural autonomy. But nothing
political, nothing too critical of Tehran."

15. (C) "Support for our goals from the USG is a very
delicate and sensitive issue," Iman continued, "and it is
very risky right now, but it is important to us and something
we want to develop in the longer-run." Iman also probed
about how the USG's Iran Democracy funds work, and whether an
ethnic association or NGO could be a recipient of such funds,
working through a third party, for the purpose (in his case)
of expanding his magazine's circulation, or building up his
tourism website, or building his magazine and website staff's
capacity for internet journalism.


16. (C) We responded to Iman's query about the USG's view of
the Iranian Azeri movement by noting that it is long-standing
USG policy to consider the free expression of cultural
heritage as a fundamental human right; that the USG supports
the aspirations of the Iranian people, regardless of
ethnicity, to live in a society in which their fundamental
freedoms and rights are respected; and that the USG had
called in the past on the Iranian regime to release detained
ethnic Azeris and other Iranian prisoners of conscience. We
underscored, however, that the USG does not support ethnic
groups in Iran that use violence to pursue their goals, and
welcomed Iman's commitment to pursuing peaceful change. We
promised to send Iman information about the Iran Democracy
Fund, though the intermediary who had set up this meeting,
rather than directly.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) Iman, though physically nervous and agitated, came
across as a moderate, thoughtful interlocutor, both in his
words and tone. While we cannot assess independently his
credentials or standing within the Iranian-Azeri ethnic
movement, and we are aware that many pan-Turkish/Azeri
nationalists actively loiter on the regional
human/womens/ethnic rights conference circuit, we assume that
his past arrests at the hands of the GOI and his continuing
efforts to publish pro-Azeri cultural materials afford him
some degree of credibility as a movement activist. His
cautionary plaint that the USG must not treat that ethnic
movement simply as a bargaining chip in any future USG
engagement with, or as a tool for further pressure on, the
Iranian regime tracks closely with similar advice we have
received from other Iranians, i.e., that we not allow the
Iranian population's grievances and aspirations to become
lost in the USG's preeminent focus on the nuclear and
terrorism issues. We also found reasonable his judgment that
focusing efforts for the near-term on raising awareness of
Iranian-Azeri ethnic issues through cultural-focused media
publications and building links with Iranian-Azeri expats
through tourism are safer venues for activism for Iman
personally and for this "movement" organizationally, than in
pursuing a more aggressive political agenda.


18. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, we will forward
background information on the 2008 Iran Democracy Fund and
Iran "small grants" programs to Iman's
intermediary/colleague, who is willing to forward it to him.
WIENER