THE AKP TURNS UP THE HEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000358

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOC PREL TU
SUBJECT: THE AKP TURNS UP THE HEAT

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL SHARON A. WIENER FOR REASONS (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. As the decision by the Constitutional Court
in the closure case looms nearer, AKP (Justice and
Development Party) party officials and sympathizers in
Istanbul have begun to press us more forcefully for visible
USG support for the party. We have been careful in our
responses to these entreaties, explaining that the U.S. is
following a careful line, designed to demonstrate our support
for democracy while avoiding being drawn into Turkish
domestic politics. This argument, which had been sufficient
until early June, no longer appears to resonate and seems to
be viewed, by both the pro- and anti-AKP camps, as a lack of
support for the party. End Summary.


2. (C) Ibrahim Yildirim, member of the Istanbul AKP
administrative board and one of our closest AKP contacts,
approached the CG in mid June to make a direct appeal for
support. He reiterated this plea, contrasting U.S statements
unfavorably with EU comments, at an event hosted by the CG on
June 20. In this discussion, he - accompanied by several
other influential AKP operatives - expressed their concern
about the outcome of the closure case and called for more
vocal support by senior US officials for the AKP. One member
of the group specifically asked whether we had been
approached by retired judges or generals seeking our support
against the AKP. We explained that in our view the ruling
party is clearly the democratically elected government and
noted that we were not plotting with Kemalists to remove the
party from government. Comment: This would have seemed like
an over-wrought conspiracy theory had ANAP (Motherland) party
founder and former Istanbul mayor Bedrettin Dalan not, at
the same event, made a special point of telling the CG that
US policy on the closure case was correct and had been "noted
favorably." End Comment.


3. (C) On June 22, AKP MP Cuneyd Zapsu told the CG the US, by
adopting a "neutral" stance, is in effect supporting the AK
Party's enemies. The CG explained our relations with the
ruling party should not be interpreted as "neutrality," and
noted that in addition to our words, people should be
watching our actions. According to Zapsu, it doesn't matter
that the USG is continuing to have close relations with the
government, has received FM Babacan at senior levels in
Washington, and is talking about democracy and the will of
the voters. "They" (meaning anti-AKP elements in the
military and judiciary) don't pay any attention to that. The
Europeans have spoken, but they don't have any influence on
the people who are trying to shut the AKP down. EU
opposition to the closure case is viewed as a convenient
excuse to keep Turkey out of the EU by criticizing Turkish
democracy. This discounts the impact of criticism emanating
from Brussels. According to Zapsu, only the United States
has influence with those trying to close the party and the
message needs to come from the U.S. military.


4. (C) As for reassuring the opposition here about AKP's true
intentions, Zapsu passionately asked "Have you listened to
what the Prime Minister has been saying the last month?" He
added that Erdogan asks him "What more can I do?" Zapsu
said he knows that the PM is not someone who wants Turkey to
be Iran, that the PM has tried to make that clear and they're
at a loss for what else they can do. Zapsu argued the rest
of the country is not like Istanbul; in Anatolia Erdogan is
viewed as a hero and people are very, very upset about the
closure case.


5. (C) Religiously-oriented civil society leaders without
formal roles in the AKP have also made a point of noting
their concerns with regard to the closure case. TUSKON
Secretary General Mustafa Gunay complained bitterly about the
US failure to show unequivocal support for the ruling party.
He said that in an effort to deal with the closure case
crisis, the AKP and its supporters, in particular TUSKON,
were trying to initiate dialogue with major industrialists
and business leaders to seek their support, but they had been
rebuffed by many. TUSKON's efforts appear to be bearing
fruit with some members of the business community, as TUSIAD
Board member Aldo Kaslowski told the CG "We all feel
responsible for this. We voted for them." Comment: The
AKP's success in reforming the economy during its first term
in office combined with the lack of a secular center right
alternative in the 2007 elections made the AKP the party of
choice for many voters who placed more importance on economic
than social issues. End Comment.


6. (C) Comment: In addition to profound differences between
the ardent secularist and AKP worldview there is also a
significant failure to communicate - both literally in terms
of the dialog TUSKON is attempting to start and figuratively.

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For example, on June 25 PM Erdogan in what was most likely
an attempt to reassure not alarm, told a group of senior
local and expat business figures that Turkey had changed
significantly during the past five years and that under
continued AKP leadership "even more significant changes"
would be made over the next three to five years. Despite
Zapsu's assurance that the PM is doing everything he can to
assure his opponents of his commitment to a secular state,
this type of remark feeds into conspiracy theories and does
nothing to reassure secularists that the AKP isn't planning
profound changes to the Turkish state and society.
Similarly, when the CG asked Zapsu whether there wasn't a
chance that the result would be just the opposite of his goal
if the military and judiciary felt they were being forced to
cater to US wishes, he really didn't have an answer. End
Comment.
WIENER